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FBI agent (intimidating mobster's widow into informing for the government):
"I also have here a report from the IRS. Something about undeclared income
and defrauding the government. That's an additional 10-15 in a federal pen."
Widow:
"Yeah, but Frankie always took care of the taxes."
FBI agent:
"You signed the returns."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Husbands and wives who elect to file joint federal income tax re-
turns are jointly and severally liable for the entire tax due.2 Ninety-nine
percent of married couples who file income tax returns make the elec-
tion to file jointly, and each spouse thereby incurs personal liability for
the other spouse's income taxes.' This Article argues that the rule is
unfair and unjustified and should be repealed.
Part II of the Article describes the nature and scope of the
problems caused by joint and several liability of spouses filing joint re-
turns (hereinafter "joint return liability"). When separation or divorce
1. Married to the Mob (Orion Pictures Corp., 1988).
2. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1982). The Internal Revenue Code states: "[Ihf a joint return is made,
the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be
joint and several." Id.
This rule has been in the statute since 1938, but before that date it was controversial and the
subject of litigation. See infra notes 95-123 and accompanying text.
3. In 1985 there were 47,809,791 joint returns filed, and 895,789 returns of married persons
filing separately. I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME-1985 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, table 1.2, at
16 (1988); id. table 1.3, at 19.
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is involved, the rule of joint return liability often causes an unfair shift-
ing of tax liability from (ex-)husbands to (ex-)wives. Although the stat-
ute itself is gender-neutral, the actual effect of the law is not. An
estimated ninety percent of collections from the "wrong" or nonearning
spouse penalize women.4 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) may col-
lect from either spouse at its pleasure, and apparently chooses its target
simply from the point of view of ease of collection.
If the wife is forced to pay her husband's taxes in such a situa-
tion-and women apparently are forced to do so in thousands of cases
each year-the effect is a coerced transfer of wealth from wife to hus-
band, as if the IRS arbitrarily had chosen the husband's side in the
couple's property settlement. The wife may be harmed seriously by
such collections, because the amount of her joint return liability can
easily exceed any reasonable measure of her ability to pay.
Part III of the Article will describe and discuss the origins of the
4. The term "wife" will be used hereinafter to refer to whichever spouse is forced to pay
taxes on the other spouse's earnings, and "husband" to refer to the spouse whose liability is thus
discharged, unless the context indicates otherwise. The same terms will be used to refer to former
spouses who are divorced, as well as separated spouses, and spouses living together, unless the
context indicates otherwise.
The statute is of course gender-neutral, but the vast majority of the reported innocent spouse
cases (over 90% in 1987) involve wives who are forced to pay their husbands' taxes. See infra note
33. One may suppose that the innumerable instances in which such deficiencies are paid rather
than contested involve a similarly high proportion of women.
The fundamental argument of this Article is that the rule of joint return liability is unfair to
everyone, male or female, who is forced to pay the other spouse's taxes. The argument is grounded
in the basic principle of the income tax that each taxpayer should be liable only according to his or
her own ability to pay. Because the rule has a disproportionately adverse effect on women, how-
ever, both as to frequency of collection and severity of consequences, a strong argument can be
made that the rule is discriminatory in effect.
The effect seems ultimately due not to any discriminatory intent in the tax rule itself, how-
ever, but to the fact that women on average are in an economically inferior position in American
society. Women have less economic independence than men because women have lower average
earnings than men, and fewer women than men are self-employed. See infra note 277 and accom-
panying text. Self-employed persons have much greater opportunity to conceal income and to take
aggressive tax positions. Thus, joint return deficiencies are more likely to be caused by the hus-
band and more likely to be greater in amount than deficiencies caused by the wife. A deficiency
caused by the husband will, on average, be more onerous for the wife to pay than the other way
around because the deficiency is likely to be larger, and because her earnings and ability to pay it
are less. These consequences are aggravated by the high rate of divorce, which has increased enor-
mously the frequency with which such collections are made from ex-spouses since the rule was first
enacted in 1938. See infra note 308.
The larger issues involving women's economic inferiority are beyond the scope of this Article.
Feminists have written a wide body of literature on the subject, however. See, e.g., Williams,
Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989) (citing a number of sources that discuss
women's economic inferiority). It seems clear that the rule of joint return liability contributes to
the "feminization of poverty," and it should be condemned on that ground alone.
5. The IRS keeps no statistics on its collections through joint return liability whether by
gender or otherwise, but it may be estimated that there are at least 10,000 such instances per year.
For a way to arrive at this estimate, see infra note 34.
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rule of joint return liability. Before Congress enacted joint return liabil-
ity in 1938, the Treasury sought to impose the rule by administrative
decision. Taxpayers challenged the rule in the Ninth Circuit case Cole
v. Commissioner.' In Cole the Government unsuccessfully argued that
the rule was required by administrative necessity, because the Govern-
ment would be unable to determine the separate incomes and expenses
of the spouses from the aggregated numbers reported on joint returns.7
The Cole court held that, at least in cases in which the spouses could
demonstrate their respective net incomes, joint return liability would
deny unjustifiably each taxpayer's right to be taxed only in proportion
to his or her own income, in accordance with ability to pay.'
Three years after the government's 1935 defeat in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, Congress overruled the Cole decision by enacting the rule of joint
return liability, and offered as its sole 'explanation the same claim of
administrative necessity that the Ninth Circuit had rejected.9 This sec-
tion will argue that the Ninth Circuit's reasoning was correct and that
the rule of joint return liability was not then, and cannot now be, justi-
fied by the government's arguments.
Part IV of the Article analyzes and criticizes the innocent spouse
rules that Congress enacted in 1971 as section 6013(e) of the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code).10 These rules exonerate the wife from the
general rule of joint return liability under certain very limited circum-
stances. Relief is available only for omissions of income and for illegal
claims of deduction, credit, or basis, and then only if the deficiency is
substantial.1 ' In addition, the wife must prove that she did not know
and had no reason to know of the husband's illegal claims in order to
obtain relief..2 This innocence requirement has proved particularly
troublesome in application, and has led to inconsistent and unpredict-
able case law.
Commentators generally agree that the innocent spouse rules are
overly restrictive and foreclose relief in many deserving cases.'" Unlike
most commentary, this Article does not recommend that the innocent
spouse rules should be amended to provide greater relief, but rather
that the rule of joint return liability should be repealed. Amending the
statute does not provide a principled means of solving the current
6. Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935).
7. Id. at 486-88.
8. Id. at 487-88.
9. See infra Part III(F).
10. See I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
11. Id. § 6013(e)(1), (2) (Supp. V 1987).
12. Id. § 6013(e)(1)(C).
13. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
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problems because the concept of innocence in which the rules are
grounded is simply inappropriate as a basis upon which to grant relief.
Current law places an unrealistic and unjustifiable duty on the wife,
similar to that of an auditor or return preparer, to examine the joint
return and inquire into questionable items.14
Part V of the Article considers two other possible rationales for jus-
tifying the rule of joint return liability, although neither the Treasury
nor Congress has articulated any other rationale than the administra-
tive difficulty of calculating proportional liability. First, contrary to
widely held belief, the tax benefits that married taxpayers may enjoy by
filing jointly cannot justify joint return liability as a quid pro quo be-
cause in many cases the taxpayers receive no benefit from joint filing,
and for those who do benefit, the amount saved bears no relation to the
amount of liability incurred. 5 Also, the benefit, if any, is usually en-
joyed by the husband, while the liability is borne by the wife.'"
Given United States divorce statistics, no theory of economic unity
of the family can justify making the economic resources of both spouses
available to pay the taxes of either one. There is no evidence that
couples are indifferent as to which spouse holds legal ownership of their
property, nor is it even clear that couples generally share all their assets
during marriage. After separation or divorce any such sharing between
spouses usually is terminated, and their economic interests often be-
come adverse. If joint return liability applies, however, the tax law still
treats them as if their economic interests were identical. 17
Part VI of the Article contrasts the rules for taxing married couples
in the United States with corresponding rules in other countries. No
developed country in the world except the United States permits its
government as a general rule to force wives to pay their husbands'
taxes. Further, there is an international trend to limit or abolish any
remaining vestiges of earlier rules that imposed such liability.
Part VI also briefly reviews United States state income tax law con-
cerning joint returns and discusses the great diversity of rules at the
state level. Several states do not impose joint return liability at all,
many follow the federal rules, and others impose joint return liability
without providing innocent spouse relief. California is unique in provid-
ing much more generous relief than the federal rules.
Part VII of the Article discusses the consequences of repealing joint
14. See infra Part IV(B)(3), (4).
15. See infra Part V(A)(2).
16. See infra Part V(A)(3).
17. Application of joint return liability implies that couples are indifferent as to which
spouse's assets are used to satisfy a deficiency. See infra Part V(B) (refuting the validity of this
implication).
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return liability and the problems of implementing a regime of separate
proportional liability. This section argues that no changes in the struc-
ture of tax rates would be necessary, and that the current rules for re-
turns of married persons filing separately are generally adequate for the
purpose of allocating the separate incomes and deductions of the
spouses on joint returns. In the interest of fairness, however, and in
order to minimize the need for recordkeeping, personal deductions and
dependent exemptions should be allocated to the spouses in proportion
to their adjusted gross incomes.
Part VII also argues that the repeal of joint return liability will
create little or no abuse potential for tax avoidance, and that the cur-
rent remedy of transferee liability is sufficient to police any such
problems. Transferee liability is much more fair than joint return liabil-
ity because it applies only if the husband is insolvent and cannot pay,
thus forcing the IRS to exhaust its remedies against him before turning
to the wife. In addition, the wife's liability cannot exceed the value of
the property transferred, which limits her liability to the amount by
which she actually benefited from her husband's tax delinquency.
II. THE PROBLEM
The following case illustrates a typical and all too common problem
under current law. Robert and Anna18 filed joint returns for the years
1983, 1984, and 1985, reporting about 35,000 dollars of taxable income
each year. Anna, a German national and United States resident, earned
a salary of about 12,000 dollars per year as a school teacher. Robert
earned fees as a freelance photographer. Taxes were withheld from
Anna's salary, but not from Robert's fees. Robert prepared and filed the
joint returns each year and assured Anna that all the taxes were paid.
In fact, he paid only a small part of the taxes due each year on his
income. In addition, Robert's business deductions were later disallowed.
Robert failed to appear at scheduled appointments with IRS auditors to
defend the deductions, however, and also failed to tell Anna of his
problems with the IRS.
In 1986 Robert left the marital home, and the couple has remained
separated. Anna continues to live in the couple's condominium and pro-
vides the sole support for their ten-year old son. The couple has no
savings. Robert never has made any child support or alimony payments.
In 1987 the IRS filed a notice of lien against the couple's condominium
and levied upon Anna's salary to collect the unpaid taxes, leaving her
only one hundred dollars per week out of her salary on which to live.
18. The Author has altered the names and some details to prevent identification of the
taxpayers.
1990]
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The IRS claims that Anna owes over 12,000 dollars in back taxes,
interest, and penalties, which is more than an entire year's income for
her, and which she cannot pay except by selling her home. All the
amounts due are because of Robert's income and disallowed deductions.
Anna's own share of the taxes was paid fully through withholding. Nev-
ertheless, the IRS can collect Robert's taxes from Anna because she
signed joint returns with him.
Anna knows where Robert lives and that he still works as a photog-
rapher. In addition, Robert has a savings account and now has regular
earnings that can be levied upon. His income is substantial, and he has
a much greater ability to pay than Anna. Nevertheless, Anna has been
unable to persuade the IRS to try to collect from him. Apparently the
sole reason collection is being made from Anna alone is that Anna's
salary was easier for the IRS to reach at the time collection proceedings
began.
Anna also has been unsuccessful in seeking an IRS review of the
disallowed deductions. The deductions appear in fact to be legitimate
and allowable, but Robert has refused to cooperate. Without Robert's
records Anna probably will not succeed in establishing his expenses
even if she does obtain a hearing, because the deficiency is presump-
tively correct, and she will have the burden of disproving it.
A. Fairness and Ability to Pay
Anna is justifiably resentful because joint return liability violates
the most basic principle of a fair income tax: the right of taxpayers to
be taxed only according to their own actual net income and ability to
pay. Anna's own taxes were paid in full. Further, Robert's income and
tax liability are far greater than Anna's. The IRS's collection efforts
bear no relation at all to her ability to pay and are ruinous for her.
Except for joint return liability and the related problem of commu-
nity property liability," income taxes are assessed and collected on an
19. A wife who resides in a community property jurisdiction is subjected to liability for one-
half of her husband's taxes under the doctrine of Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Seaborn
construed the family property law in community property states (California, Nevada, Washington,
Idaho, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, and since 1987, Wisconsin) to create a separate
liability of each spouse for one-half of the tax on the income of the other. The Court based this
construction on the theory that all earnings during marriage inure to the marital community and
are therefore owned by and taxable to each spouse in equal amounts. This form of liability does
not depend upon filing a joint return and results automatically from residence in a community
property jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971) (holding wife liable
out of her separate property for one-half the taxes due on her husband's earnings, which were
community property under Louisiana law although no returns were filed).
A spouse cannot gain protection from this form of liability even by filing separately without
first dissolving the community of property. See, e.g., Shoenhair v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 576
(1941) (holding that a valid oral agreement under Arizona law between spouses that the husband's
324 [Vol. 43:317
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individual basis. The income tax system is elaborately designed to re-
flect the individual taxpayer's actual ability to pay. Indeed, this design
often is extolled as the tax system's chief virtue: it is the fairest method
of taxation. The rates of tax on net income are progressive for each
individual. 0 A myriad of deductions, credits, and exclusions are allowa-
ble in order to ensure that taxable income reflects the taxpayer's true
economic gain for the taxable year. The entire elaborate structure is
undercut when one taxpayer is required to pay the taxes of another,
without limit, and without regard to ability to pay. In these circum-
stances, the income tax can become the most unfair of all methods of
taxation.
Anna not only resents her plight; she is astonished that the United
States imposes joint return liability at all. In her native Germany, most
married persons elect to file jointly and receive a tax advantage from
doing so. In the event of an underpayment, however, the government is
not permitted to collect more tax from either spouse than the amount
that is proportional to individual income.21 Under the German model,
not only is liability limited to the tax on her income, but the rate ad-
vantage of filing joint returns is preserved.
B. Notice
Most Americans probably would share Anna's astonishment. It
seems unlikely that many women are aware of the liability they assume
on joint returns." Unless a woman is unusually sophisticated in tax
matters, she may find it hard to believe that she could be forced to pay
her husband's taxes simply because she was married to him at the time
the income was earned. No warning appears anywhere on the individual
income tax return Form 1040. There is a warning in the Instructions to
Form 1040,3 but unless the wife prepares the return herself, she will
income from the practice of law would be his separate property prevented taxation of one-half of
such earnings to the wife). The Code provides limited relief for the innocent spouse from commu-
nity property liability, analogous in many respects to relief under I.R.C. § 6013(e). See I.R.C. § 66
(1982 & Supp. V 1987).
A discussion of these problems, which are historically unrelated to the problem of joint return
liability, is beyond the scope of this Article. For discussions of the problem of community property
liability, see Minnick, The Innocent Spouse Doctrine: The Need for Reform and Planning Alter-
natives in the State of Texas, 66 TAXES 56 (1988), and Murray, Problems of Taxation of the
Income of Spouses in the Context of Divorce and Separation, 14 CoroMUNITY PROP. J. 20 (1987).
20. The exception to this rule is the new "Kiddie Tax" under § 1(i) of the Code, which taxes
unearned income of children under 14 at the highest rate of tax applicable to either parent. I.R.C.
§ 1(i) (Supp. V 1987).
21. See infra notes 336-37 and accompanying text.
22. In an informal canvassing of nonlawyer friends, the Author could find no one who was
aware of the rule at all.
23. Even if the wife does read the Instructions, she easily could miss the warning, which
1990]
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have no occasion to consult the Instructions. The warning fails to men-
tion that joint liability extends to items that later are disallowed by the
IRS and even to items that do not appear on the return at all.24
C. Innocent Spouse Relief
Recognizing that collections under joint return liability may be at
least sometimes unfair, Congress in 1971 provided relief from joint re-
turn liability in certain limited circumstances by enacting the so called
"innocent spouse" rules. 5 Relief is available only for tax items of the
other spouse that are "grossly erroneous"26 and only if such items result
in an understatement exceeding 500 dollars. The seeker of innocent
spouse status has the burden of proving her innocence:28 she must prove
that at the time of filing the joint return she did not know, and had no
reason to know, of the existence of her husband's grossly erroneous tax
appears on page 7 of the 1989 Instructions to the federal Form 1040. Preceding it is a section
entitled "Filing Status," which compares filing statuses by rates alone.
Immediately following this section of the Instructions is the section entitled "Married Filing
Joint Return," which contains the warning. The warning in its context, is as follows:
A husband and wife may file a joint return even if only one had income or if they did not
live together all year. However, both persons must sign the return and both are responsible.
This means that if one spouse does not pay the tax due, the other may have to.
If you file a joint return for 1989, you may not, after the due date for filing that return,
amend that return to file as married filing a separate return.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPT'T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONs FOR FORM 1040 7 (1989).
24. The innocent lay reader of these instructions who is cautioned that he or she may be
responsible for "any tax due on a joint return" if the other spouse fails to pay, will naturally think
only of the bottom line shown on the return. This conclusion is in accord with common sense. One
does not normally sign papers obligating oneself to pay another's debts in uncertain, undisclosed,
and unlimited amounts.
25. See I.R.C. § 6013(e) (Supp. V 1987). Section 6013(e) states in pertinent part:
(1) In general.
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, if-
(A) a joint return has been made under this section for a taxable year,
(B) on such return there is a substantial understatement of tax attributable to grossly
erroneous items of one spouse,
(C) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return he or she did not know, and
had no reason to know, that there was such substantial understatement, and
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other
spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such substantial
understatement,
then the other spouse shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and
other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such liability is attributable to such sub-
stantial understatement.
Id. For analysis and criticism of the innocent spouse rules, see infra Part IV.
26. Section 6013(e)(2) defines "grossly erroneous" items as (1) omitted gross income, or (2) a
claim of deduction, credit, or basis in an amount for which there is no basis in fact or law. I.R.C. §
6013(e)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
27. Id. § 6013(e)(3). For a discussion of the additional dollar limitations for items of deduc-
tion, credit, or basis under § 6013(e)(4), see infra Part IV(A)(8).
28. Lessinger v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 824, 838 (1985).
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item. In addition, she must prove that it would be inequitable for the
IRS to tax her for the grossly erroneous item;29 to show such inequity
she must prove that she did not derive any significant benefit from such
item over and above ordinary support.30 Even if the wife succeeds in
proving her innocent spouse status as to one or more grossly erroneous
items, she remains liable for all other items of her husband on the joint
return.31
In Anna's case, the innocent spouse rules afford no relief. Because
the return was correct as filed, there was no "grossly erroneous" item.32
D. Incidence of Collection from Wrong Spouse
Joint return liability has caused and continues to cause much liti-
gation. There are about 300 reported cases since 1971 of taxpayers con-
testing the imposition of joint and several liability by claiming relief as
innocent spouses, making section 6013(e) among the most frequently
litigated sections in the Code. Of these cases, over ninety percent in-
volve women petitioning the courts for relief from liability for their hus-
bands' taxes, and more than two-thirds of these women have been
unsuccessful. 33 These numbers do not begin to convey the true extent of
the problem. Most collections under section 6013(d) probably are less
than 500 dollars and therefore too small to qualify for innocent spouse
relief. Many other collections do not qualify because of some other re-
striction on relief or simply because the wife does not have the knowl-
edge or means to litigate.
The IRS does not compile statistics of collections based upon joint
return liability, and therefore it is difficult to state the incidence of such
collections with any degree of accuracy. A reasonable estimate can be
made from indirect evidence and a certain amount of guesswork, how-
ever, and on that basis it appears that at least 10,000 divorced or sepa-
rated women per year may be forced to pay some part or all of their
(ex-)husbands' taxes.34
29. See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C), (D) (Supp. V 1987).
30. See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
31. See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
32. Somewhat perversely, Anna would be in a better position if Robert fraudulently had
omitted his income from the return altogether. By filing the return accurately, he foreclosed Anna
from relief.
33. There are 299 reported cases since 1971 in which § 6013(e) was an issue, for an average of
some 18 cases per year. In 1987 there were 32 such cases. Using the cases reported during 1987 as a
sample, only 2 out of 32 petitioners were men, both of whom lost; 21 out of the 30 women petition-
ers that year also lost. List of reported decisions on file with Author.
34. The rate of divorce in 1981 was 22.6 per 1000 married women per year, which means that
about two percent of all married couples divorced per year. Thus approximately six percent of all
married couples will be divorced during the three years that returns remain open after filing. Ap-
proximately 3,000,000 joint returns are found to have deficiencies each year. It may be estimated
1990]
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The revenue loss from repeal of joint return liability would not nec-
essarily be as great as these figures might suggest. In most cases collec-
tion can (and should) be made from the husband. Thus, the major part
of any revenue loss probably would result from the administrative cost
of the extra efforts the IRS would be required to make to find and col-
lect from the husband. If the husband is insolvent and cannot pay, the
IRS often still could collect from the wife as a transferee in situations
in which it now relies upon joint return liability.35
E. Effect on Separated and Divorced Persons
If the couple is separated or divorced, the deficiency assessment
based upon joint return liability may arrive after the couple already has
settled their division of property. Imposition of joint return liability
against the wife at that point has the effect of an arbitrary ex parte
revision of the property agreement. Unless the wife can qualify for in-
nocent spouse status, there is little she can do.
The IRS has no duty to pursue the husband first, and the wife has
no right to require the IRS to do so at any time.3 6 Procedural difficul-
ties seem to prevent the wife from joining the husband as a party to any
tax litigation itself. No procedure is available for impleading the hus-
band in the Tax Court, nor is there any way to force the IRS at the
appeals level to assess or collect the tax from the husband.
that in two percent of these, or 60,000 cases, the couple filing jointly will be divorced when the
deficiency notice is received. This figure is conservative, because it neither takes account of separa-
tions that do not lead to divorce within three years, nor of cases of simple nonpayment of tax.
Of these 60,000 cases, it is estimated that about half can be settled amicably between the (ex-)
spouses, leaving perhaps 30,000 cases in which the IRS must choose whether to pursue one spouse
or both. In at least half of these cases, the nonearner will be forced to pay taxes on the other
(ex-)spouse's income, and of that estimated 15,000 cases, more than half will involve wives forced
to pay their (ex-)husbands' taxes. Telephone interview with Norman Fox, IRS Chief of Operations
Research (Aug. 9, 1988). If the ratio of women to men is the same 9:1 as women to men claiming
innocent spouse status, then the incidence would be about 13,000 cases per year. The IRS keeps no
statistics on the incidence of innocent spouse relief granted or rejected at the administrative level,
and it is unclear what effect that should have on these estimates.
35. See I.R.C. § 6901 (1982). For a discussion of transferee liability, see infra Part VII(B). If
property is transferred to the wife without adequate consideration at a time when the husband is
insolvent due to tax liabilities, whether they have been assessed or not, the transfer may be set
aside under state fraudulent conveyance law, or federal bankruptcy law, if applicable.
36. See, e.g., Francis v. Commissioner, No. 7549-86-S (T.C. May 4, 1987) (finding no legal
basis for taxpayer's conditioning his agreement to $308 deficiency by insisting that the IRS collect
half from the wife, who had received half the refund for that year).
37. The husband might possibly become a codefendant for contribution in a refund suit
against the United States in district court, or perhaps an involuntary plaintiff, but there appear to
be no reported cases of anyone making such an attempt. In any event, the necessity of paying the
tax first before suing in district court may be an insuperable obstacle.
One may suspect that the same obstacle often has prevented the wife from obtaining a jury
trial, which is available in district courts but not in the Tax Court.
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Having signed a joint return, the innocent spouse cannot avoid this
problem even by the most careful planning. A property settlement
agreement that specifies which spouse is to pay contingent tax deficien-
cies will not bind the IRS, which remains free to pursue whichever
spouse seems most convenient for purposes of collection;s
F. Economic Hardship
The consequences of joint return liability may be particularly harsh
for separated and divorced women, because women typically suffer eco-
nomic hardship as a result of divorce. The additional burden of paying
her ex-husband's taxes is likely to be especially onerous and unfair
when the wife's ability to pay is at its lowest. Since the advent of no-
fault divorce in most states during the 1970s, the average size of ali-
mony, child support, and property awards to women has decreased.39
Women's average standard of living often declines substantially after
divorce. Indeed, divorce has recently been described as a financial dis-
aster for most women. 0 By contrast, the standard of living for men gen-
erally does not decline to the same extent, if at all.4 '
The decline in size of women's divorce settlements may in part be
due to changing perceptions of employment opportunities for women;
38. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Commissioner, 55 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1472 (1988) (innocent
spouse case caused by the husband's investment in a fraudulent tax shelter). There, the couple's
separation agreement provided that the husband was to pay any contingent taxes, but it did not
prevent the IRS from attempting to collect from the wife instead. The Tax Court found the wife
"innocent" under a traditional § 6013(e) analysis, giving little weight to the separation agreement.
Id.
39. See S. HEWLETT, A LESSER LIFE: THE MYTH OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN AMERICA 55-59, 61
(1985).
40. According to Stanford sociologist Lenore Weitzman:
[D]ivorce is a financial catastrophe for most women: in just one year they experience a dra-
matic decline in income and a calamitous drop in their standard of living. It is difficult to
imagine how they survive the severe economic deprivation: every single expenditure that one
takes for granted-clothing, food, housing, heat-must be cut to one-half or one-third of what
one is accustomed to. . . . [Ilt is not surprising that divorced women report more stress and
less satisfaction with their lives than any other group of Americans.
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony
and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1252 (1981), quoted in S. HEWLETT, supra note
39, at 66-67. Weitzman's claim that divorced women's standard of living declines by 30% to 70%
or more seems exaggerated, however, because it is measured by per capita income. Thus for a
family of four, if the husband pays alimony and child support equal to half of his income, and the
wife earns nothing, the husband's standard of living after divorce will apparently have doubled,
and the wife's standard of living will have declined by 33% according to the per capita method of
calculation.
41. See McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women
and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 352 (1987). McLindon states that men's standard of living gener-
ally increases after divorce, but this seems unlikely, because it is based upon the same per capita
method of calculation criticized in the preceding footnote. Moreover, the husband's loss of the
wife's unpaid household services is not considered.
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the average earnings for women, however, are only about sixty-five per-
cent of the average earnings for men." The median household income
for women with no husband present is only about half that of men with
no wife present.43
In light of the general economic inequality of the spouses and the
typically poor financial condition of women after divorce relative to
men, it seems particularly unfair to hold women liable for their hus-
bands' taxes. In doing so, the IRS in effect coerces a further transfer of
wealth from wife to husband.
G. Effect on Married Couples Living Together
Joint return liability should be abolished for everyone, including
married couples who are living together. When joint return liability is
the only avenue to collection, it can be just as harmful to women who
still are living with their husbands as to those who are divorced. A defi-
ciency that is too large for the husband to pay almost necessarily im-
plies some financial irresponsibility on his part.44
In such situations, it is difficult to see any fair policy reason for
adding to the wife's burdens by forcing her to pay her husband's taxes
out of her own money, which may be all the couple has left to live on.
Or worse, she may wish to divorce her husband, possibly even because
of his financial irresponsibility, but find that she lacks the means to
support herself because the IRS has confiscated her property and levied
upon her salary.
Joint return liability is not needed to prevent collusive tax avoid-
ance between spouses. If, for example, the husband transfers property
to the wife in order to safeguard it from the IRS and is insolvent as a
result, the wife will be liable as a transferee under general rules that
apply to all taxpayers, quite independently of filing status.45
Finally, if relief from joint return liability were limited to persons
who are separated or divorced at the time of assessment or collection,46
wives would be given an incentive to break up their marriages if they
foresee tax problems in the future. Such an incentive would be unfortu-
42. According to the New York Times, a Rand Corp. survey found in 1986 that working
women's average wages in 1986 were 65% of men's average wages, up from 60% in 1980. The
survey predicted that women would make at least 74% of men's wages by the year 2000. Women
Gain Ground in Wages, Study Shows, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1989, at Cl, col. 3.
43. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1989, at 441 (1989) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
44. For example, he may have claimed illegitimate tax shelter losses and later suffered finan-
cial reverses leaving insufficient funds to pay the deficiency, or he may have failed to report income
later gambled away or otherwise squandered.
45. See infra Part VII(B).
46. It is, however, the rule in France. See infra Part VI(A)(1).
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nate from the point of view of public policy.
H. Contribution
If the wife is forced to pay, her only remedy is to sue her (ex-)hus-
band afterwards for contribution, 7 or to enforce the terms of their
property settlement, in the event that it provides for allocation of con-
tingent tax liabilities. In partial justification of its decision denying her
innocent spouse relief, at least one court cited this right of an aggrieved
woman.48 Suits for contribution are extraordinarily rare, however, prob-
ably because of the high cost of litigation.9
47. The wife who has paid more than her share of a joint tax obligation generally may bring
an action in equity for contribution against her husband under state law according the same legal
principles as apply to other kinds of joint obligations. See, e.g., Murchison v. Murchison, 219 Cal.
App. 2d 600, 33 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1963) (holding that a husband is entitled to offset the amount he is
forced to pay for his wife's share of a joint tax against the unpaid balance of the property settle-
ment he owes her); see also Chappell v. Chappell, 253 So. 2d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Bormaster v. Bormaster, 177 Kan. 1, 274 P.2d 757 (1954); Miller v. Miller, 62 Misc. 2d 755, 310
N.Y.S.2d 18 (Civ. Ct. 1970). It is noteworthy that all the reported cases involve men suing women.
48. See Cohen v. Commissioner, 54 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 944 (1987). Like Shapiro v.
Commissioner, 55 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1472 (1988), this was an innocent spouse case in
which the husband had invested in a fraudulent tax shelter. The taxpayer protested that her hus-
band was not a party in court and had not even been assessed by the IRS. The Tax Court an-
swered that she had a right of contribution against him and that because the couple's property
settlement was not yet complete, the joint tax liability simply constituted one more item to be
divided. Id. at 947.
49. If a woman is unable to collect on her right to contribution, she is denied a bad debt
deduction. The Tax Court has twice upheld the IRS's disallowance of a wife's claim for a nonbusi-
ness bad debt deduction in this situation, on the ground that it would circumvent the prohibition
against deduction of federal income taxes. See Rude v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 165, 170-75 (1967).
In Rude the husband had left the country, and the wife's right to contribution for his share of joint
taxes that she paid in full was uncollectible. The bad debt deduction was denied as an indirect
deduction of a federal tax. Id. The Tax Court followed the Rude decision in Haynes v. Commis-
sioner, 27 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1531 (1968).
The decisional law in this area, however, is of doubtful validity. It makes no difference gener-
ally for purposes of the nonbusiness bad debt deduction under § 166(d), what use the borrower
makes of the loan proceeds. If the debt becomes worthless and the lender has a basis in the debt, it
is deductible even if the borrower uses the proceeds for an expenditure that is nondeductible to
himself, to the lender, or both. Bad debt status erases the tax character of the underlying
obligation.
The Rude decision was inconsistent with prior law in this respect. See Martin v. Commis-
sioner, 38 T.C. 188 (1962). The Tax Court in Martin held that the taxpayer who paid material-
man's liens on his personal residence, satisfying contractor's obligation, was subrogated to
materialman's claims against insolvent contractor. Thus, the deduction was allowed under § 166(d)
despite the fact that the expenditures were for the construction of his personal residence. Two
years after the Rude decision, the Treasury in effect reversed its position in Rev. Rul. 69-411,
1969-2 C.B. 177. In the ruling, the taxpayer who had received probate assets thereby became sec-
ondarily liable for, and paid, the share of estate taxes owed by an insolvent beneficiary of the
decedent's life insurance. The Treasury held that, because the taxpayer was subrogated to the
executor's claim against the insurance beneficiary, a valid debt arose by operation of law that was
worthless in taxpayer's hands and therefore deductible under § 166(d). It did not matter that the
underlying obligation was a nondeductible tax. Id.
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I. Public Policy
Joint return liability is not only unfair; it is also bad public policy.
If spouses desire to protect themselves from joint return liability, the
only way they can do so is to refuse to sign a joint return. The husband
may take this refusal, which will cost him an increase in taxes, as a
statement that his wife either does not trust him in financial matters or
does not expect to be with him much longer, or both. No other likely
reason exists for her refusal to sign a joint return. Existing joint return
rules give her an unpleasant choice between endangering her economic
interests or her marriage."
III. ORIGINS OF JOINT RETURN LIABILITY
Joint and several liability of each spouse for the entire tax due on a
joint return has been the law for more than fifty. years.' It is so familiar
a part of the tax landscape that its origins and rationale scarcely ever
are questioned. Yet the historical foundations of the doctrine are sur-
prisingly unsound.
The early income tax systems in Europe generally were based on
the matrimonial property law of the same period. Thus, for example,
when family law consisted of the old type of community property re-
gime under which the husband had sole power of administration, the
tax law generally followed suit and required joint taxation with the hus-
band primarily or solely responsible for payment of the tax on both
incomes. Such was the case in Sweden, France, and Germany. The first
income tax in England, introduced in 1799, also followed the matrimo-
nial property regime of that period. Under the common law, the wife's
property (and debts) were those of the husband, and the tax law re-
quired the husband to report and pay the tax on both incomes. As the
matrimonial property laws evolved in each country to provide women
with more freedom to manage their own property, legislators encoun-
tered pressure to make women more responsible for their own taxes.
The results have been divergent in each country.52
For a more detailed discussion of Rude, see Beck, The Deductibility of a Worthless Right to
Contribution for Joint Income Taxes: The Mistaken Line of Cases Under Rude v. Commissioner,
9 VA. TAX REv. 313 (1989). There the Author suggests that the husband should be liable for tax on
discharge of indebtedness income in the same amount as the wife's bad debt deduction. Partial
relief would thereby be provided to the wife, and to that extent the tax liability would be shifted
back to the husband. Both results seem required under current principles of law, without any need
for legislation.
50. In the case of community property liability, the situation is even worse. The wife cannot
protect herself by filing separately, and she apparently cannot protect herself at all except by
dissolving the community of interest or by divorcing. See supra note 19.
51. This liability was created by the Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476.
52. See generally Dulude, Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison of Canadian, American,
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When the present United States income tax law was adopted in
1913, the tax law followed the prevailing matrimonial property law of
the period, except for that of the community property states.5 Separate
returns were mandatory for each individual subject to the tax, probably
because married women already had the right to manage their own
property in the common-law states.5 In contrast to the situation in Eu-
rope, joint returns were introduced in the United States after separate
returns, in 1918.15 Joint returns were not adopted in order to conform
with matrimonial property law, but rather were and remain optional.
They appear to have been introduced for the sole purpose of conve-
nience, both to taxpayers and to the Treasury.5 6
Congress did not enact joint and several liability for joint returns
until 1938,5  although the Bureau of Internal Revenue began insisting
upon it in 1923,58 some five years after the introduction of joint returns.
Again contrary to the situation in Europe, joint return liability in the
United States originally was not based on any underlying matrimonial
property law. In fact, it appears that the Treasury originally invented
the doctrine out of whole cloth, without authority either in legislation
or in the common law.
A. Common Law
At common law, the husband was liable for the wife's debts, but
the wife was never liable personally for the debts of the husband. The
British, French and Swedish Law, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 67 (1985).
53. If it had been thought necessary to respect the matrimonial property law of the commu-
nity property states for purposes of taxing earned income, the result probably should have been as
in Europe: mandatory joint returns with the husband primarily responsible for payment as sole
administrator of the community property. This would have been a far more realistic interpretation
of community property law than the Poe v. Seaborn decision, which imputed half of the husband's
earned income to the wife. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Also, it would not have created
the intolerable disparities in the level of tax burden between the states which arose as a
consequence.
Apparently, no other income tax system in the world today except that in the United States
imputes earned income from one spouse to the other on the ground of community property law,
including Spain, France, and Mexico, from which our state community property laws derive. Cf. F.
Sura v. M.N.R., 62 D.T.C. 1005 (1957). The Canadian Supreme Court held that a Quebec taxpayer
was not permitted to split his income with his wife through community property law. Id.
54. Separate returns were also the rule under the first federal income tax imposed during the
Civil War. The separate return was almost invariably that of the husband alone, however, which
included the income of his wife and children to the extent that the common law made him sub-
stantially the owner of their earnings. Such separate returns were in substance joint returns of
family income, as in the United Kingdom. See G. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND ExcIsE
TAX OF THE UNITED STATES 302-03 (1863).
55. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 223, 40 Stat. 1057, 1074.
56. See, e.g., Fawsett v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 139, 141 (1934).
57. See Revenue Act of 1938, supra note 51.
58. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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wife's property nevertheless could be used to satisfy the husband's
debts because the wife's property belonged to the husband. As Justice
Holmes noted in Hoeper v. Tax Commission: "[At common law] hus-
band and wife are one, and that one the husband; and.., as the hus-
band took the wife's chattels he was liable for her debts."5
After the states enacted married women's property laws in the pe-
riod before the Civil War, the trend was toward separate liability so
that neither spouse was liable for the debts of the other.6 Marriage was
not a partnership under the common law, and a creditor could not hold
a woman liable for the debts of her husband under a theory of agency. 1
In fact, several states actually prohibited the creation of partnerships
between husband and wife for the very purpose of protecting the wife
against creditors.2
The filing of a joint return alone does not create a partnership or
conveyance of property between the spouses. State courts determining
ownership rights to a tax refund from a joint return consistently have
held that the filing of a joint return does not constitute a conveyance of
property between husband and wife, create a joint enterprise or a part-
nership, or alter prior underlying property rights between the spouses.6
Finally, although the effect of joint and several liability is to make
each spouse a kind of surety or guarantor for the taxes of the other on a
joint return, this obligation could not be created by a joint return under
any theory of common law. A joint return is not a bill or note, and the
government advances nothing in reliance on the guaranty of the cosign-
ers of the return, unless the tax saving, if any, from filing jointly is
viewed as such an advance.6 4
59. 284 U.S. 206, 219 (1931).
60. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 209-11 (2d ed. 1985). Despite the enact-
ment of women's property laws, the common-law doctrine of marital unity judicially survived until
the end of the nineteenth century, subverting the efforts of reform legislation. See generally N.
BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW
YORK 200-23 (1982).
61. Liability did attach, however, to purchases of household necessities. See N. BASCH, supra
note 60, at 51-52.
62. See C. JONES, SPLIT INCOME AND SEPARATE SPHERES: TAx LAW AND GENDER ROLES IN THE
1940's, at 37-38 (1987) (Institute for Legal Studies, Legal History Program, Working Papers Series
2). Note, moreover, that even if marriage did create a partnership, for federal tax purposes each
partner would still be liable for tax only for his or her own ratable share of partnership income.
I.R.C. §§ 701, 702 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
63. See Annotation, Right of Surviving Spouse to Tax Refund Resulting from Joint Income
Tax Return, 67 A.L.R.3d 1038, 1038-39 (1975).
64. Even under such a theory, the advance for which each spouse stands as a surety would be
limited at most to the tax saving from filing jointly as compared to filing separately. By contrast,
joint and several liability extends to the entire tax due on the return, not just to the tax saving.
Note also that the quasi-suretyship created by the joint return is in another respect far more
onerous than the analogy with the law of joint obligations might suggest. Courts routinely have
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B. Joint Returns: One Taxpayer or Two?
The joint return has been authorized since the Revenue Act of
1918. ' The Revenue Act of 1921 clarified the 1918 Act, stating that a
husband and wife may either file returns individually, or include "[t]he
income of each ... in a single joint return, in which case the tax shall
be computed on the aggregate income."66 The 1921 Act was silent, how-
ever, as to allocation of the tax liability between husband and wife. This
question was uncertain and controversial for twenty years until Con-
gress settled the matter by enacting joint and several liability of the
spouses in the Revenue Act of 1938.7
The allocation of liability was not the only uncertainty regarding
the effects of filing a joint return. It was not entirely clear from the
beginning whether the joint return should be regarded as a return of
net family income, as if husband and wife were a single taxpayer, or as
the sum of the net incomes of two separate taxpayers reported on one
piece of paper.6 8
In the latter case, it would make no difference in principle whether
husband and wife filed jointly or separately,69 except that the tax would
be higher on a joint return if the two net incomes when aggregated were
pushed into a higher bracket of the progressive rate structure.7 0 If car-
ried to its limits, this two-taxpayer or binary conception of the joint
return only could increase a couple's taxes and never could produce any
tax advantage. 1
In 1921 the Solicitor General of the Internal Revenue construed the
provision for joint returns in the Revenue Act of 1918 as requiring a
unitary or single entity approach:
held cosigners of a joint return liable for taxes on the other spouse's undisclosed income. This
liability obtained even when the cosigner had no knowledge of the unreported income-that is to
say, the cosigner was responsible for taxes for which he or she could not intentionally have volun-
teered to be a surety. See, e.g., Scudder v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36 (1967), rev'd, 405 F.2d 222
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 886 (1968).
65. See Revenue Act of 1918, supra note 55.
66. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 223(b)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 250.
67. See Revenue Act of 1938, supra note 51.
68. That the joint return tax should be the sum of the two separate taxes of the spouses (as
on some current two-column state tax returns), without aggregation of their separate incomes,
seems never to have been considered.
69. The joint return enjoyed no special tax rate until Congress enacted income splitting in
the Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114. Income splitting often reduces the taxes
on a joint return by using a rate equal to twice the tax on one-half the aggregate income. See infra
Part V(A).
70. Until 1938, unless both spouses had income, it was doubtful whether they could file a
joint return. The Revenue Act of 1938, supra note 51, § 51(b), 52 Stat. at 476, settled the question
by expressly providing that joint returns may be filed even if one spouse had no income.
71. This example ignores the issues of personal exemptions and the standard deduction.
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If a single joint return is filed it is treated as the return of a taxable unit and the
net income disclosed by the return is subject to both normal and surtax as though
the return were that of a single individual. In cases, therefore, in which the hus-
band or wife has allowable deductions in excess of his or her gross income, such
excess may, if joint return is filed, be deducted from the net income of the other for
the purpose of computing both the normal and surtax.7 2
Under this unitary approach, joint filing might make a difference in the
total tax due for many reasons, some that provide opportunities for tax
savings, and others that would increase the tax. For example, the uni-
tary approach allows one spouse to use his or her losses and other de-
ductions to offset the other spouse's gains or income, which provides a
tax saving. On the other hand, the single entity approach might suggest
that only a single personal exemption amount 3 or a single standard de-
duction 4 should be allowed in the same amount as for an individual
taxpayer filing separately. The choice between joint and separate filing
became complex, even before income splitting.7 5
72. Op. Solicitor 90, 4 C.B. 236, 238 (1921), cited in Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195, 197
(1940).
73. In the early years, a unitary approach predominated concerning the personal exemption.
The exemption for a married person was larger than that for a single person. In 1918 the amounts
were $2000 and $1000, respectively, see Revenue Act of 1918, supra note 55, § 216(c), 40 Stat. at
1069, and in 1921 $2500 and $1000, respectively, see Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 66, § 216(c),
42 Stat. at 243. Only a single personal exemption was allowed to a couple filing jointly or sepa-
rately, however, and if the couple filed separately, the exemption could be divided between them in
any way they chose. See Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 66, § 216(c), 42 Stat. at 243; Revenue Act
of 1918, supra note 55, § 216(c), 40 Stat. at 1069.
74. The standard deduction, introduced in 1944, permitted all taxpayers to deduct the lesser
of $500 or 10% of gross income in lieu of claiming other deductions. The standard deduction was
allowed only once on a joint return, but couples filing separately could each take the standard
deduction unless the other spouse itemized. For lower income levels when 10% of combined gross
income was less than or equal to $500, the standard deduction would not affect the decision
whether to file jointly or separately. For higher income levels, separate filing might secure two
standard deductions, but the deductions allowable to high earners usually would be worth more
than the standard deduction. Then, as now, one spouse could not take the standard deduction on a
separate return if the other spouse itemized. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(6)(A) (Supp. V 1987). Also, under
wartime tax rates, joint filing was often disadvantageous because of the progressive effect of aggre-
gating income into higher brackets.
75. In 1926 taxpayers were advised that if their combined net income exceeded $6500, sepa-
rate returns should be filed, unless one spouse had a net loss. 1926 U.S. Income & War Tax Guide
(CCH) 28-29.
In 1947 the same advisor summarized the advantages and disadvantages as follows: (1) if both
spouses have net incomes, there would be a disadvantage in filing a joint return if their combined
net income, in excess of the $1000 combined exemptions and the exemption for dependents, ex-
ceeds $2000; (2) if one spouse has a net income and the other has offsetting deductions in excess of
income, a joint return might result in a tax saving; and (3) if the combined adjusted gross income
of both is over $5000, each has adjusted gross income, and they elect to take the standard deduc-
tion, they should file separately. 1947 Master Tax Guide (CCH) 42-43.
There were other considerations as well. One commentator pointed out, for example, that a
husband and wife filing jointly could claim the wife's niece as a dependent, even though the niece's
chief support was provided by the husband, whereas the claim would be disallowed to both spouses
filing separately. See Rudick, Marriage, Divorce and Taxes, 5 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx'N 679, 689
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In 1935 the Treasury Department changed its 1921 unitary ap-
proach to joint filing. It promulgated new regulations that disallowed
any netting of gains and losses between spouses, 8 together with other
regulations that limited the charitable deduction to fifteen percent of
the separate net income of each spouse, whether they filed jointly or
separately.77 These regulations would have removed any financial incen-
tive to joint filing.78
In effect, the Treasury had it both ways: unitary computation when
it increased the tax by aggregation, but binary computation when the
unitary model decreased the tax because of offsetting deductions. The
Supreme Court overturned both regulations in the 1940 companion
cases Helvering v. Janney79 and Taft v. Helvering,80 as inconsistent
with Congress's intent to tax the aggregate income of the spouses and
with the Treasury Department's longstanding earlier construction of
the statute."'
The unitary theory, however, had limits. For example, in the 1932
case Gummey v. Commissioner, 2 the Board of Tax Appeals allowed
taxpayers filing jointly to deduct stock market losses of one spouse
when the other spouse made simultaneous purchases of the same secur-
ities. The wash sales rules88 would have disallowed such losses if the
(1946).
76. Article 117-5 of Regulations 86 (1935), cited in Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189, 194
(1940).
77. Article 23(o) of Regulations 86 (1935), cited in Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195, 198
(1940).
78. See Pierce v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 397, 397 (2d Cir. 1938) (remarking that "it is only
when the allowable deductions of one spouse exceed his or her income, that any advantage can be
derived from filing a joint return").
Nevertheless, and rather surprisingly, in 1938 only about 6% of all married couples filed sepa-
rately; the other 94% elected to file jointly. See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. at 16-17
(1941), reprinted in 1941-2 C.B. 413, 426-27.
These couples may have filed jointly because federal income tax rates were so low that it made
no difference in most people's tax rates whether they filed jointly or separately. In 1938 a couple
remained in the lowest tax bracket from $2000 up to nearly $5000 of taxable income (approxi-
mately $45,000 in 1989 dollars, see STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 43, table 748, at 462). Such
couples enjoyed no advantage by reporting each spouse's income separately because all the income
was already in the lowest tax bracket. See H.R. REP. No. 1040, supra, at 14-15, reprinted in 1941-2
C.B. at 424. It seems that most people reported jointly just for the convenience of filling out one
form rather than two, and not because there was any tax advantage to doing so.
79. 311 U.S. 189 (1940).
80. 311 U.S. 195 (1940). The government later invoked the Taft and Janney cases upholding
the aggregate or unitary approach as authority for imposing joint and several liability. See Moore
v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 136 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 619 (1941); see also infra note 94.
81. Under the 1986 Code, the joint return may be described as still reflecting the unitary
conception of joint reporting, as in the Solicitor General's 1921 opinion, see Op. Solicitor 90, supra
note 72, but with innumerable exceptions. See infra note 265.
82. 26 B.T.A. 894 (1932).
83. The Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 118, 45 Stat. 791, 826, the predecessor of current §
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same taxpayer had made the purchases. The court explained its deci-
sion as follows:
Had the petitioner and his wife filed separate returns, there would be no ques-
tion about the deductibility of the losses sustained by each. In filing a single joint
return, they lost none of such rights; each remained an individual, and as such, a
taxpayer, within the meaning of section 118 of the statute.8 4
Thus, the unitary approach does not dissolve the spouses' identities
into a single person, but merely serves as a principle of computation.
C. I.T. 1575: Joint Return As a "Taxable Unit"
The Bureau of Internal Revenue made its first pronouncement on
the subject of joint and several liability in 1923 in its office ruling I.T.
1575.85 This ruling stated that husband and wife "are individually liable
for the full amount of tax shown to be due on [a joint] return.'"6 The
Bureau based this conclusion upon the ground that "a single joint re-
turn is one return of a taxable unit and not two returns of two units on
one sheet of paper."8 7 This statement was necessarily metaphorical. A
married couple, apart from the husband and wife as individuals, cannot
literally be a taxable unit, or taxable at all in the sense that it can owe
money to the government. A marriage, apart from its component
spouses, is not a juridical person and therefore cannot owe anything,
own anything, or sue or be sued for taxes or anything else.
It follows that this taxable unit or unitary principle cannot explain
shifting the imposition of a tax from one spouse to another. The only
candidates for involuntary collection remain the individual spouses, and
in order to collect the tax, the "unit" must be divided into its compo-
nents. The question thus remains unanswered: which of the compo-
nents should be liable, and to what extent?
The unitary principle is merely computational, and carries no im-
plications as to liability for the tax. To deduce that using the entity
method of computing the aggregate tax requires joint and several liabil-
ity is simply to beg the question."" Nevertheless, this fallacy often was
repeated by the government in later litigation."
1091, disallowed losses if the taxpayer purchased shares of the same corporation within 30 days
before or after the date of the loss sale.
84. Gummey, 26 B.T.A. at 896.
85. I.T. 1575, 1I-1 C.B. 144 (1923).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Many income tax systems permit or require income aggregation without imposing joint
and several liability. See infra Part VI(A); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3-4-4(d) (Burns 1989); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 143.491 (Vernon 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-152.1 (1989).
89. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 136 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 619
(1941); Cole v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 602 (1933), rev'd, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935); see aLio
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D. Voluntary and Involuntary Payment
The circumstances that occasioned I.T. 1575 suggest some even
more serious confusion on the part of the government. The complete
ruling reads as follows:
Husband and wife filed a joint return for the year 1920 and the amount of tax
shown by the return to be due was paid by the wife. It appears that if separate
returns had been filed instead of the joint return, the wife would have had no tax to
pay for that year. By filing a joint return, the husband's tax liability was reduced
from 5x dollars to 4x dollars. They were divorced after the payment was made.
Inquiry is made as to whether there is any way in which the wife can secure a
refund of the tax or any part thereof paid in connection with the joint return.
Held, that a single joint return is one return of a taxable unit and not two
returns of two units on one sheet of paper. Accordingly, where a husband and wife
filed a joint return they are individually liable for the full amount of tax shown to
be due on such return. No relief can therefore be afforded the wife in this case.90
The Bureau could have denied relief in these circumstances simply
by observing that the wife assumed liability for the entire tax when she
voluntarily made payment herself. It would then make no difference
whether it was the husband alone, or both spouses jointly, who were
originally liable before her voluntary assumption. Even if the original
joint return liability were entirely the husband's, on the ground that all
the income was his, when she paid his taxes, she assumed and dis-
charged her husband's tax liability. In so doing, she gave him a gift, just
as if she had paid his debts to a trade creditor. When the transaction is
viewed in this light, it becomes apparent that the wife should not be
able to force the IRS to return her gift years later, any more than she
could force a private creditor to give her a refund under similar circum-
stances. The Treasury's revenues would be intolerably uncertain if ei-
ther spouse were entitled to a refund any time the spouse might regret
having paid more than his or her proportional share of the couple's
taxes.91
The same reasoning would apply even absent a joint return. If a
father pays his son's taxes, he in effect assumes the son's tax liability to
the extent of his payment and extinguishes it at the same time. If the
father's payment is due to a mistake, however, such as the father's erro-
neous belief that he was himself liable for the tax, he should be entitled
to a refund.2 Absent any mistake, however, if the father simply changes
infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
90. I.T. 1575, supra note 85, at 144.
91. Moreover, if the IRS did refund the tax under such circumstances, it might have diffi-
culty collecting the tax from the other spouse, even assuming that the statute of limitations per-
mitted the collection and that the earning spouse could be found and was solvent. The earning
spouse would have a good defense that his or her liability was extinguished because the other
spouse assumed it through voluntary payment.
92. See M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 11.07 (1981).
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his mind about making the gift, no ground exists for a refund.
Under the facts of I.T. 1575, the Bureau had no need to address
the question who should be liable for an unpaid tax deficiency on a
joint return. The facts did not involve a deficiency or an attempt at
involuntary collection, but rather a voluntary payment by the wife of
more than her proportional share of the tax. The Bureau did not need
to announce a sweeping rule that each spouse is individually liable for
the full amount of the tax. Instead, the ruling should have concluded
that on a joint return, both spouses are proper taxpayers of the joint
tax only in the limited sense needed to avoid any liability of the Trea-
sury to make a refund on grounds of a mistaken or later regretted ap-
portionment. This approach would have left the spouses to decide
themselves whether each would pay his or her own share to the penny,
or in some other proportion. Their decision would have no effect on the
Treasury's interests.
Such a rule would have answered the question at hand, and yet
would have implied nothing at all regarding the question which spouse
should be liable for an unpaid deficiency on a joint return when an in-
voluntary payment is demanded. The distinction between voluntary
and involuntary payment is a critical one, 3 and the failure to make the
distinction at the outset in I.T. 1575 may have confused the subsequent
development of the law.94
93. Note that the wife's right to the equitable remedy of contribution from her husband
arises only when the wife has been compelled to pay more than her share of the joint tax. If she
pays voluntarily, as in I.T. 1575, she cannot force her husband afterwards to make reimbursement,
any more than she can compel the IRS to make her a refund. This result is consistent with the
analysis above that such a voluntary overpayment is a gift.
94. The confusion is evident, for example, in Moore v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 136 (Ct.
Cl.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 619 (1941):
"Or take the case, a common one, where a joint return is filed and the tax shown due
thereon is paid, but the commissioner later finds a deficiency. Must the commissioner not
merely analyze all the figures and determine what part of the total tax was originally owed by
each, but also find out, if he can, the contributions of each to the prior payments made on
account of the tax and credit each accordingly? Such complexities in tax gathering 'are not
lightly to be imputed to legislators.'
Id. at 140 (citation omitted) (quoting Commissioner v. Rabenhold, 108 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir. 1940)
(Patterson, J., dissenting)); see also infra note 121.
The answer to the court's question is no. Because each spouse should be the proper taxpayer
for the entire tax due, it would not matter who made the prior payments. It would only be neces-
sary to determine whose income occasioned the deficiency and to assess that spouse alone for the
deficiency, no matter how much thnt spouse had already paid.
Note conversely, however, that in the context of refunds of overpayments from joint returns,
both the separate liability of each spouse and their respective prior payments are in fact routinely
determined with no apparent difficulty. See infra Part VII(A).
[Vol. 43:317
INCOME TAX LIABILITY
E. Cole v. Commissioner
The first reported case to determine the issue whether spouses fil-
ing a joint return are jointly and severally liable was Cole v. Commis-
sioner in 1933."5 In Cole the Board of Tax Appeals found no difficulty
in upholding the government's theory of joint and several liability:
In our opinion the theory of petitioner's counsel requires little discussion. In
the first place the joint return contains no data upon which the separate taxable
income of the two spouses can be computed. There is no segregation of the
amounts of gross income severally received or any designation of the deductions to
which each would be entitled. Since the joint return, though made by the husband,
reports the income as a unit, we think it is perfectly clear that liability for the tax
is joint and several and may be asserted against and collected from either spouse.96
The Ninth Circuit did not find the question perfectly clear, however,
and reversed the Board after much discussion and with a concurring
and a dissenting opinion. Its decision remains the only one in which
the issues have been considered to any extent.
The equities in Cole were very favorable to the government."8 Ac-
cording to the stipulated facts, Frida Cole had a separate income of
253,479.41 dollars for the year 1929, and her deceased husband had in-
come of 9614.47 dollars. A deficiency of 27,568.59 dollars, due entirely
to Frida's income, was undisputed." The statute of limitations barred
the Commissioner from collecting the deficiency from Frida. Thus, the
Commissioner attempted to collect the deficiency from the deceased
husband's estate, as to which the statute of limitations was still open.
Frida, as executrix, defended on the ground that, because the deficiency
was due to her income, the liability was hers alone, and could not be
enforced against the estate. As a result, the government could not col-
95. 29 B.T.A. 602 (1933), rev'd, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935). The court also decided a com-
panion case of the same date against the taxpayer as well but without discussion. See Buchhalter
v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 600 (1933).
In Burkhart v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 275 (1928), the Commissioner somewhat unaccounta-
bly attempted to tax the wife on half, rather than all, her husband's income reported on joint
returns, without mention of joint and several liability. The Board of Tax Appeals rejected the
Commissioner's attempt, finding that the wife had earned an amount that was less than the one-
half of the exemption to which she was entitled on a joint return. Id. at 277-78.
96. Cole, 29 B.T.A. at 604-05.
97. See Cole, 81 F.2d at 485. A second ground of opinion of the Board of Tax Appeals was
that the plea for separate liability effectively was a request for withdrawal of the joint return and
replacement with separate returns, which was, and remains, impermissible after the time for filing
has passed. See Cole, 29 B.T.A. at 605. The Ninth Circuit's majority opinion did not address this
issue, the Commissioner apparently having abandoned the argument on appeal. See Cole, 81 F.2d
at 485.
98. It is also noteworthy that the case involved shifting the liability from wife to husband.
Both factors may have played a role in Congress's decision to overrule the result in Cole by enact-
ing joint return liability three years later, in the Revenue Act of 1938, supra note 51.
99. Cole, 81 F.2d at 485.
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lect the deficiency at all. 0
In response to the Commissioner's argument that a husband and
wife filing jointly become a single taxpaying unit, the Ninth Circuit first
noted that the Bureau of Internal Revenue had adopted a contradictory
position in the regulations under the Revenue Act of 1934, which lim-
ited deductible capital losses to the amount of the taxpayer's capital
gains. Article 117-5 of the Regulations'0 ' stated, "In the application of
section 117, a husband and wife, regardless of whether a joint return or
separate returns are made, are considered to be separate taxpayers. M 02
The Commissioner argued that a husband and wife must accept the
necessary concomitant conditions if they choose to reduce their taxes
through the unusual privilege of filing jointly.10 3 The court found that
the "unusual privilege" did not require the taxpayers to surrender their
individuality as separate taxpayers. The court quoted Fawsett v. Com-
missioner,04 in which the Board allowed the losses of one spouse to be
deducted on a joint return even though the other spouse, as in Gummey
v. Commissioner, simultaneously purchased identical securities:
"Sections 11 and 12 of the Revenue Act of 1928. . ., the imposing provisions
of the statute, impose a tax upon the taxable income of each individual. Each is
defined as a taxpayer and the fact that the Congress, having regard to the marital
status and in order to eliminate a large number of returns, sees fit to permit the
inclusion in the one return of the income of husband and wife, does not serve to
deny to these individual taxpayers the other benefits of the taxing statutes. Hoeper
v. Tax Commission of Wisconsin ... would seem to be authority for the proposi-
tion that Congress could not forcibly require a husband and wife to jointly return
their income, and while the Federal taxing acts have never pretended to do so, but
have only permitted married people to file joint returns, we feel that this privilege
is not bought by the sacrifice of their other rights under the statutes. The accept-
ance of the privilege of filing a joint return by a married couple carries with it no
denial of their individual rights under the statute. Congress has exacted no pen-
alty for the privilege it has granted and the Commissioner may not exact one."10'
100. See id. at 486.
101. This regulation had just been promulgated in 1935, the same year as the Ninth Circuit's
opinion
102. Cole, 81 F.2d at 487. These regulations, promulgated in 1935, were later held to be inva-
lid by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189 (1940), as contrary to congressional
intent and to settled law since 1921.
103. It is not clear how this tax reduction was supposed to come about, however, because at
that very time, the Treasury's new 1935 regulations began limiting capital losses and charitable
deductions on joint returns to the separate capital gains and 15% of the separate net income,
respectively, of each spouse individually, rather than computing the limits on the aggregate joint
income. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
Thus, if the court had held for the Commissioner, the joint return would rarely have created
any tax benefit, and its only effect would have been the detriment of joint liability.
Note that in 1938, when Congress enacted joint and several liability, 94% of all married tax-
payers filed jointly, even though it appears that the vast majority derived no tax benefit from the
election. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
104. 31 B.T.A. 139 (1934).
105. Cole, 81 F.2d at 487 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fawsett v. Coin-
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The Cole court then concluded:
One of the fundamental principles of taxation is that the incidence of a tax
should be in accordance with the ability to pay. In income taxation, this means that
the tax should be levied in proportion to income. That is all which the petitioner
herein asks. If this cardinal principle is followed, justice will be done.108
Much mischief could have been avoided had Congress followed the
Ninth Circuit's eminently sound reasoning.
F. Administrative Necessity
The most significant argument advanced by the Commissioner0 7
was that of administrative necessity. 10 8 The Commissioner maintained
that because the joint return did not segregate the respective income
and expenses of the spouses, it would be impossible for him to deter-
mine their respective liabilities.
The taxpayer quite sensibly responded that if the Commissioner
asserts a deficiency on the basis of an examination, the examination
necessarily reveals the respective net income of each spouse. That was
the case in Cole, in which the respective net incomes of the spouses
were stipulated. In such cases, the calculation of the proportion of the
deficiency for which each spouse should be liable is a simple step. 0 9
The taxpayer further argued that if a case arose in which the Com-
missioner could not determine which spouse should be liable for a defi-
ciency, the Commissioner's remedy should be to assert the entire
deficiency against each spouse separately, thus placing the burden of
proof upon them.1 0 The Commissioner did not address this suggestion
missioner, 31 B.T.A. 139, 141-42 (1934)). The Hoeper decision struck down as violative of due
process a Wisconsin income tax act that required compulsory aggregation of family income and
made the husband liable for the total tax due, with the wife secondarily liable for the total tax if
not paid by him:
[A]ny attempt by a state to measure the tax on one person's property or income by reference
to the property or income of another is contrary to due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. That which is not in fact the taxpayer's income cannot be made
such by calling it income.
Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206, 215 (1931).
The only apparent difference between the Wisconsin tax -truck down in Hoeper and the fed-
eral imposition of joint and several liability is the supposedly voluntary nature of the federal elec-
tion to file jointly.
106. Cole, 81 F.2d at 487.
107. This argument became significant because it was accepted by Congress when it over-
ruled the Ninth Circuit three years later.
108. The Commissioner also argued that joint and several liability had been settled practice
for years, but was able to cite only its own 1923 ruling I.T. 1575 in support of this contention. The
court did not criticize I.T. 1575, but simply dismissed the ruling as informal, lacking the force of a
Treasury Decision and without authority even to bind the Treasury to any interpretation of the
law. See Cole, 81 F.2d at 488.
109. See Cole, 81 F.2d at 487.
110. Id. at 487-88. The IRS successfully used this same argument in United States v.
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in his brief, but the Ninth Circuit found it to be a sufficient solution to
any administrative problems the Commissioner might encounter under
a regime of separate liability proportional to net income.11'
A still more telling point, inexplicably overlooked in the Cole litiga-
tion, was that in other contexts, the Treasury was insisting on making
the very same allocations which it argued in Cole that it was unable to
make. The Cole appeal was decided in 1935, the same year that the
Treasury first promulgated its regulations limiting the deduction for
charitable contributions on a joint return to fifteen percent of the donor
spouse's separate net income.11 Determining each spouse's separate net
income on a joint return for purposes of limiting the charitable deduc-
tion necessarily involves precisely the same calculation as determining
each spouse's net income for purposes of limiting the overall tax liabil-
ity of each spouse."' What the government was willing to do for its own
benefit, it also could do for taxpayers if it chose." 4 Despite Treasury's
ability to make the calculations when the government would benefit,
the government continued to argue administrative necessity." 5
Nowicke, No. 84-14 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 20, 1987), in the context of crediting a joint refund against one
spouse's separate tax liability. The court allowed the IRS to apply the entire joint refund against
the separate liability because the taxpayer could not prove his separate net income on the joint
return.
111. Cole, 81 F.2d at 488. Another possible solution to the purported administrative problem
would have been to redesign the joint return form so as to provide space for reporting the separate
income and expenses of each spouse. Some states (Arkansas, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, North
Carolina, and Virginia) currently provide such space by using two-column returns for combined
reporting. Such a redesigned form would have solved the purported administrative difficulty. The
taxpayer might have argued that because the return forms were drafted by the Treasury, the tax-
payer should not be penalized if the forms were poorly designed and did not provide space for the
information reasonably required by the Treasury. The taxpayer might have argued further that
the government's position was tantamount to claiming that its return forms ought to determine
the law, rather than that the law should dictate the return forms.
112. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court later invalidated this
regulation in Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195 (1940). See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying
text.
113. Cf. Van Vleck v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 433 (1934), af'd, 80 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1935),
cert. denied, 298 U.S. 656 (1936). In Van Vleck the taxpayer had suffered net losses for the year
1929 that he reported on a separate return; he attempted to carry forward the losses to offset
income reported on a joint return for 1930, a year in which he again had net losses but his wife had
net income. The Commissioner claimed, and the Second Circuit agreed, that the husband's loss
carryforward from the separate return year could only be used to offset his own income in the joint
return year, of which he had none, and could not be used to offset the income of his wife, thus
rendering the loss carryforward useless. Van Vleck, 80 F.2d at 218. In order to limit loss carryfor-
wards in this manner, it is of course necessary to ascertain for the joint return year the respective
income and deductions of each spouse separately.
114. See Surber v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Ohio 1968). In Surber the court
expressed skepticism as to the existence of any administrative problem in allocating proportional
liability on joint returns: "We have been unable to find out what the 'administrative reasons' are."
Id. at 778.
115. Moore v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 136 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 619 (1941).
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The government's continued insistence on administrative necessity
was surprising in light of contemporaneous congressional action. In
1941 the House of Representatives proposed enacting mandatory joint
returns.1 ' The bill explicitly ruled out imposing joint and several liabil-
ity on mandatory joint returns, however, in order to avoid vulnerability
to constitutional attack.117 The House Report accompanying the bill
gave a complete account of how the proportional separate liabilities of
the husband and wife would be calculated and even included a lengthy
example. 118 Nowhere in the thorough discussion is there any expression
of concern about an administrative problem in making such calcula-
tions. Yet Congress had enacted joint and several liability only three
years earlier, under the purported compulsion of administrative
necessity."9
After its 1935 defeat in the Cole litigation, the Treasury did not
adopt measures to alleviate its alleged administrative difficulties. In-
stead, the Treasury continued to insist on joint and several liability in
litigation, losing in every judicial forum. Other circuit courts as well as
the Board of Tax Appeals followed without exception the 1935 Cole de-
cision that filing jointly does not require joint and several liability.'2 0
This holding remained established law until Congress overturned it in
the Revenue Act of 1938.121
116. See H.R. REP. No. 1040, supra note 78, at 10, reprinted in 1941-2 C.B. at 420. The
purpose of the bill (which was not enacted) was to equalize the tax treatment of couples in com-
mon law states with that of couples in community property states who were enjoying a rate reduc-
tion by reporting half of each spouse's income on the other spouse's separate return pursuant to
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
117. For an excellent discussion of this constitutional question in the House Report accom-
panying the proposal for mandatory joint returns in the Revenue Act of 1941, see H.R. REP. No.
1040, supra note 78, at 17-22, reprinted in 1941-2 C.B. at 427-31.
The voluntary nature of the current election is perhaps exaggerated in light of the income
splitting rate reductions for joint returns introduced by the Revenue Act of 1948, supra note 69,
which provide an offer "that could not be refused." Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the
Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 140 n.55 (1975). In 1985, 99% of married couples elected joint filing.
Professor Boris Bittker has called joint returns "mandatory in fact." See id.
118. See H.R. REP. No. 1040, supra note 78, at 10-11, reprinted in 1941-2 C.B. at 420-22. The
formula is identical to the "separate tax formula" discussed below in connection with refunds. See
infra Part VII(A)(2).
119. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 29-30 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B., pt.
2, at 728, 749.
120. See, e.g., Sachs v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1940); Crowe v. Commissioner,
86 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1936); Estate of Hague v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 104, afld sub nom. Com-
missioner v. Uniacke, 132 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1941); Seder v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 874 (1938);
Flaherty v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 1131 (1937); Darling v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1062 (1936);
Commissioner v. Rabenold, 8 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 1 39,121 (1939), af'd, 108 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1940).
In situations in which the spouses could not prove their separate incomes, however, joint lia-
bility was imposed. See Rogers v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1940); see also Anderson v.
United States, 48 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1931).
121. See Revenue Act of 1938, supra note 51, § 51(b), 52 Stat. at 447.
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Indeed, Cole probably remains valid law today in situations in
which it has not been overruled legislatively. For example, a number of
states impose joint and several liability for joint returns by administra-
tive decision without direct authority from the state income tax stat-
ute.'22 Such administrative practice would appear to be vulnerable to
attack under the authority of Cole, although no cases seem to be
reported.123
It is noteworthy that the ratio of joint returns to married filing separately was relatively con-
stant during the years 1938-1950, and was always over 90%, except for the war years when the rate
dropped to a low of about 75%. Telephone interview with Barry Winthrop, IRS (July 29, 1988).
Enactment of joint and several liability in 1938 had no apparent deterrent effect upon the rate
of joint filing, probably because then as now, most people were unaware of the rule or failed to
anticipate its application to themselves. But Congress must have known in 1938 that the new rule
of joint and several liability would burden nearly all married taxpayers and that the vast majority
of them were deriving little or no tax benefit from filing jointly.
After 1938, the courts began holding that joint and several liability had always been the law,
in effect interpreting the new law as having retroactive application. In Moore v. United States, 37
F. Supp. 136 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 619 (1941), the court of claims upheld the Commis-
sioner's assessment of a deficiency for the year 1932 against the wife, who had no income of her
own for the year, on the ground of joint and several liability. See id.; see also supra note 94 and
accompanying text. The Moore court quoted the language of H.R. Rep. No. 1860, supra note 125,
to conclude that the new legislation was intended only to "clarify" what had always been the law
and therefore applied the rule of joint and several liability retroactively for the tax year 1932,
despite the Cole case and its progeny. See Moore, 37 F. Supp. at 140-41. The statute itself makes
no mention of retroactive application, however, and the House Report is at best ambiguous.
Moore was nevertheless followed in its retroactive application to tax years before 1938 by the
Board of Tax Appeals in Schoenhut v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 812 (1941), when it announced it
would no longer follow its prior holdings denying joint and several liability, and its decision in
Gillette v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 573 (1942).
In addition to rehearsing the Commissioner's arguments of administrative necessity that the
Cole court rejected, the Moore court relied on the recent 1940 Supreme Court decisions in Taft v.
Helvering, 311 U.S. 195 (1940), and Helvering v. Janney, 311 U.S. 189 (1940), which overturned the
Treasury's binary approach to limiting deductions for charitable contributions and capital losses,
respectively. The court erroneously thought the Taft and Janney cases constituted evidence that a
joint return creates a joint "taxable unit." The court left unspecified how it derived joint and
several liability from this observation. See Moore, 37 F. Supp. at 139.
Finally, the court concluded with an etymological argument: "We think that the natural
meaning of the word 'joint,' in its context, is that both spouses should be liable for the resulting
tax." Id. at 140.
The context seems to be that the word "joint" in "joint return" made the court think of the
word "joint" in "joint and several liability." One is left to wonder whether this etymological con-
nection may not have been the reason that joint and several liability suggested itself to the govern-
ment in the first place. Is it possible that the problem might never have arisen if the joint return
had been called "combined" rather than "joint"?
122. See, e.g., Letter from James A. Chakulski to Professor Richard Beck (June 30, 1988)
(Connecticut); Letter from Louis L. Goldstein to Richard Beck (June 17, 1988) (Maryland); Letter
from Alan S. Curtis to Carl D. Gensib (Nov. 16, 1988) (Tennessee).
123. A 1968 memorandum of the North Dakota Tax Department Legal Division so con-
cluded. Memorandum of Kenneth M. Jakes, North Dakota Tax Department, Legal Division (June
24, 1968). No joint return liability is imposed in North Dakota now by statute.
It is interesting to note that the vast majority of states that provide for joint returns require
cpuples to file jointly if they filed jointly for federal tax purposes. It is therefore at least arguable
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G. Legislation
In the Revenue Act of 1938, Congress explicitly enacted joint and
several liability into the statute for the first time,2 4 with minimal ex-
planation. The House Report stated:
Section 51(b) of the bill expressly provides that the spouses, who exercise the
privilege of filing a joint return, are jointly and severally liable for the tax com-
puted upon their aggregate income. It is necessary, for administrative reasons, that
any doubt as to the existence of such liability should be set at rest, if the privilege
of filing such joint returns is continued. 125
One must suppose, in the absence of any further explanation, that the
"administrative reasons" referred to are none other than those that
were rejected decisively in Cole. The government never has provided a
satisfactory answer to the Cole court's objections,"'6 and, indeed, none
seems possible.
The actual administrative problem seems to have been only that in
situations in which the Bureau of Internal Revenue was unsure which
spouse earned the income, occasionally the Bureau neglected to assess
both spouses, and as a result, the statute of limitations ran and insu-
lated the true earner, as in Cole. The Bureau apparently could not tol-
erate seeing one spouse enjoy untaxed income of the other, even when
the situation arose entirely out of the Bureau's own negligence.
When Congress enacted joint and several liability, it is possible
that it thought it was doing no more than providing the Bureau with a
shield to redress cases of unjust enrichment at the Treasury's expense
when no other method seemed feasible. Eventually, however, the Bu-
reau was to turn this shield into a sword, and to wield it against inno-
cent women in situations of separation and divorce when the equities
were entirely on the side of the taxpayer.
that such joint returns are compulsory, and if they are compulsory, joint return liability may be
vulnerable to constitutional attack under Hoeper even when imposed by state statutes.
124. See Revenue Act of 1938, supra note 51, § 51(b), 52 Stat. at 447.
125. H.R. REP. No. 1860, supra note 120, at 749, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B., pt. 2, at 728, 749.
126. The same spurious justification for joint and several liability was repeated by the gov-
ernment as late as 1970 in the House Report accompanying the Innocent Spouse Act:
Since a joint return does not show the respective incomes and deductions of the husband
and wife, individually, and since the statute imposes a single tax upon the aggregate income,
administrative simplicity makes it necessary that the filing of such a return create a liability
that is joint and several.
H.R. REP. No. 1734, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970).
This justification is all the more remarkable because in the area of refunds from joint returns
it was by then already well established that separate net incomes and separate prior payments
must be determined in order to effect a proper allocation. See, e.g., Maragon v. United States, 153
F. Supp. 365 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
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IV. THE INNOCENT SPOUSE RULES
A. Current Relief from Joint and Several Liability
1. Origins
The rule imposing joint return liability was not well founded when
originally adopted. On the other hand, before the post-war explosion in
the rate of divorce, the enormous harm that the rule would later cause
was perhaps not easily foreseeable. 12 7 By the time it became evident in
the 1950s and 1960s that the rule of joint return liability frequently
caused serious injustice, it had become so familiar and entrenched that
imagining its repeal apparently became difficult. 28
The injustice of joint return liability became particularly obvious in
the wake of the Supreme Court's 1961 decision in James v. United
States29 that embezzled funds constitute gross income to the embez-
zler. The IRS then began asserting joint return liability for large defi-
ciencies against embezzlers' wives, even in situations when they knew
nothing of the embezzlement and had received none of the embezzled
funds. In such cases, the courts found themselves under pressure to find
or encourage inventive ways to circumvent the inequitable results of
joint return liability. 30 These methods included permitting the de-
fenses that the wife had no intention to file jointly and signed by mis-
take, '' that the wife signed only under the husband's duress, 132 and
that her signature was procured by the husband's fraud. 33
127. Indeed, all six of the cases that litigated the question of joint and several liability in
1938 or earlier involved either marriages that were still intact but the husband for some reason
could not pay, e.g., Darling v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1062 (1936); Buchhalter v. Commissioner,
29 B.T.A. 600 (1933), or where the husband had died during marriage, e.g., Crowe v. Commis-
sioner, 86 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1936); Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935); Seder v.
Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 874 (1938); Flaherty v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 1131 (1937). None in-
volved divorce.
Still, some observers were astute enough to foresee the problem. See, e.g., 4 R. PAUL & J.
MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL oINCOm TAXATION § 39.08 (1934).
128. Apparently, the only exception was the excellent article Ritz, The Married Woman and
the Federal Income Tax, 14 TAX L. REv. 437 (1959).
129. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
130. See generally Note, Innocent Spouses' Liability for Fraudulent Understatement of
Taxable Income on Joint Returns, 56 VA. L. REV. 1268 (1970).
131. See Payne v. United States, 247 F.2d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1957) (relieving housewife with-
out income of liability "as a matter of fairness" because she signed 1942 joint return mistakenly
thinking she was required to sign because she helped to fill it out).
132. Compare Hickey v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 546 (1955) (holding elderly woman
without income who signed at request of husband relieved of liability because she was instructed
by husband's doctor to comply with all husband's wishes on account of his heart disease) with
Estate of Aylesworth v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 134, 146 (1955) (finding no relief for wife because
her signatures were "voluntary, although perhaps distasteful, acts" even though there was uncon-
troverted testimony of husband's actual and threatened violence if she refused to sign).
133. E.g., Scudder v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968), rev'g 48 T.C. 36 (1967),
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The Sixth Circuit developed the theory that if the wife knew noth-
ing of her husband's concealed income and did not profit from it, her
signature on the joint return might be the involuntary result of fraud,
at least as to the omitted items.134 In Scudder v. Commissioner,'5 a
particularly heartrending decision of the Tax Court, the husband com-
mitted embezzlements that he did not disclose on the joint return. The
wife was forced to pay not only her husband's taxes and interest but
also the fifty percent civil fraud penalty, even though she knew nothing
of her husband's tax fraud and did not benefit from it. Still worse, the
wife was actually the victim of her husband's embezzlements because
she and her sisters owned the business he was managing. Nonetheless,
the IRS pursued her for taxes and penalties on their joint "income,"
which consisted of her own money that her husband embezzled from
her. Although the Tax Court expressed regret and called for legislative
change, it upheld the Commissioner, even as to the fraud penalty.'36
The Sixth Circuit reversed the case, however, on the theory that she
could not have intended to file jointly as to such an item, and her signa-
ture as to that item was the product of fraud.13 7
Finally, Congress provided limited relief from the consequences of
joint return liability through the Innocent Spouse Act of 1971.18 Con-
gress enacted the rules in response to such cases as Scudder, which the
legislative history specifically mentioned.'3 9 The "innocent spouse"
rules reflect Congress's original, quite limited aim to legislate reversal of
the result in such egregious cases. In fact, the legislative solution
adopted by Congress closely reflects the Sixth Circuit's approach. The
"innocent spouse" rules limit relief inter alia to situations when the
husband committed an illegal tax act of which the wife knew nothing,
and from which she did not benefit. For that reason, the relief provided
today unfortunately is very limited and quite unsatisfactory.
Congress also has occasionally provided relief in the form of private
tax bills,14 0 and more recently, in the form of private relief couched in
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 886 (1969); see also infra note 137 and accompanying text.
134. Scudder, 405 F.2d at 225-27; see also Sharwell v. Commissioner, 419 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir.
1969); Huelsman v. Commissioner, 416 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1969).
135. 48 T.C. 36 (1967), rev'd, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 886 (1969).
136. See Scudder, 48 T.C. at 39-41.
137. See Scudder, 405 F.2d at 222, 226 (wife relieved of liability for tax on husband's embez-
zlements from her own business because her signature was the "product of conduct equivalent in
wrong to the fraud, trickery and, indeed, the duress which the Tax Court appears to concede will
insulate its victim from liabilities"); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
138. Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063, 2063 (1971) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §
6013(e) (Supp. V 1987)). The section was revised in 1984 to expand protection for the innocent
spouse. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
139. H.R. REP. No. 1734, supra note 126, at 2.
140. Congress relieved Sondra D. Shaw of a tax liability of $12,608.74 plus accrued interest
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general terms as part of a public revenue statute."" Such private relief
is no doubt merited, but it is unfair to the tens of thousands of other
victims of joint return liability who also deserve relief.
2. Current Relief
The relief provisions under section 6013(e) do not apply at all un-
less there is a "grossly erroneous item on the return," namely, the omis-
sion of an item of income, or a claim of deduction, credit, or basis for
which there is "no basis in fact or law."' 42 Even then, relief is available
only for the tax on such grossly erroneous items.143 In effect, relief is
limited to particular items of negligence or fraud. No relief is available,
for example, to a woman in the common situation in which the return is
correct but her husband simply fails to pay the tax.144
In addition, the innocent wife must establish that she neither knew
nor had any reason to know of the grossly erroneous item.145 Further,
she must show that when all the facts and circumstances are taken into
account, it would be inequitable to hold her liable for the taxes, includ-
ing interest, penalties, and other amounts.146 The principal inquiry in
applying the equity test is whether the innocent spouse benefited from
the erroneous items beyond the level of ordinary support. 47 These re-
quirements have proven to be difficult hurdles, particularly because the
on account of her husband's embezzlements between 1958-1963. See Priv. L. No. 90-362, 82 Stat.
1438 (1968).
Congress allowed another taxpayer, Charles P. Bailey, to redetermine his tax liability for the
year 1962 under the innocent spouse rules of § 6013(e) through a private law waiving the statute of
limitations and res judicata. Priv. L. No. 95-27, 91 Stat. 1661 (1977).
141. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6004, 102
Stat. 3342, 3685 (codified at I.R.C. § 6013 note (West 1989)). The statute enacted retroactive relief
for any taxpayer who filed before January 1, 1985, when: (i) the disallowed deductions of the other
spouse exceeded the taxable income shown on the joint return; and (ii) the marriage terminated
and immediately afterwards the net worth of the innocent spouse was less than $10,000. Id. The
relief is termed a "transitional rule" and seems aimed at one taxpayer, but apparently because of
the outcry over "rifle shot" transitional rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the provision is
drafted broadly enough that it should apply to at least some other taxpayers.
142. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
143. Id. § 6013(e)(1).
144. California, however, does permit such relief in its version of the innocent spouse rules
and so does France, see infra note 320 and accompanying text. See generally infra Part VI.
The wife's plight does not become less deserving of relief because her husband's part of the
joint return was correct. There is something perverse in the current rules under which a wife could
be in a better position if her husband fraudulently omits income from the return than if he reports
it honestly but fails to pay the tax.
145. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
146. Id. § 6013(e)(1)(C). The Innocent Spouse Act also added § 6653(b)(3) to the Code,
which relieves the wife from the civil fraud penalty if the underpayment was not due to any fraud
of her own. Innocent Spouse Act of 1971, supra note 138, § 2, 84 Stat. at 2063. She is still responsi-
ble for other penalties, however.
147. See infra Part IV(A)(6).
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burden of proof as to all elements of relief is on the wife and because
the wife must establish every element of relief in order to prevail.14 In
addition, these rules have produced imprecise standards and unpredict-
able results in the case law.
149
3. Reason to Know
The innocence requirement has proved to be perhaps the most dif-
ficult test because the burden of proof is on the wife to prove both no
actual knowledge of the items in question and no reason to know of
them. The leading case in this area is Sanders v. United States,5 ° in-
volving the widow of a chiropractor turned marketer of pyramid sales
operations who had substantial unreported income. The widow herself
had earned only about two thousand dollars for the two years in ques-
tion, but the deficiency assessed against her and her deceased hus-
band's insolvent estate was over thirty thousand dollars. 51
In Sanders the Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court's decision that
the taxpayer qualified as an innocent spouse and interpreted the phrase
"reason to know" by adopting a standard of "reasonable care" from the
Restatement (Second) of Agency. 52 The Fifth Circuit approved the
district court's consideration of seven factors in its factual inquiry: (i)
the complexity of the husband's financial affairs; (ii) the wife's educa-
tion, experience, emotional state, and general subjective condition; (iii)
the degree to which the husband confided his business affairs to her;
(iv) her trust in their accountant; (v) the degree and kind of her partici-
pation in his business affairs; (vi) the extent of her participation in
their family budget; and (vii) the extent to which the couple had made
lavish or unusual expenditures. 53 These factual inquiries take into ac-
148. See Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1975).
149. An entire treatise might be written on the vast and conflicting caselaw reported under
§ 6013(e). The following discussion does not pretend to provide any degree of completeness.
150. 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'g 369 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
151. See id. at 165.
152. See id. at 170. The court quoted the relevant provision of the Restatement:
"A person has reason to know of a fact if he had information from which a person of ordinary
intelligence, or of the superior intelligence which such person may have, would infer that the
fact in question exists or that there is such a substantial chance of its existence that, if exer-
cising reasonable care with reference to the matter in question, his action would be predicated
upon the assumption of its possible existence."
Id. at 167 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9 comment d (1958)).
It is unclear why the Sanders court looked to the law of agency for a definition. The law of
torts would seem a more appropriate source. On the other hand, the reasonable care test actually
adopted undoubtedly would have been the same in any event. The district court below used the
standard of a reasonably prudent taxpayer, see Sanders, 369 F. Supp. at 166, of which the Fifth
Circuit seemed to approve as equivalent. See Sanders, 509 F.2d at 166.
153. See Sanders, 509 F.2d at 162.
1990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
count the subjective state of the wife and are for that reason alone im-
precise and lead to unpredictable results. Even the more objective
standards raised doubts for the Fifth Circuit. For example, the district
court found that the husband had a policy of not confiding financial
information to his wife, yet also found that he had asked her to balance
checkbooks and keep other financial records. 54
The cases have held that knowledge of the existence of an item, not
knowledge of its tax consequences, is controlling. This approach some-
times has led to harsh results. For example, in McCoy v. Commis-
sioner'55 the court rejected a woman's contention that as a layperson
she could not be expected to know that incorporation of a deficit part-
nership, which her husband reported on the return, triggered taxable
gain under section 357(c).
The innocence test is separate and distinct from the equity test,
although they almost always overlap. Again, the major inquiry in the
equity test is whether the wife received a significant benefit over and
above normal support.151 Significant benefits such as lavish expendi-
tures beyond the standard of living attainable with the amounts of in-
come reported on the return also give rise to a reason to know of
unreported income or erroneous deductions.1  Because the tests are
distinct, however, a wife may be held liable if found to have had reason
to know of mistakenly unreported gain, even if she did not profit from
it, as in McCoy.
4. Conflicting Caselaw Concerning Reason to Know
The cases have held that the wife has a duty to review the tax re-
turn and to make inquiries about items that should arouse suspicion in
a reasonable person under the circumstances. 58 The cases, however, are
not easily reconcilable in this area. Some recent tax shelter cases illus-
trate the difficulties in applying the reasonable person standard.
In the 1987 case United States v. Flomenhoft59 a housewife with-
out business experience was held liable for judgments to which her hus-
band had consented in the amount of 170,057 dollars for 1975 and
281,908 dollars for 1976 due to the disallowance of phony partnership
losses for those years of 200,000 dollars and 500,000 dollars, respec-
tively. She testified that she did not read the returns, and the court
found that she had no actual knowledge of the understatements. The
154. Id. at 168 n.11.
155. 57 T.C. 732 (1972).
156. See infra Part IV(A)(6).
157. See Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680, 699 (1972).
158. Terzian v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1164 (1979).
159. No. 86-C-1588, (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
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district court found, however, that she was aware of the "staggering
losses" reflected "directly over her signature" and determined that a
reasonable spouse who is a housewife with a high school education
should have known that the couple could not have enjoyed their stan-
dard of living on a negative reported income. The court found that she
should have been alerted that her husband had not actually suffered
the losses claimed. 160 The court also decided that to hold her liable
would not be inequitable because she continued to enjoy the fruits of
her husband's fraud in the form of an expensive house and Mercedes
automobile. 1 '
By contrast, in Shapiro v. Commissioner,6 2 a 1988 tax shelter case,
a housewife likewise without business experience was relieved of liabil-
ity for a 96,490 dollar deficiency due to a 172,000 dollar loss disallowed
on the joint return because she had no reason to know of the existence
of the shelter. Although she had signed the return without reading it,
she trusted her husband's accountant who had prepared it. Further, her
attorney probably reviewed the return because she signed it as part of a
separation agreement that made the husband responsible for any addi-
tional taxes and allowed him any refund. 6 3 Although the couple lived
very well and the husband reported income of 170,000 dollars, the joint
return showed a tax due of only 8994 dollars.16 4 Under the separation
agreement she received property valued at over 375,000 dollars, in addi-
tion to their four-bedroom house, Lincoln Continental, and other valua-
ble property.16 5 Contrary to Flomenhoft, the Shapiro court did not
seem to think that the wife's suspicion should have been aroused by the
172,000 dollar reported loss or by the couples high standard of living.166
In Flomenhoft, unlike Shapiro, the couple was still married and
there was no evidence that they would separate. Mr. Flomenhoft was in
prison for tax fraud, and because he consented to the deficiency judg-
ments, it may be inferred that the IRS had tried to collect from him
but could not, perhaps because of insolvency. 167 The court may have
160. Id. at 12. The court also found as a second reason that she should have known because
she was an officer and a cotrustee-partner in the husband's companies that were used to generate
the fraudulent deductions. Id. The testimony, however, indicated that her actual activity was mini-
mal, and the court did find, as noted above, that she had no actual knowledge of the understate-
ments. Id. at 9-10.
161. Id. at 10.
162. 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472 (1988).
163. Id. at 1473.
164. Id. at 1474.
165. Id. at 1473. None of this went beyond ordinary support under Sanders because the
husband had been doing very well. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
166. Shapiro, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1474-75.
167. See Flomenhoft, No. 86-C-1588. If so, the IRS could have proceeded against her as a
transferee and avoided the inquiry into her innocence and reason to know.
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feared that Mr. Flomenhoft would enjoy the fruits of his own fraud as a
result and perhaps held against his wife for that reason. Conversely, the
court in Shapiro simply may have felt that the husband should pay the
deficiency, particularly in light of their separation agreement requiring
him to do so.16 As in nearly all the innocent spouse cases, the opinions
reveal nothing about why the IRS did not collect, or at least try to col-
lect, from the husband. Such information is crucial to an evaluation of
the fairness of these cases. While these cases may have been decided
fairly from the point of view of the outcome, they are certainly inconsis-
tent as to the stated criteria for the reason to know standard of inquiry.
A third recent tax shelter case seems completely inconsistent with
Shapiro and seems unjustifiable on any reading of the statute. In Co-
hen v. Commissioner"" a divorced school teacher was held liable for a
4586 dollar deficiency due to a loss reported from a fraudulent tax shel-
ter. It was stipulated that the husband did not know that the shelter
was fraudulent. The husband, a certified public accountant and partner
in the tax department of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., prepared the
return and gave it to her for signature. 70 She did not question him or
anyone else about the shelter, but the court held that as a college grad-
uate, she should have known of her responsibility to review the return
and that her "ostrich imitation" was unreasonable.' 1 ' The court indi-
cated that her failure to question her husband about the item
amounted to intentional ignorance.' 72 If she had questioned her hus-
band, however, what would she have learned? It was stipulated that the
husband himself was deceived as to the shelter. The husband was a tax
specialist and partner in the world's largest accounting firm. Could the
wife, a school teacher without business experience, be expected to unde-
ceive him? Surely reliance upon the expertise of a qualified professional
should be due diligence sufficient to satisfy the reasonable person stan-
dard. The Cohen standard almost seems to be a return to strict liabil-
ity, at least for spouses who have some minimum level of education.
In other tax shelter cases, however, the duty to review and investi-
gate the return seems to have been overlooked entirely. In Bouskos v.
Commissioner'7 3 a divorced housewife was held to have no reason to
know that a coal mining shelter was abusive because her husband did
168. It seems that if the wife had lost she still would have been able to enforce the provision
of the separation agreement requiring her husband to pay the taxes. Because she was not yet
divorced, the divorce court probably still had jurisdiction, and the amounts involved suggest that it
would have been worthwhile for her to proceed against him.
169. 54 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 944 (1987).
170. Id. at 945.
171. Id. at 947.
172. Id.
173. 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117 (1987).
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not discuss finances with her, she had no financial background, and the
couple made no unusually lavish expenditures beyond their generally
high standard of living. An accountant prepared the return, and the
wife did not even look at it when she signed it. 174 The court did not
mention any duty on the part of the wife to review the return, let alone
to investigate a huge deduction attributed to coal mining in West Vir-
ginia although the husband's financial success was attributable to a Cal-
ifornia supermarket business. 175 To the contrary, the court seemed to
count her failure to review and investigate the return as more evidence
that she had no reason to know of the item.70
Similarly, the duty to review seems to have been ignored in Guth v.
Commissioner.1 In Guth the wife, a nurse's assistant, was exonerated
from liability for her husband's disallowed deductions of some 8000 dol-
lars per year for contributions to his own chapter of the Universal Life
Church. 7 18 The court accepted her testimony that she thought the chap-
ter had been formed to further his religious beliefs and that he had
deceived her as to his true motive of tax avoidance. 79 Once again, the
court stressed factors such as her lack of business or tax experience, her
lack of involvement in the family's finances, and the absence of unusual
or lavish expenditures that might have put her on notice, but the court
ignored any duty to review the return.'80 A reasonable person reading
the return, however, and seeing the huge charitable deductions would
have wanted to learn more about the husband's expensive religious ac-
tivities. In addition, she was "treasurer" of the Universal Life Church
chapter, which, had the court applied the Flomenhoft standards, should
have given her reason to know.
One suspects that in both Bouskos and Guth sympathy for the wife
motivated the court to overlook the duty to review the joint return and
inquire as to questionable items. Neither case provides much informa-
tion regarding the wife's financial condition at the time of trial. In other
reported cases, however, it is reasonably clear that the court's overrid-
ing consideration was sympathy. In Smith v. Commissioner,'' for ex-
ample, a disabled widow without employment or assets and with a small
child to support was held to have had no reason to know that her de-
174. Id. at 1119.
175. To be sure, the deductions were apparently reported on a partnership return that the
wife probably never saw, but the amounts were reported on the joint return and inquiry would
have disclosed the nature of the deductions.
176. See Bouskos, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1119-20.
177. 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 878 (1987).
178. Id. at 880-81.
179. Id. at 880.
180. Id. at 881.
181. 53 T.C.M.(CCH) 743 (1987).
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ceased husband, a truck driver, had omitted all but 5612 dollars out of
his 1981 income of 19,122 dollars. The widow had little education and
no business experience, and her husband neither confided his business
affairs to her nor showed her the joint return he required her to sign.182
She had cashed nearly 11,000 dollars in checks for her husband, how-
ever, and had paid approximately 6000 dollars in household bills at his
direction.183 Despite her lack of education, it is difficult to believe that
if the widow had seen the return, she would not have realized that the
family was living on more than the 5612 dollars reported in 1981. The
court would have been heartless to render a decision against her; fur-
thermore, such a decision would have been useless because of the
widow's inability to pay the 6000 dollar deficiency. In order to arrive at
a fair decision, however, the court was compelled to find her free from
liability on the ground that she had no reason to know of the omitted
income.'
5. Purpose of Innocence Requirement
The lack of consistency in these cases is lamentable, but because
the purpose of the innocence requirement itself is not clear, it is far
from clear what could or should be done to correct it. The legislative
history provides little guidance other than, as suggested above, Con-
gress's desire to reverse the results of certain cases like Scudder.8 5 In
light of Scudder, the no reason to know requirement seems aimed at
ensuring that the wife is genuinely a victim of her husband's misdeeds
and has not condoned them by turning a blind eye toward them. How
should courts effectuate that purpose in cases like Shapiro' and Co-
hen,8 7 in which both spouses apparently were victims of fraudulent tax
shelter promotions? What should be the result in cases like McCoy,'88
in which both spouses may have been innocent of the tax effect of in-
corporating a deficit partnership? The question seems unanswerable
182. Id. at 744. She apparently did not ask for such information. Other cases have held that
a guilty spouse's refusal to show the tax return or provide financial information to the petitioner
for innocent spouse status puts the petitioner on notice that something is amiss and defeats inno-
cence. See, e.g., Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300 (1973). Like the voluntary failure to review
the return, the husband's refusal to show the return has cut both ways.
183. Smith, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 744.
184. See id. at 744-46.
185. Scudder v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 886
(1969); see supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
186. Shapiro v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1472 (1988); see supra notes 162-66 and
accompanying text.
187. Cohen v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 944 (1987); see supra notes 169-72 and ac-
companying text.
188. McCoy v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 732 (1972); see supra notes 155-57 and accompanying
text.
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without some other guiding principle or purpose.
The Sixth Circuit recently stated in Purcell v. Commissioner189
that "[t]he purpose of the innocent spouse rule is to protect one spouse
from the overreaching or dishonesty of the other." If so, then perhaps it
was appropriate to deny relief both in Cohen and in McCoy because
neither case seems to have involved dishonesty or overreaching by the
husband. The statute itself makes no such requirement, however, and
many courts have granted relief when the earning spouse does not ap-
pear to have been guilty of any wrongdoing, as in Shapiro, when no
evidence was reported that the husband knew that the tax shelter in
question was abusive.
In effect, the innocence or due diligence requirement has evolved
into a hopelessly inconsistent test that is now little more than an oppor-
tunity for a court to grant relief whenever it feels that the tax liability
would be inequitable under the circumstances. The situation regarding
the equity test seems no different.
6. Equity and Significant Benefit
Under the equity test, the wife must prove that to hold her liable
for the tax would be inequitable under all the facts and circum-
stances. 190 The test requires an investigation into whether the wife re-
ceived a significant benefit from the erroneous item beyond ordinary
support. 1 ' This test can be ambiguous, because, as the Fifth Circuit
stated in Sanders v. United States, "[O]ne person's luxury can be an-
other's necessity, and the lavishness of an expense must be measured
from each family's relative level of ordinary support.'1 92 In Sanders the
wife was held to have no reason to know of the husband's unreported
income, despite the purchase and improvement of a new home, new
cars, a condominium in the Bahamas, and gambling trips to Las Vegas
because the deceased husband was a wealthy physician. 93 The court
also found no significant benefit to the wife, despite the couple's life-
style, apparently because after the doctor's death, she was left with no
189. 826 F.2d 470, 475 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); see infra notes 213-
15 and accompanying text.
190. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
191. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, div. A, § 424, 98 Stat. 494, 801, omitted the
explicit requirement of a significant benefit to the innocent spouse, but the Committee Report
explained: "The bill does not specifically require that the determination of whether it would be
inequitable to hold the innocent spouse liable include the consideration of whether such spouse
benefitted from the erroneous item, but that factor should continue to be taken into account." H.R.
REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1502 (1984).
192. Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 168 (5th Cir. 1975), af'g 369 F. Supp. 160 (N.D.
Ala. 1973).
193. See id. at 166, 170.
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assets other than about 150,000 dollars in life insurance proceeds.194
The court below explained at length that because she was a housewife
with no employment prospects and with a small child to support, the
life insurance proceeds probably would be insufficient for her needs,
and in any case, any benefit received from the deceased husband's unre-
ported income would accrue eventually to the child for its feeding, shel-
ter, and education.195
Similarly, in Dakil v. United States9 ' the widow of a wealthy doc-
tor who had omitted substantial amounts of income was exonerated
from a deficiency of about 30,000 dollars, despite the fact that a jury
interrogatory held against her on the issue of significant benefit. The
Tenth Circuit, upholding the court below, held that it was not con-
vinced she had benefited from a luxurious lifestyle during marriage be-
cause no evidence was presented as to what would be ordinary support
in her circumstances. Moreover, the court held that the equity require-
ment must be met in addition to the substantial benefit test, and the
court found that to impose her husband's taxes on her would be over-
whelmingly inequitable. The widow had accumulated no cash from the
marriage, she worked part-time helping senior citizens at one dollar and
sixty cents per hour, and she received social security payments of 207
dollars per month. 9 ' The court said: "The unnecessarily harsh attempt
to collect from her individually the tax liabilities of her husband should
never have been made, and, having been made, should be cast into ob-
livion. Even a tax collector should have some heart."'"" The court made
no findings as to her net worth, however, and it appears that she did
own a home and automobiles.199
Even in circumstances in which the wife in fact received significant
amounts of property, the ordinary support limitation seems to have
provided some courts an opportunity to dispense mercy. In Terzian v.
Commissioner0 0 the Tax Court held that 155,000 dollars transferred to
the wife in lieu of alimony, some of which was traceable to omitted in-
come of the husband, did not constitute a significant benefit. In Ter-
zian the wife was fifty-three years old at the time of divorce and had no
skills or reasonable prospect for employment. The court held that the
settlement would provide the wife with no more than reasonable sup-
194. It appears that the husband may have paid the premiums in part out of his unreported
income, however. See Sanders, 369 F. Supp. at 166.
195. Id. at 166-67.
196. 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974).
197. Id. at 433.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. 72 T.C. 1164 (1979).
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port for the rest of her life, but did not inquire into what level of sup-
port the husband could have provided if he had paid his taxes
correctly. 01
In all three cases it appears that the courts were moved to apply
the significant benefit test with leniency out of sympathy for the tax-
payers. A finding in any of these cases that the wife had benefited
would have required her to pay the entire deficiency, without limitation
to the amount by which she actually benefited from the omitted
income.
It is not easy to find a case in which a court denied relief solely on
the ground of significant benefit.0 2 The language of the statute requires
a finding of no actual or constructive knowledge as well as a finding
that it would be inequitable to deny relief.20 3 The cases deciding against
taxpayers on the ground of significant benefit, however, seem invariably
to find also that the petitioner for relief had constructive knowledge,
perhaps because benefits that are large enough to be significant are ipso
facto sufficiently large to put the spouse claiming innocence on notice
that something is wrong. Even if the wife was not aware of the signifi-
cant benefit at the time of signing the return, the IRS still can argue
that if she had made proper inquiry, she would have known of the erro-
neous items. For example, in Adams v. Commissioner04 the husband,
who was the spouse claiming relief, was found to have received a signifi-
cant benefit from his wife's omission of sales commissions because his
property settlement at divorce was 257,000 dollars, while prior to di-
vorce his separate net worth was only 33,000 dollars. His claim to inno-
cence on the ground that his wife refused to show him the joint returns
and refused to disclose her separate income also was rejected, however,
because her refusal to be forthright should have put him on notice. In
addition, he made no attempt to set straight his separate tax liability. 05
Under the case law, it appears that in practice, if not in theory, the
equity and significant benefit tests are not separate from the innocence
test. At best they may be aspects of a single global test of fairness.
Often, however, the tests seem little more than ritual formulas that a
court must recite in order to grant relief in sympathetic cases.
201. See id. at 1172.
202. A district court did, however, make such a decision in Busse v. United States, 75-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9714 (1975), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 542 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1976).
203. See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C), (D) (Supp. V 1987).
204. 60 T.C. 300 (1973).
205. Id. at 303.
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7. No Basis in Fact or Law
As originally enacted in 1971, the innocent spouse rules applied
only to omissions from gross income. The Tax Reform Act of 1984206
broadened the rules to provide relief for deficiencies resulting from er-
roneous claims of deduction, credit, or basis, but only if they are "in an
amount for which there is no basis in fact or law. 2 07 The burden is
upon the spouse claiming innocence to prove that such an erroneous
claim has no basis in fact or law,208 and sustaining this burden is some-
times difficult. The phrase is new to the tax law and has no clear defini-
tion.209 The committee reports provide some guidance by using the
phrase "phony business deductions" as an example of the kind of item
intended. 10 In addition, it is clear at least that a deduction will not
qualify for relief merely because it is disallowed.2 1' Beyond that, the
standard is ambiguous, as can be seen from two recent cases involving
deductions for worthless stock losses. In Shenker v. Commissioner212
the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that because the
facts found by the Tax Court clearly indicated that the corporation in
question remained viable until 1972, there was simply no basis for
claiming the loss in 1971, and the standard therefore was met.
By contrast, in Purcell v. Commissioner13 the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the Tax Court's conclusion that because the corporation was in
financial straits in 1977 some arguable factual and legal basis existed
for claiming the loss in that year, and that the standard therefore was
not met. The Purcell court attempted to distinguish Shenker by argu-
ing that if there had been some basis there for claiming the loss in 1971,
the Eighth Circuit would have reached the same result as the Sixth Cir-
cuit.214 Judge Jones disagreed, however, and offered a concurring opin-
ion in Purcell in which he argued that the court simply should have
rejected the Eighth Circuit's analysis as erroneous on the ground that it
in effect "equated the nondeductibility of a claimed loss with the con-
clusion that a deduction taken for that loss has 'no basis in fact or
law.' ,,215 Measuring the degree of arguability for a deduction promises
to be a very troublesome, if not hopeless task.
206. Tax Reform Act of 1984, supra note 191, § 424, 98 Stat. at 801-03.
207. I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1987).
208. See Allen v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1975).
209. For an extended discussion of this problem, see Borison, Innocent Spouse Relief: A Call
for Legislative and Judicial Liberalization, 40 TAx LAW. 819, 842-60 (1987).
210. See H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 191, pt. 2, at 1502.
211. See id.
212. 804 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1986).
213. 826 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1987).
214. Id. at 475.
215. Id. at 476-77 (Jones, J., concurring).
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One commentator has pointed out that placing the burden of proof
on the wife to demonstrate the lack of any factual or legal basis of dis-
allowed deductions may put her in the "proverbial 'Catch-22.' "216 If the
wife is able to prove the phoniness of the deduction in the year of trial,
the IRS may argue that she could have done so in the year the return
was filed. Therefore she had reason to know of the understatement and
should be denied relief on that ground.217
Another difficulty is that the wife's burden may require her to
prove fraud on the part of her husband. If the couple is still married,
such a requirement would invite either marital disharmony or collusion.
Both are troubling from the point of view of public policy.2
Finally, it should be noted that a wife is often not in a position to
prove anything at all with respect to her husband's deductions if she is
separated or widowed. For example, in Douglas v. Commissioner219 the
husband died before the IRS audited the joint return, and because his
record keeping was inadequate, the widow was unable to substantiate
his deductions. She claimed innocent spouse relief, but because she
could not prove that the deductions were without foundation in fact or
law, relief was denied.2 0
8. Dollar Limits
The innocent spouse rules also impose certain arbitrary dollar lim-
its. Unless the grossly erroneous items, independent of interest and
penalties, result in a tax understatement exceeding 500 dollars, for ex-
ample, they are not considered substantial, and no relief is available.221
This standard is unfair to the relatively poor individuals for whom
amounts under 500 dollars may be quite substantial.222
For a grossly erroneous claim of deduction, credit, or basis to qual-
216. Borison, supra note 209, at 854.
217. See id.
218. Id. at 852.
219. 86 T.C. 758 (1986).
220. Id. at 762-63.
221. See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3) (Supp. V 1987). Before the Tax Reform Act of 1984 introduced
amendments, an omission in excess of 25% of the gross income stated in the return was required in
order for a taxpayer to qualify for relief. See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(A) (1982). Courts construed this
requirement very strictly, which sometimes led to harsh results. In Estate of Klein v. Commis-
sioner, 537 F.2d 701 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976), a widow was denied relief for a
$45,000 omission although that was more than half of the gross income stated on the joint return,
on the ground that a partnership return that the husband had filed had to be read together with
the personal return. The court further held that "gross income" meant gross receipts without de-
duction for cost of goods sold, and because the husband's share of gross receipts of the partnership
was over $1,000,000, the court denied relief. Id. at 706 & n.11.
222. A nonqualifying deficiency even may exceed $500, when interest and penalties are
included.
1990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
ify for relief as a substantial understatement, it must meet in addition
some onerous percentage of income requirements.22 If the wife's in-
come for the preadjustment year is 20,000 dollars or less, the tax liabil-
ity attributable to the erroneous claim (not the claim itself) must
exceed ten percent of such adjusted gross income (AGI).224 Further, if
such AGI for the preadjustment year is more than 20,000 dollars, the
tax liability attributable to the claim must exceed twenty-five percent
of such AGI.225 Preadjustment year is defined as the most recent taxa-
ble year ending before the date the deficiency notice is mailed.226 These
requirements seem designed to ensure that only very burdensome
amounts of liability that might strain the wife's present ability to pay
will qualify for relief.
If the wife has remarried, she must include her new husband's in-
come in the preadjustment year income test, even if she did not file a
joint return with her new husband.2 7 Because the new husband will not
be liable personally for the wife's former taxes, this provision does not
measure her ability to pay. In addition, the new husband may be put in
the position of having to pay the first husband's taxes in order to avoid
seizure of his wife's property, garnishment of her wages, or bankruptcy.
The rule is wholly unjustified.
9. Hardship
No statutory relief exists for hardship or inability to pay. No mat-
ter how impoverished the wife, and no matter how large the husband's
tax deficiency, the IRS can and does levy upon the wife's salary, car, or
home to pay the husband's taxes.228 Some courts have considered hard-
ship as an explicit factor for relief under the equity test.229 Even if relief
is finally granted in court, however, the anguish and cost of litigation
may cause an indigent wife substantial hardship. In cases like Smith v.
Commissioner,23 ° in which it was obvious that the wife could not pay
223. See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(4) (Supp. V 1987).
224. Id. § 6013(e)(4)(A).
225. Id. § 6013(e)(4)(B).
226. See id. § 6013(e)(4)(C).
227. Id. § 6013(e)(4)(D).
228. Note here that state law exemptions from enforcement of private judgments do not ap-
ply to federal tax collections. IRS collection powers are enormously greater than those of any pri-
vate creditor. Compare I.R.C. § 6334(d) (1982) (establishing IRS right to levy upon all the
taxpayer's wages or salary except only $75 per week (plus $25 for each dependent)) with N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. § 5205(d) (McKinney 1978) (requiring an exemption of 90% of the debtor's income,
leaving only 10% subject to garnishment by creditors).
229. See, e.g., Dakil v. United States, 496 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1974); see also supra notes 196-
99 and accompanying text. Contra Instruction Administrative of Feb. 18, 1985, 5-B-10-85, no. 14
(providing that hardship is an explicit reason for relief).
230. 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 743 (1987); see also supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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the tax in any event, the IRS collection efforts seem pointless.
10. No Obligation to Pursue the Husband First
The IRS has no obligation to pursue the husband first and exhaust
collection attempts against him before turning to the wife. Indeed, al-
most the reverse situation exists. Joint return liability seems to have no
other purpose than to provide the IRS with the power to choose which-
ever spouse has assets more easily available for levy, without regard for
which spouse is responsible for the deficiency.
Recently, however, the IRS has announced a new policy that is at
least a step in the direction of pursuing the husband first. The IRS will
permit its field personnel to defer collection involving potential inno-
cent spouses. Instead, they may pursue the "responsible" spouse first,
before making a determination of the innocence claim. If collection can-
not be made from the responsible spouse, the IRS then could determine
the validity of the innocent spouse claim."' This policy would be of
immense value if it were mandatory rather than discretionary and if it
applied to all cases, rather than only to those in which there is a colora-
ble claim for innocent spouse relief.
11. Position to Defend Deficiency
A consequence of permitting the IRS to pursue the wife first is that
sometimes she effectively may be prevented from contesting an incor-
rect deficiency. If the items in question relate to the husband's income
or deductions, the wife may not have knowledge of or access to the rele-
vant records. Without such access to the facts she may not be able to
submit evidence in her defense. Because the Commissioner's assessment
has the presumption of correctness, she has the burden of proof, and
she cannot prevail without presenting evidence. Thus, the wife may be
forced to pay taxes relating to her husband's income that he himself
might have been able to prove that he did not owe. This irony appears
to be the situation in Anna's case with which this Article began. She
may have the curious problem of proving-without records-that Rob-
231. See Letter from Grant A. Newman, Director, Office of Field Operations (July 6, 1988),
quoted in O'Connell, Innocent Spouse Rules Can Avoid Unexpected Liability on Joint Returns
with Former Spouse, 17 TAx'N FOR LAW. 226, 229 (1989). The letter, as quoted, reads:
In our next revision of Internal Revenue Manual 5300, we will install language permitting
our field personnel, with managerial concurrence, to defer collection on potential "innocent
spouse" situations. Field personnel will be made aware under what conditions Internal Reve-
nue Code 6013(e) permits a spouse to qualify for relief as an "innocent spouse" and to refer
that case to the Examination Division for consideration. Collection activity against the "re-
sponsible spouse" will proceed as normal.
Id.
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ert's deductions were either phony, as the wife in Douglas232 could not,
or legitimate; nothing in between will suffice.
B. Proposals for Amending the Innocent Spouse Rules
The rules for relief often have been criticized as too restrictive, and
many commentators have cried for reform to provide relief in more sit-
uations. 233 Many improvements easily might be made. For example, the
relief provisions would be much more fair if all of the dollar limitations
were repealed,234 as California has done in its version of the innocent
spouse rules.235 The "no basis in fact or law" restriction might be re-
pealed so that any disallowed claim of deduction, credit, or item would
qualify for potential relief. 236 California also has taken this step.23 7 The
legislature might reverse the burden of proof, as it is for the civil fraud
penalty, so that the government would be required to prove actual or
constructive knowledge and significant benefit.23 s This measure would
be an improvement, but would not solve the problems of ambiguity in-
herent in these criteria.
No good reason seems to support continuing to exclude simple non-
payment of tax from the list of situations qualifying for relief. If the
husband fails to pay his share of the tax, that may be just as irresponsi-
ble as underreporting, and the consequences may be just as unfair to
the wife. California, again, provides some relief in this situation, but
unfortunately hedges the relief with innocence and equity
requirements. 39
A dramatic improvement could be made by requiring the IRS to
pursue the husband first in all cases, and then permitting collection
232. Douglas v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 758 (1986); see supra notes 219-20 and accompanying
text.
233. See Borison, supra note 209; Goldstein, The Innocent Spouse Act, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 448
(1972); Lax, The Innocent Spouse Provision Under Section 6013(e) of the Internal Revenue Code:
Relief or Refuse?, 12 U. ARK. LITrLE RoCK L.J. 25 (1989); Panny & Faust, The Innocent Spouse
Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code: In Search of Equity, 32 U. MIAmi L. REV. 137 (1977);
Phillips & Braford, Even a Tax Collector Should Have Some Heart: Equitable Relief for the
Innocent Spouse Under IRC § 6013(e), 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 33 (1987); Quick & DuCanto, Joint Tax
Liability and the "Innocent Spouse" Doctrine in Common Law and Community Property Juris-
dictions: A Review of Code Section 6013(e) and its Progeny, Section 66, 17 FAM. L.Q. 65 (1983);
Note, The Innocent Spouse Rule: Recent Developments and Proposed Changes, 14 Sw. U.L. REV.
129 (1983).
234. See Borison, supra note 209, at 863.
235. See infra note 367 and accompanying text.
236. See Borison, supra note 209, at 863.
237. See infra note 366 and accompanying text.
238. This was suggested in Goldstein, supra note 233, at 459, and again in Panny & Faust,
supra note 233, at 170.
239. See infra Part VI(B).
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from the wife only when such efforts have proved fruitless.240 This rule
is used in France and Belgium.241 Such a measure probably would elimi-
nate the vast majority of cases. As noted above, the IRS apparently has
taken a first step in this direction.
1. Impossibility of Repairing the Innocent Spouse Rules
There seems to be no natural or fair stopping point for expanding
the scope of the innocent spouse rules because no clear policy or princi-
ple justifies joint return liability in the first place. Without such a prin-
ciple, any amendments short of outright repeal of joint return liability
necessarily will be arbitrary. This contention can perhaps be seen most
clearly by analyzing the rationale of the innocence requirement, which
lies at the heart of the relief rules.
2. Inappropriateness of the Innocence Requirement
The innocence requirements under I.R.C. section 6013(e) are inap-
propriate as a theoretical basis for relief both under current law and
under any proposed reform. Even a requirement of actual knowledge
before liability could be imposed would be unjustified unless joint re-
turn liability itself can be justified independently.
Certainly, no duty of innocence exists in any form if each spouse
files separately. A wife filing separately will not become liable even if
she has actual knowledge of the other spouse's tax cheating. Indeed,
that may be the very reason she is filing separately. The wife even can
enjoy gifts out of the proceeds of the husband's tax cheating, provided
she is not herself a participant in the tax fraud, and provided the hus-
band does not become insolvent as a result of the transfers. 42
This drastic difference in the wife's level of duty cannot be justified
by the fact that the wife signs the joint return under penalty of perjury.
240. Such a rule would not be unique in the Code. In 1982 Congress enacted amendments to
§ 302(c) allowing waiver of attribution from entities in the context of stock redemptions. These
amendments include a related rule of joint and several liability, which is enforceable in just this
manner. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 228, 96 Stat.
324, 493 (codified at I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(C) (1982)) (TEFRA). According to the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation:
The entity and beneficiaries are jointly and severally liable in the event of an acquisition by
any of them within the 10-year period. . .Congress intended that the tax will be collected
from a beneficiary only when it cannot be assessed against or collected from the entity, such
as when the entity no longer exists or has insufficient funds. Further, it was intended that the
tax will be assessed and collected from the beneficiary whose acquisition causes the deficiency
before it is asserted against any other beneficiary.
General Explanation of TEFRA, Joint Committee on Taxation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1982).
241. See infra Part VI(A).
242. Spouses may incur transferee liability according to the same rules as any other taxpayer.
See infra Part VII(B).
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Such reasoning is circular. The Treasury never has explained ade-
quately why one spouse should be required to certify the accuracy of
the other's tax items.
3. From Strict Liability to Due Diligence
The courts interpret the innocence test as whether a "reasonable
person under the circumstances" would have reason to know of the un-
derstatement.2' The test sounds as if it were imported from tort law. In
fact, much of the case law reads as if the wife actually owed some duty
of care to protect the IRS from negligence or fraud on the part of her
husband. Such a duty would be analogous, for example, to the duty of
an accountant to inquire into the facts of underlying transactions that
appear suspicious in order to protect third persons who may rely on the
accountant's client's financial statements. 44 If such a duty existed, the
appropriate damages for its breach would be to make good the govern-
ment's loss, namely, to pay the husband's taxes plus interest.
The law recognizes no duty on the part of a spouse to act as an
auditor for the IRS. It appears, however, that the innocent spouse rules
accidentally have created the equivalent of such a duty. If such a duty
were recognized, however, some rationale for joint liability would be
provided. It is perhaps for this reason that the law appears to be mov-
ing in the direction of replacing the rule of strict liability under I.R.C.
section 6013(d) with a theory of negligence or due diligence as the prin-
ciple for imposing joint return liability. 45
243. See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 509 F.2d 162, 170 (5th Cir. 1975); see also supra note
152 and accompanying text.
244. Courts have imposed liability on accountants in connection with public offerings of se-
curities. See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982). Seaboard held that
an accountant may be liable for securities fraud under rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989), if
the accountant knows or is reckless in not knowing that facts reported in a prospectus materially
misrepresent the financial condition of issuer. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982).
245. It would not be inaccurate to describe the present state of law, at least as applied to
grossly erroneous items that exceed the dollar floor limitations, as follows: the wife is not liable for
her husband's taxes on a joint return unless she knows or should have known of the erroneous
item, i.e., fails to exercise due diligence. This formulation of the law is of course backwards: the
statute imposes strict liability in the absence of relief for due diligence.
The two formulations are fully equivalent in effect, but they carry vastly different implica-
tions. If the wife acquires liability only through negligence, the rule implies that she originally has
no such liability. In short, it is logically a rejection of joint return liability, to the extent that such
liability means the wife is herself the taxpayer with respect to her husband's taxes.
There is a difference between incurring a tax liability, and being the taxpayer with respect to
it. Thus, an employer is liable for the withholding of tax from an employee, but the employer is
not the taxpayer, and as a result can deduct withheld taxes as compensation expense, despite the
prohibition against deducting federal income taxes under I.R.C. § 275 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). One
can never avoid one's own taxes merely by showing that there was no reason to know of an item of
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It is appealing to view the wife's liability as caused by some fault of
her own, rather than as the result of a rule that appears purely arbi-
trary and therefore intuitively unfair. All the proposed reforms of the
innocent spouse rules discussed above would enlarge the areas governed
by negligence and contract the area of strict liability. Eliminating the
dollar limitations on relief, eliminating the requirement that erroneous
claims must have no foundation in fact or law, and reversing the burden
of proof as to innocence all would move the law in the same direction.
Unfortunately, however, joint return liability based on fault is only su-
perficially appealing and will not survive analysis.
4. Wife As Return Preparer
A comparison with the legal duty upon return preparers is instruc-
tive. Return preparers are liable for the penalty under section 6694(a)
for negligent disregard of rules and regulations if they know or have
reason to know that a taxpayer has provided them with inaccurate or
incomplete information: in short, a preparer has a duty to inquire into
questionable items." 6 The due diligence test under the innocent spouse
rules is very similar to the test under section 6694(a). Ordinarily a
preparer will not be familiar with the taxpayer's personal finances and
will not know of extraordinary expenditures or a lavish lifestyle of the
taxpayer. If the preparer, however, is aware of inconsistencies between
the taxpayer's actual transactions and those reported because he or she
is a friend or family member of the taxpayer, or because he or she has
prepared related returns, the accountant will be liable for the penalty if
he or she fails to inquire into the apparent discrepancies.
At this point the analogy to the duty of preparers breaks down.
The penalty for a preparer's negligence is 100 dollars per return.24 7 The
government never has attempted to require a negligent preparer to pay
the resulting deficiency of the taxpayer. Yet the government has a
much stronger case for reliance on a preparer's professional integrity
and expertise than on a wife who may know little or nothing about
taxes, and who does not purport to be responsible for the correctness of
her husband's tax items. Moreover, the wife claiming innocence is not a
preparer at all.248 If the husband prepared the return, it is difficult to
income. To be sure, this leaves out the benefit test, but it is at least thinkable that an item of
taxable income might provide no economic benefit because, for instance, it becomes useless before
the taxpayer becomes aware of its existence.
246. See I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1982); see also Rev. Rul. 80-265, 1980-2 C.B. 378 (holding that a
preparer of a corporate return indicating interest paid to a shareholder has a duty to inquire when
preparing a return of a shareholder who did not furnish any information as to interest received).
247. I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1982).
248. It is nearly unthinkable that a wife who in fact prepared the return might achieve inno-
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see why the IRS should have any right to rely on the wife's signature
for the accuracy of his tax items.
The duty of due diligence on the part of preparers arises from their
professional responsibility in a system of self-assessment which is so
complex that professional assistance is generally essential to its admin-
istration. If the taxpayer is unwilling to provide complete information
to the preparer, the preparer is free to resign, and the taxpayer will be
forced to seek another preparer, who will be subject to the same obliga-
tions as the first. In such circumstances, it makes sense for the IRS to
claim some right to rely on the preparer's due diligence.
The wife's duty of due diligence did not arise from any perception
of a need to protect the Treasury from irresponsible certification of the
husband's return. Quite the reverse, the duty arose from a perception
that the wife needs protection from IRS collection powers under section
6013(d).249
If the wife is dissatisfied with the return as prepared by her hus-
band or his accountant, assuming she reads the return and makes in-
quiries, she can try to persuade her husband to make the return
accurate, or she can refuse to sign. She already has an incentive to en-
courage her husband to file accurately, namely, to keep him from poten-
tial difficulties with the IRS that may subject him to serious financial or
even criminal penalties. If he refuses and insists on her signature, she
risks the stability of her marriage by defying him.
The IRS gains no assurance that the husband's tax items are cor-
rect when the wife signs the joint return. 5 ' The IRS has no reason to
rely on her signature as to the accuracy of his part of the return; her
signature is likely at best to mean no more than that she considers mar-
ital tranquility more important than involving herself in her husband's
financial affairs.
cent spouse status under current law (although nothing in the statute would appear to prevent it).
249. See I.R.C. § 6013(d) (1982). If Congress had not overruled the Cole case, and propor-
tional (separate) liability were the general rule for joint returns, it would be extremely unlikely
that anything like the current innocence requirements would have developed to impose liability on
the wife for her husband's taxes. There would be no duty of due diligence for her to breach, and no
reliance interest on the part of the IRS. It would be obvious that the wife's signature related only
to her own tax items. Even if she prepared the return for her husband as well, she would at worst
become liable for the preparer penalties.
250. On the other hand, the IRS might adopt a policy of routinely auditing husbands who file
separately, on the ground that their wives may be filing separately in order to avoid liability for
dubious items. If so, the wife's separate return would be regarded as a tacit denunciation to the
IRS of the husband's return. It of course would be intolerable to impose such a duty explicitly: the
wife must either pay the husband's delinquent taxes herself, or notify the IRS of tax fraud.
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5. Innocence Requirement Defeats the Purpose of Joint Filing
A duty of due diligence requires the wife to become involved in tax
matters. The original purpose of introducing joint returns was, at least
in part, to relieve her of that burden. Joint returns originally were in-
troduced simply for convenience. Both taxpayers and the government
benefited from the convenience of filing one return instead of two, long
before tax rates and joint liability became issues. Under a due diligence
requirement, the wife may not, under peril of joint return liability, en-
trust the family tax affairs to her husband. In effect, both spouses must
prepare the joint return, which frustrates the original intention behind
joint filing. Requiring both spouses to prepare the return is wasteful
and inefficient. One may suppose that in most families one spouse takes
responsibility for preparing the return, and the other simply provides
any relevant information and records. Under such circumstances, it is
unclear why the IRS should be able to assert that it is entitled to rely
on the nonpreparing spouse's signature for anything but that spouse's
own taxes.
V. OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS FOR JOINT RETURN LIABIITY
A. Tax Benefit of Income Splitting as Justification
Policy reasons for imposing joint and several liability for the privi-
lege of filing a joint return are obscure at best. The widely held belief
that such liability is the price one must pay in exchange for the tax
benefits of income splitting is not correct either historically or logically.
As a matter of history, the statute has required joint and several liabil-
ity since 1938, but income splitting was not introduced until ten years
later.2 51
Income splitting permits couples with substantially disproportion-
ate incomes to lower their taxes by dividing their aggregate income into
two equal parts that are taxed separately, so that some of the higher
earner's income may be taxed in a lower bracket. The effect of income
splitting is built into the tax tables for married taxpayers filing jointly.
When income splitting first was enacted in the Revenue Act of 1948,212
it was a relatively simple concept. The effect on the rate of tax was the
same as if each spouse separately reported one-half of his or her own
income together with one-half of the other spouse's income, just as
couples were doing in the community property states on the authority
251. See supra notes 51, 69, and accompanying text.
252. See Revenue Act of 1948, supra note 69, § 301, 62 Stat. at 114.
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of Poe v. Seaborn.253 Indeed, that was precisely the intended effect, be-
cause Congress's purpose in enacting income splitting for joint filers
was to equalize the tax rates for married couples in common law states
who were disadvantaged in comparison to couples in community prop-
erty states. 54
If joint and several liability had any justification as a quid pro quo
for lower taxes, Congress plausibly might have imposed it on all mar-
ried couples who by right of their marital status enjoy the option of
choosing whichever filing status is less costly. In every year since 1918,
when joint returns were first introduced as an optional filing status,255
some couples have paid less tax by filing separately.256 Why not charge
them some price for this benefit? It is all a matter of perspective. If
joint returns originally had been mandatory for married couples in
1913, as they were in the United Kingdom,257 for example, and a new
option of separate filing had been introduced afterwards, the new op-
tion, which could avoid aggregating two incomes into a higher tax
bracket, would have been regarded as the valuable privilege. The bene-
fits to couples in both filing categories ultimately derive from the privi-
lege of choosing the category in which they will pay the least tax.
Even if one supposes arguendo that the enjoyment of income split-
ting should require the exaction of some price, the quid should bear
some reasonable relation to the quo. The tax saving from filing jointly
may be insignificant, however, compared to the total tax liability
thereby assumed. For the benefit justification to make sense, the maxi-
mum liability assumed should be the saving achieved by filing jointly
over filing separately.
It is not entirely clear how the tax benefits of income splitting
should be calculated, and often it is not clear whether such benefits
exist at all. For many couples who are subject to joint return liability,
there is a tax benefit only when joint filing is compared to married filing
separately. For most two-earner couples, there is a tax detriment if
253. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
254. See H.R. REP. No. 1040, supra note 78, at 12, reprinted in 1941-2 C.B. at 422-23.
255. See Revenue Act of 1918, supra note 55, § 223, 40 Stat. at 1074.
256. Before income splitting was enacted, it was usually advantageous for high income
couples who both had income to file separately in order to avoid aggregating their incomes into a
higher bracket. If one spouse had losses, however, it was advantageous to file jointly so that the
losses could offset the other spouse's income.
After income splitting was introduced in 1948, it became more rare, but still possible, that
couples could reduce their taxes by filing separately. For example, one spouse may have large
medical expenses or casualty losses that would be allowable on a separate return, but disallowed on
a joint return because they are allowable only to the extent they exceed 7.5% and 10% of adjusted
gross income, respectively. See I.R.C. § 213(a) (Supp. V 1987); id. § 165(h)(2)(A)(ii); see also infra
note 265.
257. See Ritz, supra note 128, at 445 & n.59.
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joint filing is compared to filing as single persons, a detriment known as
the marriage penalty.
1. Marriage Penalty
The marriage penalty arose in 1969 as a result of amendments to
the 1948 rate structure that Congress enacted in response to complaints
of single taxpayers.5 8 A single taxpayer could be liable for as much as
forty-one percent more than the tax on a couple having the same aggre-
gate income but filing jointly. In 1969 Congress reduced the rate on sin-
gle persons so that their tax would never exceed 120 percent of the tax
payable by married couples at the same income level. 5 9
Married persons filing separately, however, are not permitted to
use the reduced rate applicable to unmarried persons. Permitting them
to do so would reintroduce the very problem of geographical disparity
that income splitting was designed to resolve.260 For that reason, mar-
ried persons filing separately are required to use the old rate for unmar-
ried persons, now called the rate for married filing separately.26'
As a result, married persons now often must pay higher taxes than
they would if they were unmarried: hence the terms "marriage penalty"
and "marriage tax.' '262 The marriage penalty affects two-earner couples,
and as their incomes become more nearly equal, the penalty increases.
For couples whose incomes are substantially disproportionate and for
one-earner couples, the joint return rates remain advantageous. Under
1988 rates fifty-three percent of all couples will receive an average mar-
riage subsidy of about 609 dollars, and forty percent of all couples will
pay an average marriage tax of about 1100 dollars. The total of the
marriage subsidy is estimated at 17.4 billion dollars, but the total mar-
riage penalty is greater, at 24 billion dollars.268
258. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 262 (1969).
259. See id.
260. Otherwise, couples resident in community property states could reduce their taxes be-
low the joint return rate by dividing their income evenly under Poe v. Seaborn and filing sepa-
rately using the new reduced rate for unmarried persons. Couples in common-law states could not
reduce their taxes by filing separately, however, unless their incomes were in fact approximately
equal.
261. Thus income splitting now produces a tax that is higher than twice the tax on half the
same income reported by an unmarried taxpayer; however, the joint tax is equal to twice the tax
on half the income reported as married filing separately.
262. The problem was exacerbated when the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed former § 221,
the deduction for two-earner married couples, which provided some limited relief from the mar-
riage penalty. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 131, 100 Stat. 2085, 2113; see
also Subotnik, The Marriage Tax Revisited: An Analysis of the Tax Consequences of Marriage,
90 W. VA. L. Rlv. 1127 (1988).
263. See Rosen, The Marriage Tax Is Down but Not Out, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 567, 573-74
(1987). The marriage tax was reduced somewhat by the rate changes of the Tax Reform Act of
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Thus, it cannot accurately be said that the status of marriage al-
ways provides a valuable tax option. For two-earner couples, marriage
often occasions an unfortunate and expensive disadvantage because
neither filing status for married persons is as beneficial as not being
married at all. 64 Under current tax rules, neither marital status is good
or bad in itself; everything depends on the taxpayer's situation in the
tangle of rules. The argument that income splitting justifies joint return
liability seems hollow for that forty percent of married couples who suf-
fer the marriage penalty. While they may be better off filing jointly
than filing separately, they would be still better off if they had never
married, or were divorced. From this vantage point, filing jointly, as
ninety-nine percent of married persons do, involves an overall tax detri-
ment, rather than a benefit. If joint return liability were justified on a
quid pro quo theory, the liability probably should have been abolished
in 1969, when the marriage penalty arose.
2. Variability of Benefits
The tax system is designed almost to force married persons to file
jointly rather than separately, primarily through the irresistible incen-
tive of income splitting.265 The joint return aptly has been called
1986, and the subsidy is somewhat higher than before.
It does not appear that Rosen's calculations take into account the right of spouses to offset
each other's gains and losses on a joint return, but, on the other hand, it is not clear what differ-
ence that would make if it were taken into account.
264. The marriage penalty was held to be constitutional in the United States but unconstitu-
tional in Germany. See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of the marriage penalty in a test case brought by a lawyer and his wife who filed
separately but attempted to use the rate table for unmarried persons). The court conceded that
the penalty had an adverse effect upon marriage, but said that the effect was merely indirect, and
that couples are not thereby "absolutely prevented" from getting married. The Drukers had in fact
divorced by the time of the decision in order to escape the marriage penalty, and continued to live
together. Id. at 50.
This result contrasts with the very similar constitutional objection that was successfully raised
in Germany against a marriage penalty arising from compulsory aggregation of both spouses' in-
comes on mandatory joint returns. See infra Part VI(A)(2).
265. There are also other tax detriments to married persons filing separately, however.
The general rule for items of deduction, exemption, exclusion, or credit is that each spouse
filing a joint return is entitled to the same deductions to which he or she would be entitled if
single, unless otherwise specified. Thus, trade or business expenses, for example, are generally de-
ductible under I.R.C. § 162 (1982), without any disadvantage to joint filers. There are many items
of deduction, exemption, exclusion, or credit, however, which have their own particular restrictions
for joint filers. Such rules do not appear to evidence any consistent philosophy, except that nearly
all such sections work to the disadvantage of married persons. Perhaps the philosophy is that an
overly generous benefit is already given in the form of income splitting, and joint filers should be
required to relinquish some of this benefit through the special restrictions. If so, the theory is
seriously flawed, because the recapturing restrictions strike equally those who are benefited by
joint returns and those who are already injured by the marriage penalty.
In any event, an unfortunate result is that elaborate calculations must sometimes be made to
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determine whether it is more advantageous to file jointly or separately. Note here that several of
the limitations listed below seem to have the purpose of discouraging married persons from filing
separately, perhaps to prevent such status shopping.
Wherever items involve dollar limits or percentage of income limitations, there are almost
always special rules for joint filers. Nearly all such sections tend to reduce the advantage of filing
jointly. Many sections prescribe dollar limits for deductions but allow joint filers a deduction that
is something less than twice the amount allowable to a single person; often it is the same amount
as if the joint return were a single person. Married persons usually cannot avoid the problem by
filing separately, however, because the statute generally allows only half the joint deduction to
each spouse filing separately, and sometimes nothing at all, rather than the amount allowable to
unmarried taxpayers. Such sections include, for example: I.R.C. § 55(d) (Supp. V 1987) (providing
an alternative minimum tax exempt amount, which is $40,000 for joint returns, $30,000 for singles,
and $20,000 for married filing separately); id. § 63(c)(2) (providing the standard deduction, which
is $5000 for joint returns, $3000 for singles, and $2500 for married filing separately); id. § 121(b)
(1982) (providing a one-time exclusion of gain from sale of a principal residence, which is $125,000
for joint filers and singles, but $62,500 for married filing separately); id. § 129(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987)
(providing the dependent care exclusion, which is $5000 for joint returns and singles, but $2500 for
married filing separately); id. § 163(d) (1982) (providing the investment interest limitation, cur-
rently being phased out, which is $10,000 for joint returns and singles, but $5000 for married filing
separately); id. § 163(h)(3) (Supp. V 1987) (providing the qualified residence interest deduction,
which permits deductions for two residences in the same manner for a joint reiurn as for a single
person, but which under § 163(h)(5)(A)(ii) limits married persons filing separately to only one
residence each); id. § 179(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (limiting the election to expense depreciable
business assets, which is $10,000 for joint returns and singles, but $5000 for married filing sepa-
rately); id. § 217(b)(3) (1982) (providing the two moving expense limitations for housing, which are
$3000 (purchases) and $1500 (leases) both for joint returns and for singles, but reduced to $1500
and $750, respectively, for married filing separately); id. § 219(g)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1987) (providing
the pension plan applicable dollar amounts, which are $40,000 for joint returns, $25,000 for singles,
but $0 for married filing separately).
Some sections seem to evidence a new category of specially disfavored taxpayers: married
spouses filing separately who did not live apart at all times during the taxable year. These include:
id. § 86(c) (providing the Social Security exclusion base amount, which is $32,000 for joint returns,
$25,000 for others, but $0 for married filing separately and not living apart); id. § 469(i)(5) (provid-
ing limitations to the $25,000 offset to the passive loss rules for rental real estate activities, which
treat joint returns and singles in the same manner, provide only half of such amounts to married
filing separately, but nothing at all to separate filers not living apart at all times during the taxable
year).
Also generally unfavorable to married persons are those sections imposing floors to deductibil-
ity that are expressed as a percentage of adjusted gross income. Aggregation of the spouses' in-
comes increases the threshold floor amount. that must be exceeded in order to qualify for the
deduction. These sections include: id. § 67 (providing a 2% floor on miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions); id. § 165(h)(2)(A)(ii) (providing a 10% floor for personal casualty losses); id. § 213(a) (pro-
viding a 7.5% floor for medical expenses). These floors are determined as a percentage of the AGI
on the return, whether it is joint or separate, and thus the floor may be lowered by filing sepa-
rately, and in some cases that will result in a net tax saving.
An income ceiling to the earned income credit under § 32(b)(2) phases out the credit as a
percentage of AGI. See id. § 32(b)(2). Aggregating income is thus disadvantageous to married tax-
payers, but married persons must file jointly in order to claim the credit at all and thus cannot
escape aggregating their incomes.
Aggregation of income is also unfavorable for the § 21 dependent care credit, because the
percentage of employment related expenses (household services and dependent care) allowable as a
credit declines as aggregate AGI exceeds $10,000. See id. § 21(a)(2). The fact that the couple's
employment related expenses are aggregated on a joint return will not help because the credit is
also limited to the amount of the lesser-earning spouse's earned income under id. § 21(d)(1)(B).
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"mandatory in fact".266 The benefits of income splitting, comparing now
the permissible statuses of filing jointly versus married filing separately,
are highly variable, depending upon the amount of the couple's total
joint income and the degree to which the earnings of the spouses are
disproportionate.267 The greatest benefits, as a percentage reduction of
taxes over separate filing, are enjoyed by upper middle class, single-
earner families. In principle, the maximum absolute amount anyone
could save filing jointly over filing separately through the rate system
alone is 3194 dollars, and this saving would be available to single-earner
couples having a taxable income between 34,350 dollars and 71,900
dollars.2 8
For both larger and smaller household incomes there may be no
The problem cannot be avoided by filing separately, because a married person cannot claim the
credit at all except on a joint return, unless (i) the taxpayer is legally separated under a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance, or (ii) the taxpayer maintains a separate household (of which the
spouse is not a member during the last six months of the year) for more than half the year that is
the principal abode of a qualifying dependent, and furnishes over half the cost of maintaining such
a household. Id. § 21(e)(4).
A few dollar limited deductions do not appear unfavorable to joint filers, at least in the sense
that such filers are no worse off than two single persons. These include: id. § 151 (1982) (personal
exemption amounts); id. § 911(b)(2) (Supp. V 1987) (exclusion of up to $70,000 per year of foreign
earned income).
At least one dollar limited deduction may sometimes put married taxpayers filing jointly in an
even better position than two single persons: § 1244(b) allows a deduction for losses on small
business stock of $50,000 per year, or $100,000 for married persons filing jointly, even if only one
spouse suffered the entire loss. See id. § 1244(b) (1982).
Finally, the limitations on the charitable deduction in § 170(b), which are expressed as per-
centages of AGI, may also sometimes favor joint filers because the aggregation of income may
produce a greater AGI and hence a higher ceiling to the deductible amount. See id. § 170(b) (1982
& Supp. V 1987).
It is difficult to estimate how many of the couples currently filing separately do so for reasons
of privacy rather than for tax benefits. Also, some couples may file separately because a state tax
advantage outweighs the federal tax disadvantage, and the state tax rules require use of the same
filing status as that used for federal purposes. For example, the Connecticut progressive tax on
dividends and capital gains in excess of certain floor amounts undoubtedly induces some couples to
file separately in order to split such items between joint owners on two returns.
266. See Bittker, supra note 117, at 140 n.55.
267. The benefits of income splitting derive entirely from the progressive rate structure. Tax-
ing couples by doubling the tax on one-half of their combined income can only produce a savings if
some income is thereby moved into a lower tax bracket. In a flat rate tax system, income splitting
would have no effect. The more equal the spouses' incomes, the smaller the benefits. A married
couple with exactly equal incomes derives no benefit from income splitting as such, because the
joint tax is always equal to twice the tax on one-half the combined incomes filing separately.
268. This result is calculated as follows: filing jointly, an extra $14,875 of the husband's taxa-
ble income will be taxed at 15% rather than 28%, for a savings of $1934. Next, the wife's exemp-
tion of $2000 and standard deduction of $2500, which are useless to her if she has no income, will
permit an additional $4500 of the husband's income otherwise taxable to the husband at 28% to
escape tax altogether on a joint return. With taxable income over $71,900, however, the 15%
bracket begins to be phased out under § 1(g), and the benefits decline. This calculation ignores the
effect of exemptions for dependents and the odd effect of the last sentence of § 1(g)(2). See I.R.C.
§ 1(g)(2) (Supp. V 1987).
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benefit at all to filing jointly. At 1989 rates, if either spouse has taxable
income over 71,900 dollars, the five percent surtax under section 1(g),
which phases out the fifteen percent bracket, effectively eliminates all
brackets lower than twenty-eight percent, and the effect is that of a flat
tax.2' 9 For such persons there no longer may be any rate advantage to
filing jointly, but joint and several liability applies nevertheless.
At lower income levels the benefits of income splitting are hardly
any more proportional to the liabilities assumed. The following example
illustrates this point: A two-earner family with two children and com-
bined income of 38,300 dollars,10 of which the wife earns 12,500 dol-
lars211 and the husband 25,800 dollars, would pay 3795 dollars in taxes
filing jointly at 1989 rates. Filing separately, the wife's taxes would be
1200 dollars (taking one exemption) and the husband's would be 2910
dollars (taking three exemptions), making the couple's combined taxes
filing separately 4110 dollars. The couple's combined saving from filing
jointly is thus 315 dollars, or 7.7 percent of the combined taxes filing
separately. The saving results entirely from the fact that 2425 dollars of
the husband's taxable income is moved from the twenty-eight percent
into the fifteen percent bracket.
If none of the couple's income is in the twenty-eight percent
bracket filing separately, the couple will save nothing by filing jointly.
Thus, for two-earner couples in which each spouse earns more than
4500 dollars, the 2500 dollar standard deduction plus 2000 dollar ex-
emption amount, and whose higher earner does not earn more than
23,375 dollars,27 2 there is no saving by filing jointly. Because these in-
come figures are very close to the national mean, it appears that a very
substantial number, probably over one-third, of all two-earner couples
may receive no benefit at all from joint filing under 1989 rates.27 If the
269. This was evidently the intended effect. Because of an apparent drafting error, however,
the last sentence of § 1(g)(2) treats the phase out of the 15% bracket and of the personal exemp-
tions for separate filers as if they filed jointly, with bizarre results for high income couples. Some
would incur a penalty as high as $3867.50 for separate filing (those with joint taxable incomes over
$250,000, which is relatively evenly divided between them), and others would incur a benefit from
separate filing of as much as $546 (certain couples with joint taxable incomes over $180,000, but
divided very unequally between them). The results seem unintended. See Stuchell, The Married
Filing Separately Anomaly-Is This What Congress Intended?, 42 TAX NOTES 241, 242-43 (1989).
270. Two-earner families had a median income in 1986 of about $38,300, and one-earner fam-
ilies of about $25,800. STATISTCAL ABSTRACT, supra note 43, at 428.
271. Under this assumption, the wife would be contributing 32.6% to total family earnings.
The median was 26.7% in 1980. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BULLETIN 298, TIME OF CHANGE: 1983
HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, tables 1-12, 1-13, at 18-19.
272. These calculations still assume the example with two children. The figure is $19,375 or
less if no children and $21,375 if one child.
273. Many would nevertheless suffer a small marriage penalty because the standard deduc-
tion is $3000 for a single person, but only $2500 for a married person. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) (Supp.
V 1987). The marriage penalty in the example above is $150. Does this couple have a tax benefit of
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lower earners in such couples became aware of the joint return liability
they are assuming, and that it is gratuitous and without any benefit to
their spouses or themselves, the number of joint returns filed could
drop precipitously in favor of filing separately, and the IRS would be
overwhelmed with a flood of new returns.
3. Cost Is Borne by the Wrong Spouse
The cost of joint liability usually is paid by the wrong person. The
husband ordinarily benefits most (or exclusively, as in the above exam-
ple) from income splitting as the higher or sole earner, but it is the wife
who incurs the larger additional liability for his taxes. She may herself
receive little or no benefit from the tax saving, unless one makes the
assumption that reducing the husband's taxes always directly benefits
the wife. Even when tax refunds are divided equally, as may be com-
mon in divorces, the respective liabilities assumed by the spouses are
often greatly disproportionate.
In the above example, the wife incurs an additional potential liabil-
ity of 2687 dollars,7 4 which is more than eight times greater than the
joint saving.2 7 5 It should be noted that the wife's taxes would be identi-
cal whether she files jointly or separately; all the saving is on the hus-
band's side of the return.
The above examples concern liability only for taxes that are explic-
itly shown due on the return. If the return is incorrect, and it is later
found that some of the husband's income was not declared or deduc-
tions relating to his income are disallowed, the wife becomes liable for
the resulting deficiencies, together with penalties and interest, unless
she can qualify for relief as an innocent spouse.
Finally, it should be noted that deficiencies are far more likely to
be caused by the husband's misreporting of tax items than by the
wife's. Tax cheating is risky behavior, which is probably more common
in men than in women.27 6 Husbands also generally have more opportu-
$315 (filing jointly over filing separately) or a tax detriment of $150 (filing jointly because they are
not permitted to file as two single persons)?
274. This amount is 70.8% of the joint taxes, which is the husband's proportional share of
the taxes filing jointly. The husband assumes an additional liability of $1108.
275. If one makes the assumption that the savings from joint filing are not shared evenly, but
that each spouse keeps his or her own share, the imbalance between costs and benefits becomes
even more striking. In the above example, the wife's 29.2% share of the savings from filing jointly
is $92, but she must assume liability for her husband's $2687 share of the joint taxes, which is an
amount 29 times greater than her share of the joint saving.
It is likely in many cases that the IRS saves more by joint filing than the wife, because it is
spared the cost of processing an extra return.
276. See Kinsey, Survey Data on Tax Compliance: A Compendium and Review, in AMERI-
CAN BAR FOUNDATION TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE PROJECT WORKING PAPER 84-1, at 32 (Dec. 1984).
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nities both to cheat ard to take aggressive reporting positions than
wives, because men are more frequently self-employed as professionals
or small businessowners than women."" Women are more commonly
employees, and opportunities for salaried workers to take aggressive or
dishonest tax reporting positions are far more limited than for the self-
employed. 8
4. Liability and Rates
There is no necessary connection between joint return tax rates
and joint return tax liability. It is perfectly possible for a tax system to
impose joint liability without providing a beneficial tax rate for married
persons, as federal law did between 1938 and 1948, and as several states
within the United States currently do. 79 A tax system just as easily
may provide a beneficial rate for married couples, including income
splitting, without imposing marital liability, as do Germany and
Belgium, for example.2 80 Of course, a tax system may provide neither a
special rate for joint returns, nor any marital liability, as in several state
income tax systems.28'
B. Justification That Marriage Is an Economic Unit
If joint liability can be justified at all, it is only through an appeal
to some special economic nature of the marital relationship. Implicit in
the spouses' right to offset each other's gains and losses on a joint re-
turn is the idea that each suffers from the losses incurred by the other
because their property is somehow pooled: one flesh, one pocketbook.
Before considering whether the one pocketbook theory is an accu-
rate description of the average marriage, some peculiarities may be
noted. First, the joint return is and always has been optional each year.
The same couple can file jointly one year, separately the next, and then
jointly again without restriction, simply according to which status ap-
277. See id.; see also STATisTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 43, table 627, at 380.
278. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF TAXATION& AM. BAR FOUND., REPORT OF THE SECOND INVITA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE (M. Durst reporter 1988), reprinted in 42 TAX
LAw. 705, 716-21 (1989).
In explicit recognition of this fact, a salaried worker in France is permitted a deduction of
20% of salary just in order to offset the lack of opportunity to understate income. Code General
des Impots (C.G.I.) art. 158-5; see also Martinez & di Malta, Droit Fiscal Contemporain 233 (Paris,
Litec 1985).
279. For example, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Michigan, which all have flat rate taxes, em-
ploy this system. See infra Part VI(B).
280. See infra Part VI(a)(2) (Germany); infra note 318 (Belgium). The vexing question
whether married persons with disproportionate incomes should continue to enjoy a rate advantage
over single persons having the same family income is beyond the scope of this Article, which is
addressed solely to the question of marital liability on joint returns.
281. Iowa and Maryland take this approach on combined returns. See infra Part VI(B).
1990] 377
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
pears more advantageous in any given year. 22
Second, joint liability presumes absolute and total pooling of all
family property. Such a presumption extends far beyond the degree of
sharing prescribed under the community property law of any jurisdic-
tion. All community property regimes recognize some separate property
of the spouses that is outside the community and is neither subject to
division upon divorce, nor reachable by the separate creditors of the
other spouse. Generally, such separate property of each spouse includes
property owned before marriage, to the extent it is not subsequently
commingled, and the separate gifts and inheritances of each spouse
during marriage. 8 Joint return liability is personal to each spouse,
however, and thus all property of one spouse becomes subject to the
other's tax obligation, even property that would be separate property
under community property law.28 4
1. No Actual Sharing of Property Is Required
Couples who file jointly do not necessarily share their property or
income more than couples who file separately. Aggregating income and
deductions for purposes of computing the tax neither requires nor cre-
ates any actual sharing of property. 8 5 Couples are permitted to file
jointly even under circumstances in which it is obvious that they have
no intention of sharing anything. There is no requirement, for example,
that a couple even be living together in order to file a joint return. 8
Many couples file jointly after separating, sometimes pursuant to the
terms of a final property settlement agreement,87 and sometimes even
282. After the due date for filing of either spouse has expired, however, the election to file
jointly cannot be revoked in order to file separate returns. Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-1(a) (1989). This is
of course a necessary backstop to joint and several liability.
On the other hand, a joint return may be filed at any time after separate returns have been
filed within three years of the due date of filing. Id. § 1.6013-2.
283. See Murray, Problems of Taxation of the Income of Spouses in the Context of Divorce
and Separation, 14 COMMUNITY PROP. J., July 1987, at 20, 23.
284. See infra note 318 and accompanying text. Under Belgian law there is no joint and
several liability, but there is a rebuttable presumption that the wife's property may be used to
satisfy the husband's taxes. She can rebut by proving the property is her separate property under
the applicable matrimonial property regime. Id.
285. See infra note 334 and accompanying text. In Germany couples who have elected the
matrimonial regime of separation of property are not permitted to file jointly and cannot enjoy the
benefits of income splitting or of offsetting each other's gains and losses. Id.
286. Congress repealed such a requirement in 1944. See Income Tax Act of 1944, § 11(a), 58
Stat. 231, 240 (1944) (amending § 51(b) of the 1939 Code).
287. A court may not order a person to sign a joint return against his or her will as part of a
property settlement, however, because the Code requires a voluntary election. See Leftwich v.
Leftwich, 442 A.2d 139 (D.C. 1982) (holding that wife could not be forced to sign a 1978 joint
return and thereby incur joint liability when her wages had already been garnished in 1977 and a
lien placed on the family house for husband's failure to pay a $10,000 1977 tax deficiency, still
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after a final divorce decree.288 Quite obviously, such couples intend to
share little or nothing. Couples file jointly whenever it appears that
there is a tax advantage in doing so, or at least when there is no tax
disadvantage, and not because they actually share their property.289
2. Do Couples Actually Share?
Although the government never has made the argument explicitly,
it may be that married couples have been permitted to aggregate their
gains and losses on joint returns since 1918 because it appeared that
couples in fact share all their property as if it were some sort of com-
mon pool. This theory would imply that husbands and wives should be
indifferent as to who holds title to property, which is, on this supposi-
tion, all in the family anyway.290 If these were the government's as-
sumptions about family finances, the facts do not appear to support
them.
In the 1930s and 1940s, husbands and wives usually did not share
all their property to such an extent that they were indifferent as to who
had legal ownership. Tax returns from the period, before income split-
ting was introduced in 1948, show that wealthy married individuals
commonly reported large amounts of investment income from sepa-
rately owned property on separate returns. Moreover, many of the tax
reduction techniques of the 1930s and 1940s involving family partner-
ships, short term trusts, and the like had as their common denominator
the husband's retention of control of capital assets while diverting some
unpaid at time of decision, although husband characterized her stand as "spiteful vindictiveness").
288. Under § 6013(d)(2), a couple need only be married, and not "separated under a decree
of separate maintenance," as of the last day of the taxable year to be eligible to file jointly. See
I.R.C. § 6013(d)(2) (1982). Thus a couple that divorces on January 1 can still file jointly on April
15 for the prior year. It is not altogether clear what "separated under a decree of separate mainte-
nance" means, however. See Robinson & Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time: Marital
Status As a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAx REv. 773, 802-06 (1989).
289. In 1973, however, Representative Richard Fulton of Tennessee introduced the so called
"Bonnie Bill." H.R. 9325, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 24,253 (1973). This bill would have
required any couple wishing to take advantage of income-splitting to attest to an oath stating that
both spouses in fact had "equal ownership, management, and control of the income, assets, and
liabilities of the marriage partnership, with penalties for perjury and fraud inhering to the
oath."'" 119 CONG. REC. 11,821 (1973) (statement of Rep. Richard Fulton, including testimony of
Virginia Cavan given before the House Ways and Means Committee), cited in Robinson & Wenig,
supra note 288, at 775 n.4.
Cf. infra note 334 and accompanying text (requiring that income splitting is permitted only
for couples living under a regime of community property).
290. This line of thought would suggest that technicalities of ownership between husband
and wife should be ignored in order to avoid opening the door to maneuvering and tax evasion.
The argument was made in defense of the Wisconsin income tax that was declared unconstitu-
tional in Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
The Wisconsin tax required aggregation of family income, including children's income, and
imposed joint and several liability on all persons whose income was aggregated. Id. at 213.
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or all of the annual income, and taxes on the income, to the wife. If
husbands had been willing simply to transfer some capital to their
wives outright, no such artful schemes would have been necessary.291
These observations apply only to couples who owned investment
assets, and perhaps nothing can be deduced regarding the vast majority
of couples who were less affluent. On the other hand, couples who en-
joyed no more than their current income probably were constrained to
spend it all on living expenses, which necessarily involved some sharing.
In order to be any more precise, one would need to know which spouse
had control of spending decisions. Little information appears to be
available on the subject from that period. If contemporary behavior is
any guide, however, one may assume that the person who earned the
money also exercised control over spending.292
3. Recent Studies of Family Sharing
Two recent surveys of contemporary intrafamily financial behavior
do not point in the direction of complete sharing of income or savings
as the family norm. Shere Hite reports in a study of 4500 question-
naires returned by American women, half of whom were married, that
seventy-five percent of wives who work are working at least in part for
the financial independence it brings, and that eighty-two percent of
women under twenty-five say they never want to be financially depen-
dent on a man.293 These women clearly do not regard their property as
belonging equally to their husbands. Hite further reports that only
thirty-six percent of two-earner married couples pool their income into
one account. From the anecdotal evidence presented, it appears that
such couples typically may be young or have low incomes.29 ' The rest
either split expenses evenly, usually out of separate accounts (twenty-
eight percent), or each pays for specific expenses (thirty-two percent),
apparently also out of separate accounts. 95 Hite's study did not reveal
statistics about sharing of savings or capital assets, but presumably
such sharing is much less common than for current expenses, especially
for assets owned before marriage.296
291. See generally Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in
the 1940s (Legal History Program, Institute for Legal Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Law School Working Paper 2:5) (1987), reprinted in revised form in 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259
(1988).
292. See infra Part V(B)(3).
293. S. HITE, WOMEN AND LOVE: A CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN PROGRESS 432, 438 (1987).
294. Id. at 445.
295. Id. at 443-47.
296. See Dulude, supra note 52, at 88-89 (discussing Pahl, Patterns of Money Management
Within Marriage, 9 J. Soc. POL'Y 313, 314 (1980)). Dulude summarizes Pahl's findings as follows:
Applying this information to determine whether spouses generally pool and share all or
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Blumstein and Schwartz, in their study of some 12,000 American
couples, reported that more than two-thirds of married persons favor
pooling over keeping money separate.91 According to the study, women
generally favor keeping their own money separate more than men be-
cause it gives them some autonomy to make purchases without having
to ask permission of their husbands. The percentage of married persons
reported to favor pooling increased with the number of years the per-
sons had been married. Pooling seems to be regarded as an index of
commitment to the marriage, and prenuptial agreements that limit
pooling are regarded as evidence of a limited commitment.29
Blumstein and Schwartz' findings are somewhat ambiguous for our
purposes, however, because the authors inquired into attitudes toward
pooling and not into actual behavior. Because their respondents re-
garded pooling as an index of commitment to marriage, and commit-
ment is seen favorably, it follows that the respondents also will regard
pooling as desirable. For that reason, the results probably cannot be
taken as a measure of actual sharing without serious risk of overstate-
ment. For example, a key question asks whether "the two partners
should pool all their property and financial assets," '99 which presuma-
bly includes even assets acquired before marriage. Sixty-three percent
of women and sixty-seven percent of men married two years or less an-
swered in the affirmative.300 It seems unlikely, however, that couples in
such numbers actually transfer their separate property into joint owner-
ship upon getting married. The newlywed husband may think of his car
as now theirs, but it probably will not occur to him to change its
registration.
Blumstein and Schwartz found that the more strongly their respon-
dents believed in marriage as a lifetime institution, the more likely they
were to favor pooling. Approximately half of the married persons with-
out strong commitment to the institution of marriage favored pool-
most of their income and assets, the answer we get is yes and no. Yes, it appears that couples
with very low incomes do share everything because they have no choice. At the other end of
the scale the answer is no; spouses who each have substantial incomes and assets do not tend
to share much at all. Among middle-income people, sharing seems most common when the
spouses are young and have similar incomes and least frequent when the wife has no income
and stays home. In fact, with the single exception of the very poor, the earnings and assets of
couples are generally controlled and managed by the spouse who has legal title to them.
Id. at 89. Dulude's interpretation of Pahl's study has been criticized, however, partially upon the
ground that Pahl's reports all derive from a center for battered women and are therefore unrepre-
sentative. See McIntyre, Tax Justice for Family Members After New York State Tax Reform, 51
ALB. L. REV. 789, 792 n.17 (1987).
297. P. BLUMSTEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 94-109 (1983).
298. Id. at 96.
299. Id. at 608.
300. Id. at 95.
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ing.301 The authors concluded that the more couples are committed, the
more they favor pooling, and the more people pool, the more committed
they become. 0 2 This conclusion seems very plausible, as does the con-
verse: the less couples are committed, the less they favor sharing, and
the less they share, the less they are committed. It follows that the
couples most likely to divorce are those least likely to pool their assets.
Thus, in the most critical cases-those involving separation and di-
vorce-the one pocketbook model of marriage provides the least sup-
port for imposing joint return liability.
4. Sharing Cannot Justify a Shift in Liability
At most, one might assume that each spouse is to some extent eco-
nomically benefited if the other spouse has property or income, because
the burden of household expenses may be shared. This observation
might indicate that the family's ability to pay taxes is enhanced when
there are two earners, 303 and that married couples should therefore be
taxed on their aggregate incomes and should not be permitted to file
separately using the same rate as unmarried persons. The argument,
however, cannot justify any transfer of tax liability from one spouse to
the other, and it may be noted, the Treasury never has advanced any
such argument.
VI. MARITAL LIABILITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Foreign Jurisdictions: Marital Liability in the United States Is
Unique
No other country in the developed world permits its government to
collect a husband's taxes from a divorced wife. The United States is
unique, at least among the major industrial nations, in making hus-
bands and wives personally liable for payment of each other's income
taxes as a general rule. The trend among the developed nations is to-
ward individual taxation, and away from joint or family taxation. As of
1977, of the twenty-four nations in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), fourteen allowed separate taxa-
tion of husbands and wives, and seven of those had adopted separate
301. Id. at 104.
302. Id. at 559 n.8. Note, however, that the divorce rate is at or above the national average in
all the community property states. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 43, table 134, at 88. This
may tend to contradict the general statement, or more probably, it may mean that community
property law has little or no effect on sharing during the marriage.
303. For characteristic expressions of this assumption, see Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S.
206, 219-20 (1931) (Holmes, J., dissenting); H.R. REP. No. 1040, supra note 78, at 19-20, reprinted
in 1941-2 C.B. at 429. Both expressions were made in the context of justifying compulsory aggrega-
tion of income for married persons in a progressive rate system.
[Vol. 43:317382
1990] INCOME TAX LIABILITY 383
taxation since 1970.04
Even in countries in which the couple or the family is treated as
the basic tax unit for computational purposes, it is rare for spouses to
be held liable for each other's taxes, particularly for the taxes on earned
income. Of the major industrial countries, only the United Kingdom,
France, and the United States impose any marital liability for the other
spouse's earned income.305 In the United Kingdom, marital liability ap-
plies only to the husband; the wife never can be taxed on the husband's
incomeY°6 In France, the wife may be taxed on the husband's income if
she still is living with him in the same household, but separated, di-
vorced, widowed, or abandoned women virtually are exempt from mari-
tal liability under administrative practice. 07 The United States appears
to be alone in requiring women in such situations to pay their (ex-)hus-
bands' taxes.
The rate of divorce in the United States is by far the highest in the
world: twice as high as in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Swe-
den, or West Germany; three times higher than in France; and twenty
times higher than in Italy.30 8 It is thus particularly striking that the
United States is alone in allowing its government to collect a husband's
taxes from his divorced wife, because it is in the United States that
304. OECD countries having individual taxation before 1970 were as follows: Australia, Can-
ada, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, and Turkey. Those adopting some form of individual
taxation between 1970 and 1977 were Austria (1973), Belgium (1976), Denmark (1970), Finland
(1976), Italy (1977), Sweden (1971), and the United Kingdom (1972).
OECD countries having joint taxation in 1977 were the following: Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. Countries listed as having family
taxation were France and the Netherlands. See COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE TREATMENT OF FAMILY UNITS IN OECD MEMBER
COUNTRIES UNDER TAx AND TRANSFER SYSTEMS 15-17 (1977). Ireland, Norway, and the Netherlands
have since introduced separate taxation for earned income. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE TAX SYSTEMS:
EUROPE, CANADA, AND JAPAN 8 (J. Pechman ed. 1987) (Netherlands) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE
SYSTEMS].
While the trend is clear, the actual situation in many of the countries listed is a great deal
more complex and difficult to classify than the above list would suggest. "Joint" taxation is ambig-
uous. It may mean that returns may or must be made jointly of aggregate income of the spouses; it
may mean in addition that special rates apply to such joint returns; and finally it may mean that
the spouses are jointly liable for some or all of the tax under varying circumstances.
305. See generally COMPARATIVE SYSTEMS, supra note 304. No marital liability is imposed at
all in Australia, Canada, Japan, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. See generally id. Neither Germany nor
Belgium imposes joint and several liability of the spouses, despite the provision of joint returns
with favorable income-splitting rates in both countries. See infra notes 318, 333-34 and accompa-
nying text.
306. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
307. See infra notes 316-31 and accompanying text.
308. See S. HzwLETr, supra note 39, at 412 n.55. In 1983 it was projected that half of all first
marriages in the United States would end in divorce and that 41% of all people of marriageable
age would at some time experience a divorce. P. BLUMSTEIN & P. ScHwARTZ, supra note 297, at 33-
34.
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women have the greatest need for protection from consequences of
divorce.
Moreover, in most European countries divorced women and their
children are afforded far greater economic protection than in the
United States. In Sweden and France, for example, a government
agency pays court ordered amounts of support directly to the wife, and
the husband pays the support to the agency. These payments are guar-
anteed to the wife, whether or not the husband honors his support obli-
gation. If the husband is unable to provide a sufficient amount for
reasonable support in the first instance, courts will order adequate sup-
port in any case, and the agency will make up the difference. 09 Also,
many European countries have government provided day care and gen-
erous policies of maternity leave for working mothers, as well as univer-
sal free health care.310 These benefits relieve divorced women in Europe
from significant economic burdens faced by women in the United
States. The insecure economic position of divorced women in the
United States is exacerbated by the tax rule imposing joint return
liability.
The United Kingdom has an extraordinarily complex and archaic
system of rules31' under which the husband alone is required to file a
return of aggregate family income, and sometimes may be held liable
for the wife's taxes, unless certain elections are made. As of April 6,
1990, however, the United Kingdom will abolish the old system and in-
stitute separate returns with separate liability for the tax.3 12 The cur-
rent system will therefore not be described here.
Most other countries, including Canada, Australia, and Japan, have
only separate returns and no liability shifting.313 Some other countries
require the higher earning spouse to pay the tax on the other spouse's
investment income, as in the Netherlands. 14 Sweden imposed the same
rule until 1987, when it switched to completely separate returns and
separate liability."1 '
309. S. HEWLETT, supra note 39, at 68; see also McLindon, supra note 41, at 401.
310. See S. HEWLETT, supra note 39, at 91-99.
311. See Kerridge, Taxation and Marriage, 47 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 77 (1988). Kerridge wrote of
the United Kingdom's system:
Nobody in his right mind would, were he asked to draw up a set of rules for the taxation of
married couples, consider enacting from scratch a system remotely resembling the shambles
we have today. It is the result of a series of historical accidents and owes little or nothing to
any particular view or purpose.
Id. at 77 (footnote omitted). Exactly the same might be said of the American system.
312. See Finance Act 1988, § 32, sched. 14, Part VIII, repealing Tax Act 1988, § 279; see also
E. SIMON'S TAXES § 5.103A.
313. See COMPARATIVE SYSTEMS, supra note 304, at 22.
314. See id. at 8 (Netherlands); id. at 26-27 (Japan).
315. See id. at 5.
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A brief sketch of the rules for the income tax liability of husbands
and wives in two European countries that do impose some form of lia-
bility shifting, although more in theory than in practice, will provide
some useful comparisons. The countries to be examined are France and
Germany.
1. France
Married persons living together in France are taxed on a household
basis (foyer fiscal) and are required to aggregate their income, together
with that of their children under eighteen years old, and report it on a
joint declaration signed by both spouses. 16 A family quotient system
not only permits income splitting for husband and wife, but also allows
additional splitting for minor children. Thus, a husband and wife each
has one "part" for calculating the family quotient, the first and second
children have one-half part each, the third child one part, the fourth
and succeeding children again one-half part each. i7 The aggregate
household income then is divided by the number of parts, the progres-
sive tax rate is applied to the quotient, and the resulting tax is then
multiplied by the number of parts again to determine the final tax.
A married woman may be forced to pay her husband's taxes in
France, but relief provisions make such collections very rare in practice,
unless the couple still is living together at the time of collection. 18 Each
spouse is jointly liable (tenu solidairement) for the entire tax, including
penalties and interest.31 9 Either spouse may apply for release from the
joint obligation of payment, however, by requesting administrative re-
lief (juridiction gracieuse). The relief will be granted in cases in which
it appears that the spouse has been a victim of the other spouse's irre-
sponsibility, that the spouse has not been complicit in any fraud, or
that the spouse is financially incapable of bearing the burden of the
joint obligation.32 0 Simple nonpayment by the other spouse qualifies as
316. See Code General des Impots (CGI) 170-1.
317. CGI Arts. 193-196.
318. In contrast, Belgium has a system of income splitting on household tax returns which is
similar to that of France, but does not impose joint and several liability. See Bolus, La Femme
Mariee: Un Contribuable a Part Entiere, in REFLEXIONS OFFERTES A PAUL SIBILLE: ETUDES DE Fis-
CALITE 190-97 (1981). The government may attempt to collect the husband's taxes out of the wife's
property in Belgium (after exhausting its remedies against the husband) under a provision impos-
ing a presumption of fraud, but the wife may defend by showing that the property in question is
her separate property under her marital property regime. The presumption of fraud provision
seems more akin to transferee liability than joint return liability. As in France, there is a right to
contribution under private law to the wife who is forced to overpay. See id.
319. CGI Art. 1685.
320. Instruction Administrative of Feb. 18, 1985, 5-B-10-85, no. 14; see also Letter from M.E.
Barbier, Bureau Francis Lefebvre, to Monsieur Richard Beck (Oct. 12, 1987).
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irresponsibility. 2 '
The Treasury has directed that special protection is to be given to
divorced or abandoned wives, particularly those who subsist on modest
salaries or have heavy family responsibilities. The discharge of liability
usually does not extend, however, to the portion of tax due to the wife's
own earnings.322 In practice, it appears that more than eighty percent of
the separated or divorced wives who apply for relief are completely re-
lieved of liability for the husband's share of the tax3 23 Because collec-
tion proceedings against the wife cannot begin until all remedies against
the husband are exhausted, very few such cases occur.
A taxpayer may appeal an unfavorable decision by the tax adminis-
tration to an administrative court, but the decision can be reversed only
on grounds of an error of law, error of fact, obvious error of valuation,
or abuse of discretion. 24 The courts do not appear especially generous
in granting such appeals, but it is difficult to be sure because the re-
ported cases publish very few facts.
Before the enactment of the law 82-1126 of December 29, 1982, the
husband alone filed and signed the household tax return, and he alone
had standing to deal with the tax authorities. He was primarily liable
for the household's income tax, and the wife was secondarily liable.
32 5
Although her liability was joint and several, the government was very
circumspect in applying the rule against widows, divorcees, and aban-
doned wives. A Treasury directive states that before proceeding against
the wife, all efforts to tax the husband first must be exhausted. If the
husband has disappeared, attempts must be made to trace him through
the fiscal services, police, and gendarmerie.26
If the government does proceed against the wife after all efforts to
tax the husband are exhausted, relief from joint liability through
juridiction gracieuse is available as a last resort. This procedure for
administrative relief formerly applied only to the wife. The law of De-
cember 29, 1982, equalized women and men in tax matters, giving both
spouses equal rights to contest the tax, requiring both spouses to sign
the return, and granting to the husband for the first time the right to
request remission from joint liability through juridiction gracieuse.3 27
The new law also removed the requirement of proceeding against the
321. Id.
322. Letter from Vincent Durufle, Inspecteur Adjoint, Tresorerie Principale de Neuily s/
Seine, to Richard Beck (June 25, 1988).
323. Id.
324. See Mine. Anne-Marie Popon, Conseil d'Etat, Section du Contentieux, 6 Janvier 1984.
325. See Letter from M.E. Barbier, supra note 320.
326. See Inst. CP 7 Juillet 1980, 80-118-Al. The "Gendermarie" is a sort of a national guard.
327. See Letter from M.E. Barbier, supra note 320.
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husband first, and now apparently requires that the responsible spouse
be proceeded against first on a gender neutral basis.3 28
Although France has a statutory community property regime that
is both optional and highly variable by agreement, it is altogether irrel-
evant to the determination of income tax on earned income.2 9 Accord-
ing to one commentator, many people in France are under the
misapprehension, however, that if they have elected not to live under
the community property law, joint and several liability does not apply
to them.38 0 As in the United States, France recognizes a right to contri-
bution between the spouses under private law for overpayment of one
spouse's share of the joint liability, despite joint liability under the tax
law.331
2. Federal Republic of Germany
The West German tax system permits married couples to elect ei-
ther separate assessment (getrennte Veranlagung) or joint assessment
(Zusasmmenveranlagung).3 3 2 If a couple elects joint assessment, the
progressive rates may be abated through income splitting: the tax is
then equal to twice the tax on half of the spouses' combined incomes.333
The election may be made by couples living under either of the two
community property regimes discussed below. The election is not avail-
able to couples living under a separate property regime (Gutertren-
nung), however, on the ground that such couples live under the
applicable family law economically as individuals. 4
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Droit Fiscal, n. 127, Nov. 14, 1987, p. 7.
331. Memento Pratique Francis Lefebvre, para. 90, rem. 2.
332.. Einkommensteuergesetz (EStG) 26.
333. EStG 32 a V. The Federal Republic of Germany introduced income splitting in 1957 in
imitation of American law, following a 1957 decision of the German Supreme Court invalidating
prior law. Prior law had made joint returns requiring aggregation of the spouses' incomes compul-
sory and caused two-earner married couples to pay higher taxes than if they were unmarried, cite
This law was struck down on the ground that it constituted an impermissible burden on marriage
and violated article 6(1) of the German Constitution, which guarantees special protection of the
State to marriage and family. Grundgesetz [GG] art. 6 (W. Ger.). No special rate for married filing
separately was enacted, because that too would have been unconstitutional for the same reason. No
such rate was needed in any case, because there is no equivalent in Germany to the Poe v. Seaborn
decision. See K. TwKc, STEUERRECHT 28-29, 298-99 (9th ed. 1983).
334. See K. TwKE, supra note 338, at 300.
German family law provides for three different regimes governing matrimonial property. Un-
less the spouses elect either separate property (Gutertrennung) or community property
(Gutergemeinschaft), they are governed by the regime of community of gains (Zugewinngemein-
schaft). For a short description of these regimes, see Angerhofer v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 814, 820-
29 (1987).
Under the Gutergemeinschaft regime, both spouses own property jointly as a marital commu-
nity, including gains acquired during marriage, and the community property (Gemeingut) is jointly
1990]
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Spouses electing joint assessment become joint debtors (Gesamt-
schuldner) for the entire tax .335 Nevertheless, the tax authorities cannot
actually enforce collection from either spouse of the tax by levy
(Zwangsvollstreckung), except in proportion to that spouse's income, if
either spouse applies for limitation of liability (Beschrankung der Haf-
tung).336 Thus, if the wife, for instance, earned nothing, nothing could
be collected from her against her will.33 7 Either spouse may request the
limitation of tax liability at any time before the tax liability is finally
extinguished through levy or otherwise. The limitation causes the tax
liability to be divided according to the respective incomes of the
spouses. A tax that already has been paid can no longer be so
divided.3 38
The division of tax liability is made through a fictive separate as-
sessment of each spouse.33 9 Then, the proportion of each spouse's sepa-
rate tax to the total of their separate taxes is determined, and that
managed, unless by agreement it is managed by one spouse subject to restrictions protecting the
other spouse's interest in the property. Upon divorce, the property is divided equally between the
spouses. BOrgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) § 1471 (W. Ger.). A deceased spouse's half share of the
marital property belongs to his or her estate and thus passes to that spouse's heirs. Id. § 1482.
Under this regime each spouse clearly would have a "present, vested interest" in the community
property in the sense of Poe v. Seaborn.
For income tax purposes, however, tax liability depends entirely upon the activity of the
spouse who earned the income, and not at all upon the community property status of the earnings
or gains. Thus, earned income is taxable to the spouse who earned it, notwithstanding that it is
community property under the Gutergemeinschaft regime. Further, profits from community busi-
ness property are taxable to the spouse whose management activity produced them. HHR Kom-
mentar 26a Anm. 4e. In Angerhofer it was held that the Zugewinngemeinschaft regime did not
qualify as community property under Poe v. Seaborn, on the grounds that each spouse owns and
manages his or her own property separately, and upon divorce has only an equalization claim
against the other spouse for the cash value of half the increase (Zugewinn) in the other spouse's
estate to the extent such increase exceeds the increase in the claimant's own estate. Angerhofer, 87
T.C. at 827. The equalization right of the spouse with the lesser Zugewinn is lost entirely if the
marriage is terminated by death rather than by divorce, and because it is not descendable unless
the marriage ends inter vivos, the equalization claim is not a "present, vested interest" in the sense
of Poe v. Seaborn. Id. In order to buttress this conclusion, Judge Parr observes that for purposes
of the German income tax, spouses living under the Zugewinngemeinschaft and filing separately
would be taxed only on their own earned income, and not, as the petitioners desired, on half of
their combined income. Id. at 828. But the same is true for the Gutergemeinschaft regime, which
clearly would qualify as community property under Poe v. Seaborn.
335. Abgabeordnung (AO) 44.
336. Hermann/Heuer/Raupach, Einkommensteuer- und Korperschaftsteuergesetz mit
Nebengesetzen Kommentar, 19th ed., ("HHR Kommentar") EStG 26b Anm. 6.
337. Letter from Professor Klaus Tipke to Richard Beck (May 13, 1987).
338. HHR Kommentar 26b Anm. 6.
339. See HHR Kommentar EstG 26a Abs. 2 Erlauterungen. For purposes of the separate
assessment, some personal deductions may be divided between the spouses in any way they may
decide (e.g., charitable contributions), others must be divided evenly (e.g., the allowance for handi-
capped dependents), and still others must be allocated only to the spouse who incurred the ex-
pense (e.g., insurance premiums). Id.
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fraction is multiplied by the total joint tax to be divided.3 40 In this way
the beneficial rates of income splitting are preserved, but each spouse's
liability for his or her share of the reduced tax is limited to that propor-
tion of the total taxes he or she would have paid if each had been as-
sessed separately.34' Refunds of overpaid taxes are made only to the
spouse who paid the tax. 42 If both spouses paid taxes, the refund is
payable to each spouse in proportion to his or her tax payments and
without regard to which spouse's income caused the tax liability.3 43
B. States in the United States
1. A Variety of Approaches
The state income tax systems in the United States exhibit almost
every possible combination of rate structures and liability rules for tax-
ing husbands and wives. Some patterns, however, may be discerned. No
state apparently allows income splitting without joint return liability.
All states that provide for joint returns except North Dakota require
joint return liability, some by statute and others by administrative
practice.3 44 Six states provide for combined (two-column) returns, ei-
ther alone or in addition to joint returns, and four of these states im-
pose no joint liability for the combined return. 5
Most states require joint filing if the taxpayer elected joint filing at
the federal level, thus making the joint return liability compulsory,
when applicable. 46 About half of the states now provide for some inno-
cent spouse relief modeled on the federal rules, and there is a growing
tendency to enact such rules into the state tax statutes.4 7
Two states have no joint returns and impose no joint liability for
filing combined returns that provide a separate column of tax items for
husband and wife: Missouri and North Carolina, both with progressive
rates.3 48 Two states impose no joint liability for combined returns, but
also provide for joint returns that do require joint return liability: Iowa
340. HHR Kommentar 26b Anm. 3.
341. This method is identical to the method used by the RS to calu!ate each spouse's sepa-
rate share of a refund from a joint return year, and it is the netbod recommcnded in this Article
for reform of United States tax law.
342. HHR Kommentar 26b Anm. 9.
3J-3. Id.
344. See, e.g., COLO. RE-. STA.T. § 39-22-103(11) (Supp. 1988); ,'ee also N.D. 'Lax Dep't Mem.
(June 24, 1968) (prepared by Kenneth M. Jakes, Counsel).
345. See infra notes 348-51 and accompanying text.
346. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-107 (Supp 1988).
347. See infra notes 362-77 and accompanying text (discussinig Calitorniq'. innocent spouse
provisions).
348. Se Mo. A.i. STAT., § 143.491 (Vernon 1976); N.C. GEN, STAT. § 10-152.1 (1989).
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and Maryland. 49 Colorado and New York recently abandoned such
combined returns.35 0 Arkansas and Virginia alone impose joint liability
for both combined returns and joint returns.3 5'
Arranged according to the type of tax rates imposed, flat, single
table progressive, and two or more table progressive, the liability rules
are as follows:
Of the seven states with flat taxes, which provide no rate advantage
to filing jointly, all impose joint return liability. Four of these states
provide innocent spouse relief (Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, and
Michigan), 52 and three do not (New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee).5 S
Of the thirteen states that have a single progressive rate, making
joint filing disadvantageous for two-earner couples, all impose joint re-
turn liability. Seven of them provide some form of innocent spouse re-
lief (Arkansas, Colorado, District of Columbia, Iowa, Montana, Ohio,
and South Carolina),3" and six provide none (Connecticut, Delaware,
Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, and Virginia). 5
Of the twenty-seven states with two or more tax rates, providing an
income-splitting advantage to joint filers, all impose joint return liabil-
ity. Eleven provide some innocent spouse relief (Alabama, California,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Utah, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin),3s5 and eight provide no relief (Arizona, Ha-
waii, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and
Oregon). 57
Of the two states with piggy back taxes measured as a percentage
of federal tax liability, both impose joint return liability and innocent
349. See Letter from Don Flockhart to Richard Beck (June 21, 1988) (Iowa); Letter from
Louis L. Goldstein to Richard Beck (June 17, 1988)(Maryland).
350. See N.Y. TAx LAW § 651 (Consol. 1989); Letter from Stan Williams to Richard Beck
(June 23, 1988)(Colorado).
351. See Letter from William E. Keadle to Carl Gensib (Nov. 2, 1988)(Arkansas); Letter
from Danny M. Payne to Richard Beck (July 11, 1988)(Virginia).
352. See, e.g., Letter from Jacqueline R. Elledge to Richard Beck (July 1, 1988)(Illinois);
Letter from Katherine Reid to Carl D. Gensib (Sept. 27, 1988)(Indiana).
353. See Letter from Paul R. Lambert to Carl D. Gensib (Jan. 20, 1989)(New Hampshire);
Letter from Lewis J. Levin to Richard Beck (June 21, 1988)(Pennsylvania); Letter from Allan S.
Curtis to Carl D. Gensib (Nov. 16, 1988)(Tennessee).
354 See, e.g., Letter from William E. Keadle to Carl Gensib (Nov. 2, 1988) (Arkansas); Let-
ter from Edward M. Mony to Richard Beck (June 27, 1988) (District of Columbia).
355. See, e.g.,-Letter from Hilda E. Lay to Richard Beck (June 17, 1988)(Maine); Letter from
Danny M. Payne to Richard Beck (July 11, 1988)(Virginia).
356. See, e.g., Letter from Deborah Ann Fondren to Richard Beck (June 24, 1988) (Ala-
bama); Letter from Jerry A. Roberts to Richard Beck (June 14, 1988) (Georgia).
357. See, e.g., Letter Barbara M. Dickerson to Richard Beck (June 22, 1988)(Arizona); Letter
from Joyce Seray to Richard Beck (July 12, 1988)(New Mexico).
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spouse relief.358
Most states that provide innocent spouse relief follow the federal
standards of section 6013(e). Some states, however, have their own re-
lief statutes, which differ from the federal rules. In New York, the state
statute is identical to section 6013(e), except that New York considers
100 dollars rather than 500 dollars a "substantial understatement."35 9
On the other hand, with respect to the significant benefit test, one case,
eventually reveresed on appeal, ruled that a taxpayer could fail to ob-
tain innocent spouse status in New York although she succeeded in fed-
eral court in a jury verdict against the IRS on the same issue.3 60 Finally,
some states have their own standards of administrative relief. In Idaho,
for example, the Tax Commission may abate the tax in particular cases
if it would cause undue hardship.3 61 California is unique in respect to
relief provided to innocent spouses and will be considered separately
below.
2. California
California is a community property state with a progressive per-
sonal income tax that is not based on the federal income tax. Joint re-
turns are permitted, which allow income splitting.362 California imposes
no marriage penalty because the same rates apply to married taxpayers
filing separately as to single taxpayers.6 Joint returns require joint and
several liability,3 64 but California's relief provisions are significantly dif-
ferent and more liberal than the provisions under the IRC. The relief
takes several forms.
First, there is a provision roughly equivalent to section 6013(e) at
section 18,402.9 of the California Revenue and Tax Code,36 but with
the following significant liberalizations: there is no requirement that
items of deduction, basis, or credit have no basis in fact or law-it is
enough that an item of deduction be "erroneous"; 6 6 and there is no
requirement that the understatement be "substantial," thus removing
358. See Letter from Robert A. Gross to Richard Beck (June 10, 1988)(Vermont); Letter
from Donald C. Gross to Carl D. Gensib (Nov. 7, 1988)(Rhode Island).
359. N.Y. TAx LAw § 651(b)(A), (B) (Consol. 1989).
360. In re Sabatine, No. 800025 (N.Y. Div. Tax App. Dec. 17, 1987). The hearing officer's
decision was based on the fact that the significant benefit test was deleted from the federal statute
as a separate requirement, retroactively to the years in question, but was still in effect under New
York law. This questionable reasoning subsequently was overturned. In re Sabatine, No. 800025
(N.Y. Tax App. Tribunal 1988).
361. See Letter from Daniel D. John to Richard Beck (June 24, 1988).
362. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 17045, 18402 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
363. Id. § 17041.
364. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18,555(b) (West 1983).
365. Id. § 18,402.9 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
366. Id. § 18,402.9(a).
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all dollar limitations from relief."' 7
Next, there are two entirely different and unique relief provisions
affecting joint returns, which have no IRC equivalents. Section
18,555(b), enacted in 1976, gives jurisdiction to a court in a proceeding
for dissolution of marriage to revise the tax liability of a spouse to be
proportionate to his or her income 68 The only limitations to this power
are that (1) relief cannot be given from liability for income earned by or
subject to the exclusive management and control of the spouse;6 9 (2)
liabilities that already have been paid cannot be revised; 70 and (3)
clearance must be obtained from the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) if re-
portable gross income exceeds 50,000 dollars or if the tax liability re-
lieved exceeds 2500 dollars.71 Under section 18,555(b) a spouse need
not prove either innocence or inequity. Spouses, however, must be in
divorce court in order to benefit from this provision,3 7 2 which is unfor-
tunate because it appears to create an unwelcome incentive for sepa-
rated spouses to seek a divorce.
Finally, section 18,555(c), enacted in 1982, provides much needed
relief in the all too common situation in which the joint return was cor-
rect, but the tax was unpaid. 73 The FTB may revise liability of one
spouse to be proportional to the income that spouse earned or subject
to that spouse's exclusive management and control, except for taxes al-
ready paid.3 74 There are, however, unfortunate innocence and inequity
limitations. First, the spouse must be innocent of the nonpayment,37 5
with the burden on that spouse to establish that he or she did not know
of the nonpayment and had no reason to know of it at the time the
return was filed.37 6 Second, a determination must be made after thirty
367. See id. It should be noted that both of these liberalizations were recommended recently
for the IRC in Borison, supra note 209. The California changes were introduced in 1977, before
which time the law was equivalent to the IRC.
368. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18,555(b) (West 1983).
369. Id. § 18,555(b)(1).
370. Id. § 18,555(b)(2)(B). For a discussion of I.T. 1575 and the federal treatment of this
issue, see supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
371. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 18,555(b)(2)(D) (West 1983).
372. See id. § 18,555(b).
373. See id. § 18,555(c).
374. Id. § 18,555(c)(1)(A).
375. The innocence requirement seems misconceived. Suppose husband and wife live to-
gether, husband has substantial income but wife has none, and neither is in a position to pay taxes
(husband has temporarily run out of money). The wife has no good choices, apparently. If she
signs jointly to give her husband the benefit of lower rates and he does not pay later, the wife can
get no relief from joint return liability. She cannot file separately, however, without incurring com-
munity property liability under Poe v. Seaborn for the tax on half of her husband's income, and no
relief is available there, either, because she lives with her husband and has knowledge of his
income.
376. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18,555(c)(1)(B)(2) (West 1983).
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days notification to the other spouse as to whether under all the facts
and circumstances it would be inequitable to hold the spouse liable for
the nonpayment.77
VII. IMPLEMENTING PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY
A. Calculation of Separate Liability
1. No Other Changes Necessary
Repeal of joint return liability would be a major step forward both
in fairness and simplicity. Unlike much recent tax reform, repeal will
result in no increased learning and compliance costs for taxpayers. For
a rule that has been in the tax statutes for over fifty years, it may seem
surpising that joint return liability can be repealed without making any
other changes in the tax system. Our current system of four different
rate tables easily can be retained unchanged after repeal of joint and
several liability.'78 The issue of liability is entirely independent of issues
of tax rates. The administrative convenience of filing a single joint re-
turn rather than two separate returns also could be retained because
the issue of liability is likewise independent of any questions of report-
ing format.3 79
No constituency is likely to oppose repeal of joint return liability,
and so no transitional rules will be needed. Repeal will create no poten-
tial for tax avoidance, and so no antiabuse rules will be required. The
only costs involved in repeal apparently will be the IRS's increased ad-
ministrative costs of assessing and collecting from the correct taxpayer
in each case.
2. Separate Tax Formula
The repeal of joint and several liability will require a formula for
determining the separate proportional liability of each spouse on a joint
return. Fortunately, such a formula exists and is currently employed in
several other contexts for related purposes. The formula may be found
in the rules for calculating each spouse's separate share of a refund
377. Id. § 18,555(c)(1)(B)(4).
378. No inference should be made that the current rate system is satisfactory, however. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to address such issues, but for a discussion of the advantages of
strict individual filing by all persons whether married or not, with one tax table for everyone, see
Gann, Abandoning Marital Status As a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L.
REV. 1 (1980); Munnell, The Couple Versus the Individual Under the Federal Personal Income
Tax, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 247-78 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin eds. 1980); Rosen, Is It Time
to Abandon Joint Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 423 (1977). For a study of the complexity of the current
system, see Robinson & Wenig, supra note 288.
379. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, both joint returns and income split-
ting are allowed, but liability is proportional. See supra Part VI(A)(2).
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from a joint return;380 in the rules that determine for estate tax pur-
poses the deductible amount of an income tax liability of a decedent's
estate on a joint tax return;8 ' and in the rules for determining a
spouse's right to contribution, or to a refund, under local law.382
All these rules are based upon the same principle: that a joint re-
turn does not alter the underlying property rights of the spouses. A
joint return is not a conveyance of property and does not convert in-
come of one spouse into property of the other.383 The method of deter-
mining each spouse's share of the joint tax obligation is the same in all
cases. Each spouse's share is the amount that bears the same ratio to
the total tax due on the joint return, as the amount of tax for which the
spouse would have been liable if he or she had filed separately bears to
the total of the amounts for which both spouses would have been liable
if they both had filed separately. In this way, a proportional part of the
rate advantage of joint filing is preserved in each spouse's share of the
joint liability. The formula is thus:
separate liability = separatjoint tax
both spouse's separate taxes
3. Refunds
The usual rule for refunds is that a single check made payable to
both spouses is sent to the address on the joint return. If the spouses
are separated, however, each spouse may file an amended joint return
signed by that spouse alone to claim his or her share of the refund. In
such a case, the IRS will send to that spouse a separate check, limited
to the amount of the joint overpayment that is proportional to the tax
liability the spouse would have had if both spouses had filed separately.
Several recent Revenue Rulings have called this the "separate tax
method of allocation" or "separate tax formula. '38 4 No refund, can be
380. See infra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.
381. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-6(f) (1958).
382. See infra notes 390-92 and accompanying text.
383. See, e.g., Rosen v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that spouses
have separate interests in any overpayment which is apportionable to the extent each spouse con-
tributed to the overpaid tax).
384. See Rev. Rul. 80-6, 1980-1 C.B. 296 (applying the separate tax method of allocation);
Rev. Rul. 80-7, 1980-1 C.B. 296 (applying the separate tax formula); Rev. Rul. 80-8, 1980-1 C.B.
298 (applying the separate tax method of allocation).
The rule provides that the overpayment is creditable or payable only to the spouse who actu-
ally made payments in excess of his or her own separate liability, but only to the extent aggregate
payments of both spouses exceed their aggregate liability. In other words, the separate overpay-
ments are credited only to the proper payor, but the refund is limited so as not to create a
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made except to the actual payor(s) of the overpayment, however, and
then only to the extent the payment(s) exceed the couple's aggregate
tax liability. Thus, if one spouse overpays his or her own separate liabil-
ity, but not the aggregate liability, that spouse has made a voluntary
and nonrefundable assumption of the other spouse's tax liability. This
practice was, or at least should have been, the rule of I.T. 1575.85
4. Refunds from Net Operating Loss Carryovers
Similar rules apply to limitations on the use of loss carrybacks and
carryovers from one year to another when the spouses were married and
filing jointly in one of the years, but were not married to each other in
the other year. According to the general rule, losses are personal to each
taxpayer and can only be used to offset the separate income of that
taxpayer in another year. Thus, an allocation using the separate return
formula must be made for one or both years.
If the taxpayer reported the loss on a joint return, each spouse's
share of the loss must be determined, and only that spouse's share may
be carried to a year in which the taxpayer was unmarried or married to
a different spouse.3 8 If a joint loss with one spouse is carried forward to
a year when the taxpayer is married to a different spouse with whom he
or she files jointly, an allocation must be made for that year also in
order to prevent the loss from offsetting income of either the current or
the former spouse. 8 7
5. Setoff of Refunds
These rules work to benefit the Treasury to the extent that the
question is one of limiting the use of losses. The rules also may work in
the taxpayer's favor, however, when the question is whether the IRS
may use a refund due on a joint return to offset a separate tax liability
of one of the spouses relating to a different year. To the extent that the
overpayment is due to one spouse's payment in excess of that spouse's
proportional liability, it cannot be used to offset a separate tax liability
of the other spouse. The overpayment must be refunded to the spouse
who paid it.388 In the absence of proof of the relative contributions of
deficiency.
385. See supra Part III(C), (D).
386. See Rev. Rul. 60-216, 1960-1 C.B. 126, amplified, Rev. Rul. 65-140, 1965-1 C.B. 127.
387. See Rev. Rul. 75-368, 1975-2 C.B. 480 (citing Calvin v. United States, 354 F.2d 202 (10th
Cir. 1965) (limiting net operating loss carryover sustained by a woman prior to marriage to the
amount of her own income reported on joint return and not using it to offset any income of her
husband)).
388. See Maragon v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 365 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (finding tax withheld in
excess of woman's separate liability on joint return for 1951 must be refunded to her and cannot be
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the spouses to the joint tax liability, however, the entire refund may be
credited against the separate tax liability of one spouse.3 89
6. Nontax Property Rights
Similar rules apply to determining ownership rights to tax refunds
in other, nontax areas of the law. It has been held, for example, that
when one spouse is bankrupt, only that spouse's share of a refund from
a joint return may be claimed by the trustee in bankruptcy.39 Simi-
larly, when an overpayment in a joint return was due entirely to pay-
ments from a deceased husband, the refund was required to be paid
entirely to decedent's estate rather than to the widow, notwithstanding
the fact that the widow would have been jointly liable for any
underpayment.3 91
Finally, as noted above, if the tax is underpaid and one spouse is
forced to pay more than his or her share on the ground of joint return
liability, the overpaying spouse has a right of contribution under local
law against the other spouse for the amount overpaid.39 2 The amount of
the overpayment is calculated according to the same proportional
method as in the other situations.
7. Apportioning Items of Income and Deduction
In order to apply the separate tax formula, one must first be able
to calculate the tax liability of each spouse as if he or she had filed
separately. That requires apportioning items of income, deduction, ex-
clusion, and credit on a joint return to one or the other of the spouses.
The current rules for allocating such items on separate returns of mar-
ried people are fairly clear although there is very little authority on the
subject. The paucity of caselaw may mean that the rules are on the
whole quite workable and give rise to very little controversy. On the
other hand, it may indicate that the issues simply have not arisen be-
cause so few married persons living together file separately.3 93 The Joint
Committee on Taxation has said that such allocations would be unduly
complex if all married persons were to file separately, but it offered no
used to offset husband's deficiency for 1944 when spouses had filed separate returns).
389. See United States v. Nowicke, No. 84-14 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 20, 1987).
390. See In re Wetteroff, 324 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Mo. 1971), af'd, 453 F.2d 544 (8th Cir.
1972).
391. See, e.g., In re Estate of Carson, 83 N.J. Super. 287, 199 A.2d 407 (P. Div. 1964). See
generally Annotation, Right of Surviving Spouse to Tax Refund from Joint Income Tax Return,
67 A.L.R.3d 1038 (1975).
392. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
393. B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs § 111.3.2 (1981).
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arguments to substantiate the assertion.94
More than 800,000 married persons file separate returns each
year.3 95 In view of such numbers, it appears significant that there has
been so little litigation over issues of allocation. It is not known, how-
ever, how many of such persons are living with their spouses at the time
of filing. Issues of allocation would be more difficult for such persons,
because establishing the facts of payment presents inherent difficulties
whenever finances are commingled, even if the legal rules are
unambiguous.
The rules themselves are easily stated. Income from community
property and jointly owned property is divided equally between the
spouses, even if one spouse actually receives all the income.9 6 Deducti-
ble items that are paid out of community or jointly owned funds are
ordinarily divided equally between the spouses. Items paid out of sepa-
rately owned property, however, usually are deductible only by the
payor spouse, even if the payment is for a joint obligation.3 97 Nonethe-
less, even when payments are made out of a joint account or a separate
account of the other spouse, if the taxpayer can prove that the funds
used were his or her own, the taxpayer will be entitled to the entire
deduction. If the source of the funds cannot be traced, one-half of the
deduction is allowed to each spouse. 9B
For certain items, such as interest and taxes, it is also necessary
that the payor be liable for the obligation. Thus, for example, if the
husband makes payments of interest and taxes on a house owned by
the wife, he will not be allowed the deductions. 9 Charitable donations,
394. For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation in its General Explanation of the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 stated, in connection with the enactment of the two-earner de-
duction designed to mitigate the "marriage penalty": "Allowing married couples to file separate
returns as single taxpayers would have been very complex because of the necessity for rules to
allocate income and deductions between the spouses." Id. at 33. The Joint Committee on Taxation
gave no arguments or examples, however. By contrast, when the House of Representatives pro-
posed in 1941 to require joint returns of all married couples without joint and several liability,
apportionment of separate liability did not appear to raise any problems. For an example of the
proposed apportionment, see H.R. REP. No. 1040, supra note 78, at 10-11, reprinted in 1941-2 C.B.
at 420-22.
395. Individual Income Tax Returns 1985, IRS Publication 1304, table 1.3 (Rev. 1988).
396. See Finney v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1976) (holding interest and stock
distributions from joint accounts taxable one-half to husband even though wife received and used
all the funds because husband had unrestricted right to withdraw funds from the accounts).
397. See Jolson v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1184 (1944).
398. See Finney, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1507-08 (finding interest portion of mortgage pay-
ments on house owned by the entirety fully deductible by husband because husband met burden of
proof that funds were traceable to him, but holding real estate taxes deductible one-half to each
spouse in absence of such proof).
399. See Johnson v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 868 (1980) (holding interest and taxes
paid by legally separated husband for house owned by wife not deductible by him because he was
not the obligor, even though he was guarantor in the event of her default).
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casualty losses, and investment losses are deductible only by the owner
of the property contributed or lost.4 00
The exemption for dependents is allowable on a separate return
only to the spouse who provides over one-half of the dependent's sup-
port for the year.401 Considerable litigation in the past has grappled
with the issue of which spouse is entitled to the exemptions. Most of
the pressure probably was relieved by the rules enacted in 1984, which
automatically allocate exemptions for children to the custodial spouse
in cases of separation and divorce, unless the parents otherwise agree.40 2
8. Problems in Current Rules for Apportionment
These rules create two difficulties. One is that tracing of funds is
occasionally necessary, which may require burdensome recordkeeping.
The other is a problem of fairness. The spouse who spends earnings on
the couple's nondeductible household expenses may be deprived of a
fair share of the couple's deductions, for example, if the other spouse
makes all payments of deductible amounts out of his or her separate
funds.40 3 The all or nothing rule for exemptions seems arbitrary and
always will be somewhat unfair if both spouses have earnings because
both spouses ordinarily can be expected to make some contribution to
household expenses, and therefore to the support of dependents. Allo-
cating all dependent exemptions to the higher earning spouse will cause
the other spouse's share of the joint tax to be inappropriately high.
Such issues would not appear to present a significant problem
under a regime of proportional liability. The issue raised for the per-
sonal deductions is similar to the situation in which one spouse pays
some or all of the other spouse's share of the joint taxes out of his or
her separate funds.0 4 In both cases, it simply may be a question of
Under certain circumstances, however, such payments may qualify as deductible alimony
under § 215 if they meet the conditions of § 71. In addition, the deduction for interest and taxes
still should be allowable to the recipient regardless of whether the payments are an indirect gift or
indirect alimony.
400. See, e.g., Loewenstein v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1112 (1968) (finding that
where complete and valid gift of property had been made to wife, casualty loss deduction allowable
only to her and not to husband).
401. I.R.C. § 152(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
402. If both spouses fail to meet the test because they are deemed each to have provided
exactly half of the dependent's support under community property law, the exemption will be
allowed to either spouse, but may not be divided between them. See IRS Publication 555 (Rev.
Nov. 1985); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-22-012 (Feb. 20, 1981).
403. Note that one spouse is not permitted to claim the standard deduction filing separately
if the other spouse elects to itemize. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(6) (Supp. V 1987).
404. If the joint taxes are not overpaid as a result, no refund can be made to the payor
spouse, because such a refund would create a joint deficiency. See supra notes 90-91 and accompa-
nying text (discussing I.T. 1575).
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which spouse writes the check for a particular expense. If the spouses
desire to pay their own precise shares of the joint tax obligation, it is
probably not unfair to require them to arrange between themselves to
do so.
9. Personal Deductions and Dependent Exemptions Should Be
Allocated in Proportion to Adjusted Gross Income
These problems could be avoided, however, if the federal rules were
changed to conform to the rules now in effect in a number of state in-
come tax systems. Most states require the spouses to divide personal
deductions and/or exemptions between them according to the federal
rules; 40 5 some states allow allocation in any way the spouses choose;406
other states require an equal division;407 and still others require or allow
the spouses to divide deductions and exemptions between them in pro-
portion to their respective adjusted gross incomes (AGI).05 On the
whole, it appears that the latter method is likely to be the most fair.
Each spouse automatically would be entitled to a share of the deduc-
tions and exemptions that is proportional to his or her income, and at
the same time, cumbersome recordkeeping would be avoided. This ap-
proach would be particularly sensible for the dependent exemptions.
Business deductions would continue to be allocated only to the business
in which they arise, and property losses only to the owners of the
property.409
Spouses who wish to file separately for purposes of privacy and
405. For example, Nebraska follows this practice. See Letter from Cynthia A. James to Carl
D. Gensib (Sept. 28, 1988).
406. For examples of such states allowing allocation of both personal deductions and depen-
dent exemptions, see Letter from Steve Bender to Richard Beck (June 14, 1988)(Montana); Letter
from Danny M. Payne to Richard Beck (July 11, 1988)(Virginia). For states permitting allocation
of dependent exemptions only, see Letter from Barbara M. Dickerson to Richard Beck (June 22,
1988) (Arizona); Letter from Joyce Spray to Richard Beck (July 12, 1988) (New Mexico); Letter
from Rodgers L. Way, Jr. to Richard Beck (June 15, 1988)(Ohio).
407. For states requiring the 50-50 allocation, see Letter from Daniel D. John to Richard
Beck (June 24, 1988)(Idaho)(both); Letter from Gerald Yates to Richard Beck (June 21,
1988)(Mississippi)(exemption only); Letter from Edward M. Many to Richard Beck (June 27,
1988) (District of Columbia)(deductions only); Letter from Mark D. Bugher to Carl D. Gensib
(Nov. 14, 1988)(Wisconsin) (deductions only).
408. See, e.g., Letter from William E. Keadle to Carl Gensib (Nov. 2, 1988) (Arkansas); Let-
ter from Edward M. Many to Richard Beck (June 27, 1988) (District of Columbia).
Rosen reported that the results obtained in measuring the marriage tax or subsidy were not
materially affected when alternate methods of allocating itemized deductions were used, including
allocation in proportion to the spouses' AGI. Rosen, supra note 263, at 572. While it may make
little difference as to the aggregate tax paid, it seems likely to affect materially the burden of the
spouses inter sese.
409. Ultimately, the allocation of these deductions would depend on local law. It may be that
the wife's ownership rights under local law are unfair and discriminatory. Such issues are beyond
the scope of this Article.
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who do not wish to disclose their AGI should be allowed to continue
using the current rules. If they cannot agree on who paid which
amounts and cannot agree to disclose their incomes, the deductions and
exemptions should be allocated by giving fifty percent to each.
The proposed rules are a much smaller departure from current fed-
eral rules than they first might appear. The personal deductions cur-
rently are limited to the payor only in appearance, because the spouses
may plan ahead to choose who will make the payments. One spouse can
even make cash gifts to the other in order to enable him or her to make
payments and thereby transfer the deduction. In short, the present sys-
tem is de facto largely elective, but only for those few who understand
the rules. The proposed rule of automatic allocation in proportion to
AGI would eliminate traps for the unwary and produce a fair result in
the vast majority of cases, without any need for recordkeeping. In addi-
tion, the rule would preserve the elective aspect of the current rules for
those few taxpayers who may have some reason to require it.
B. Transferee Liability
1. Abuse Potential
If Congress abolished joint and several liability, would opportuni-
ties arise for taxpayers to abuse the new rules? One might imagine, for
example, that a two-earner couple could plan for the wife to accumulate
property with her earnings, while the husband paid all the family living
expenses, ran up large debts, and became insolvent and unable to pay
his taxes. If the tax law viewed the wife's accumulated property as hers
alone, the IRS would not be able to levy on it to pay the husband's
delinquent taxes. One difficulty with such a scheme is that the husband
will continue to owe his taxes, a debt that usually cannot be discharged
even in bankruptcy,41 0 and therefore he never will be able to enjoy his
own earnings or property again without paying. I
In the same example, if tracing problems make it difficult to iden-
tify actual transfers of property from the husband to the wife, or if
transfers were made at a time when the husband was still solvent and
410. Tax debts generally are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(7),
523(a)(1) (1988). Tax payments could be deferred for up to five years, however, in the context of a
Chapter 13 reorganization. Id. § 1322(a)(2).
411. If the wife has bought the accumulated property with funds transferred from the hus-
band, and the husband is insolvent or becomes insolvent as a result, the IRS can reach that prop-
erty without invoking joint return liability, because the wife will be liable as a transferee.
Transferee liability is completely independent of marital status, and applies whenever property is
transferred without adequate consideration, if the transferors are insolvent and unable to pay their
taxes at the time of or as a result of the transfers. See I.R.C. § 6901 (1982). For a detailed discus-
sion of transferee liability, see infra notes 414-36 and accompanying text.
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other losses in subsequent years made the husband insolvent, the gov-
ernment would appear to be without a remedy. On the other hand,
there appears to be no abuse potential in this situation. As noted above,
the husband would always owe his taxes, including interest and penal-
ties, even after bankruptcy. If taxes could be avoided on any significant
scale using such methods, some married couples might do so now. They
could simply file separately to avoid joint return liability. The necessity
of foregoing the relatively small benefits of income splitting, if any,
would scarcely serve as a deterrent.412
2. Separation and Divorce
Collusion would be much less likely in cases of separation and di-
vorce, because property is usually divided between the spouses at arm's
length. Could the government's legitimate interests be unfairly
prejudiced even without collusion? The following hypothetical illus-
trates the problem. Assume the husband has unreported income or a
large refund because of an abusive tax shelter. The wife acquires prop-
erty from him that is derived from the untaxed income pursuant to a
separation agreement. A deficiency is later assessed against the husband
because of such items. If the husband had paid his taxes correctly, the
couple would have had less property to divide, and the wife would have
received a smaller share. In effect she received property that should
have been paid to the government. Absent joint return liability, how-
ever, the IRS could not proceed against the wife under these circum-
stances, unless transferee liability applied.
If the husband in this example is solvent and the IRS satisfies the
full deficiency out of his share of the divided property, the wife inevita-
bly will enjoy some inequitable enrichment. Because the husband's tax
items gave rise to the deficiency, however, it does not seem inequitable
to place the burden of payment on him alone. He should be held re-
sponsible for calculating his taxes correctly, and he is in the better posi-
tion to correct or defend against a proposed adjustment. Moreover, he
is in a better position to know of the potential tax liability.413
If the IRS experiences difficulty or finds it impossible to collect
from the husband, the IRS should not be permitted to proceed against
the wife under joint return liability on the supposition that she can
later recover from him through her right to contribution. If the IRS
412. It is noteworthy that nearly every other government in the world manages to collect its
taxes without resorting to joint return liability. See generally supra Part VI(A).
413. If the husband is aware of potential tax liabilities at the time of divorce that would
materially diminish the amount of marital property to be divided, he can insist that the property
agreement itself require the spouses to share contingent tax liabilities or to put property in escrow
to pay such liabilities.
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cannot collect the tax from the husband with all the resources at its
disposal, it seems very unlikely that the wife will be able to do so.
3. Transferee Liability
If Congress repeals joint return liability, the IRS may be expected
to rely on transferee liability as a substitute. If the IRS cannot collect
from the husband because he is insolvent, transferee liability often will
apply to permit the government to collect part or all of the deficiency
from the wife. Transferee liability for taxes depends upon state law of
fraudulent conveyance or federal bankruptcy law, when applicable, and
puts the IRS in the same position as a private creditor seeking to set
aside a conveyance,of property by an insolvent debtor.414 This proce-
dure usually will ,require the IRS to prove that the husband was insol-
vent at the time of transfer of property to the wife, or that he became
insolvent as a result of the transfer and that the property was trans-
ferred without adequate consideration. 415 When inadequate considera-
tion supported the transfer, fraud is presumed and the creditors need
not prove actual fraudulent intent on the part of either the debtor or
the transferee.416 Transferee liability therefore can apply even to a wife
who is an innocent spouse within the meaning of section 6013(e). 17
Even if adequate consideration supports the transfer, however, if the
wife is aware of or participates in her husband's fraud on his creditors,
the transfer may be. set, aside as fraudulent.418
It is important to note that transferee liability cannot apply unless
the husband is insolvent and unable to pay at the time of attempted
collection, as well as at the time of the transfer.419 Thus, if the IRS is
restricted to exclusive reliance on transferee liability because joint re-
turn liability is unavailable, that will automatically have the desirable
effect of forcing the IRS to exhaust all remedies against the husband
414. I.R.C. § 6901 .(1982).
415. State law may differ as to what constitutes adequate or fair consideration. See T. EISEN-
BERG, BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 282 (1988). Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act a transfer from husband to wife may be presumptively fraudulent without regard to the
amount of consideration. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(b)(1), 7A U.L.A. 653 (1985).
416. See, e.g.,.Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680 (1972) (applying Montana law and setting
aside a transfer of a $10,000 certificate of deposit to the taxpayer's wife without consideration
where the embezzler husband was insolvent at the time of transfer because an unassessed tax
liability of over $115,000 from unreported income exceeded his total assets of $46,429).
417. In Mysse the court held the wife to be an innocent spouse with respect to § 6013(e)
because she had no actual or constructive knowledge of the embezzlements and received no signifi-
cant benefit beyond ordinary support. She was nevertheless liable as a transferee for her husband's
taxes to the extent of the transfer. Id. at 696.
418. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska, 661 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Wilkey v. Wax, 82
Ill. App. 2d 67, 225 N.E.2d 813 (1967); see also infra notes 423-24 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 415-17 and accompanying text.
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before proceeding against the wife.
4. Transferee Liability and Divorce
The question frequently has arisen whether property transferred
by the husband to the wife in exchange for her marital rights pursuant
to a separation agreement constitutes an exchange for adequate consid-
eration within the meaning of state fraudulent conveyance law as well
as under similar federal bankruptcy law. Here one must distinguish be-
tween the wife's rights to support or alimony, children's rights to sup-
port, and the wife's ownership rights to marital property.
When property is transferred to the wife in lieu of alimony and in
exchange for a waiver of her rights to support, courts often have held
the transfer to be supported by adequate consideration, thus putting
the property beyond the reach of creditors, including the IRS.'2 ° On the
other hand, the matrimonial dispute or separation must be genuine,
and the wife's right to alimony must be both enforceable and reasona-
ble in amount.' If the wife would not be entitled to alimony under
state law, her waiver of such rights is worthless and does not constitute
fair consideration.2
Even when the wife's rights to alimony are real and valuable, a
transfer still may be set aside if the circumstances indicate that the
wife was aware of or participated in her husband's fraud on creditors. 23
A woman's failure to mention her husband's debts to a divorce court
when she is aware of them constitutes fraud when the decree leaves the
husband without means to satisfy his creditors. 2' It has been held that
420. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Batson, 70 Misc. 2d 8, 332 N.Y.S.2d 714 (Sup. Ct.
1972) (holding wife's right to alimony and to widow's right of inheritance election "fair considera-
tion" under New York debtor and creditor law).
421. See id. at 11-12, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19 (denying debtor's and wife's motion for sum-
mary judgment because genuine issues of fact existed regarding the validity of the marital dispute
and separation on the eve of litigation, and as to the actual value of the wife's rights surrendered
in exchange for the debtor husband's property).
422. See Brown v. Borland, 230 Neb. 391, 432 N.W.2d 13 (1988) (setting aside insolvent hus-
band's transfer of his interest in jointly owned residence in exchange for wife's right to alimony
pursuant to separation agreement when alimony would not have been awarded by a court due to
husband's poor work history and prison sentence, and when wife was self-supporting).
423. See Wilkey, 82 Ill. App. 2d at 67, 225 N.E.2d at 813 (setting aside transfer of all debtor
husband's assets to wife in lieu of alimony pursuant to divorce decree when wife was aware that
husband was under threat of imminent litigation for damages by widow of man whom husband
had murdered and presuming "fraud in fact" from circumstances even when consideration is
present).
424. See Alaska, 661 F. Supp. at 727. Insolvent husband who was the defendant in a suit to
recover several million dollars obtained through medicare fraud transferred all of his assets consti-
tuting a $200,000 insurance claim to his wife in exchange for her rights to alimony pursuant to a
divorce decree. The transfer was set aside as fraudulent because the husband did not defend the
divorce action, and neither the husband nor the wife informed the divorce court of the welfare
1990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
a wife without knowledge of the insolvent husband's tax debts is an
innocent purchaser of his property in exchange for a waiver of her valu-
able rights to support pursuant to an antenuptial agreement, and in
such circumstances the transfer may not be set aside.425
The question whether a wife's waiver of rights to child support in
exchange for an insolvent husband's transfer of property constitutes
fair consideration sufficient to overcome transferee liability is more
problematic. It has been held that although a wife may waive support
rights, a minor child may not.4 26 Because the husband will remain liable
for child support no matter what provision is made by transfer of prop-
erty into a trust or otherwise for the benefit of children, a waiver of
rights to child support does not constitute consideration. Thus, a trans-
fer of property by the boxer Joe Louis in trust for his children at a time
when he was insolvent, but made without fraudulent intent, was set
,-ide to pay income taxes.427 On the other hand, it has been held that
transfers of real property by an insolvent husband pursuant to divorce
"in lieu of alimony" into two trusts for the benefit of minor children,
with life estates reserved respectively to the husband and wife, were
supported by adequate consideration except for the life estate reserved
to the husband.2 8 It also has been held that a transfer in consideration
of the wife's agreement not to pursue child support and alimony did not
constitute fair consideration when the wife was self-sufficient and the
husband was without means because a court probably would not award
child support or alimony under such circumstances. 429 That decision
seems to imply that an exchange of valuable antecedent rights to child
support might constitute consideration for a transfer of property if a
couit of competent jurisdiction approved. It may be proper to recognize
some difference between child support and alimony for these purposes,
fraud litigation, of which wife was aware. Id. at 730.
425. In Miele v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Fla. 1986), the court upheld an ante-
nuptial agreement into which the wife entered at a time when her husband faced a prison sentence
on state charges but before the government made tax assessments over the government's objection
that due to insolvency the husband had no separate property out of which to make the antenuptial
settlement or to pay support. The court held the consideration valid, reasoning that the husband
might someday emerge from debt and prison to become financially sound again. The court cited
the Florida Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which requires actual fraud on the wife's part
before a transfer for fair consideration may be set aside, but the government admitted the wife was
without knowledge of the husband's nonfiling of tax returns. Id. at 1000-01.
426. See First Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1958).
427. See id.
428. See Milstead v. Pennington, 268 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1959) (applying Alabama law).
428. See Brown, 230 Ncb. at 391, 432 N.W.2d at 13. The decision was also based upon a
finding that such rights of either kind would relate only to future support, and thus neither would
cunstitute an "antecedent debt" as required under Nebraska's Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act. See id.
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however, because child support, unlike alimony, probably could be
awarded afterwards on the ground of a later change of circumstances,
when rights to both were surrendered in exchange for lump-sum
transfers.
The wife's claim to her share of marital property is adequate con-
sideration to the extent of her prior ownership. It has been held that a
division of community property is not a fraudulent conveyance because
the wife already owned the property transferred.43 0 To the extent prop-
erty is jointly owned in common law jurisdictions, the same reasoning
would hold, unless the joint ownership itself is the result of a fraudu-
lent transfer. The conveyance of an insolvent husband's interest in a
jointly owned residence to the wife pursuant to a separation agreement
has been set aside as fraudulent because she gave up no valuable rights,
but received nearly all the marital property.431 Similarly, under federal
bankruptcy law, a trustee successfully has avoided an insolvent debtor's
transfer of his interest in a jointly owned residence to his wife pursuant
to divorce within one year of his bankruptcy petition because the wife
gave no "reasonably equivalent value" in exchange. The residence con-
stituted nearly all the couple's marital property, and because the
spouses were on approximately equal economic footing, the wife gave
nothing in return for receiving almost all the marital estate.43 2 On the
other hand, such a conveyance has been held valid against creditors
when it was supported by consideration in the form of cancellation of
antecedent debts of the husband to the wife from earlier cash advances,
together with a fresh cash advance to bail him out of jail and obtain a
lawyer.433
Applying the above principles to a division of marital property that
is in the separate name of one spouse who is insolvent due to unas-
sessed tax liabilities, a division of property under an equitable distribu-
tion or similar statute clearly would constitute a fraudulent transfer if
the court or the parties did not take into account tax liabilities of which
the wife is aware. Even if she is not aware of the tax liability, however,
such a division of marital property probably would be voidable for want
430. See Irmgard Santos v. Commissioner, 246 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that a divi-
sion of community property was not a transfer for purpose of transferee liability, because wife
already owned half under state law).
431. See, e.g., Brown, 230 Neb. at 391, 432 N.W.2d at 13 (setting aside husband's transfer of
joint interest in residence to wife under separation agreement under Nebraska Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act because husband was insolvent at time of transfer, even though wife had
made most of the payments on the residence, which were gifts to husband and did not constitute
"fair consideration").
432. See In re Lange, 35 Bankr. 579 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983) (construing Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(2), 550(a) (1988)).
433. See Barbee v. Pigott, 507 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 1987).
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of adequate consideration, because it seems doubtful that her property
rights rise to the level of ownership.43 4 Although the wife's rights to
marital property have been held to be consideration equal in value to
the husband's property transferred to her in United States v. Davis, 485
it would appear that to the extent the value of the marital estate is
reduced by an inchoate tax lien, the wife's property rights to the mari-
tal estate also are diminished, and the consideration for the transfer
would be pro tanto inadequate. If the consideration is inadequate, in-
quiry into the wife's intent is unnecessary, and transferee liability
would apply even if she knows nothing of the husband's tax liability.
Consider the following illustration. Assume the husband has total
assets with title in his name of 300x dollars, all of which is marital
property subject to division. The wife has 100x dollars of her own sepa-
rate property. They divide the marital property by agreement in the
ratio two to one, 200x dollars to the husband, and 100x dollars to the
wife, so that after the division each spouse has 200x dollars of net as-
sets. Subsequently, a tax deficiency is assessed against the husband for
300x dollars, which was an inchoate lien against the marital property in
his name. The husband became insolvent as a result of the transfer to
the extent of 100x dollars. In retrospect, the marital estate was worth
nothing net of the tax lien, and thus the wife's marital property rights
also were worth nothing. All 100x dollars of the transfer would thus be
without consideration and subject to payment of the husband's taxes. If
the tax assessment were for 200x dollars instead, so that the marital
estate was worth 100x dollars net of the tax liability, the husband would
not be insolvent as a result of the transfer because he would be left with
200x dollars after the division of property, and transferee liability
would not apply. The husband would pay the entire tax liability, unless
there was a provision in the separation agreement to share contingent
liabilities, in which case he would seek reimbursement from the wife.
5. Transferee Liability Compared to Joint Return Liability
By contrast, if the wife were subject to joint return liability, all
200x dollars of her assets, including her separate property, would be
subject to levy. Indeed, if the wife inherited additional property from
her family subsequent to the divorce, even that property would be sub-
ject to joint return liability. Moreover, the IRS would not be required to
434. No inference should be drawn that the underlying local law of family property rights is
itself fair and nondiscriminatory. A discussion of such issues is beyond the scope of this Article,
which is limited to the tax consequences of such rights.
435. 370 U.S. 65 (1962) (finding husband's transfer of appreciated stock to wife in divorce a
taxable sale in exchange for her marital rights).
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proceed against the husband first and to prove his insolvency. But the
IRS should not be able to collect more from the wife than the maxi-
mum amount by which she benefited from the husband's nonpayment
of tax. That amount is only the portion of the 100x dollars transfer that
was transferred without consideration. The benefit test under trans-
feree liability is thus much more fair than under joint return liability.
Under joint return liability, the wife is liable for the entire tax defi-
ciency if she is found to have received a significant benefit over and
above ordinary support, even if the deficiency is far larger than her
benefit.
As noted above, an innocence test also is required under transferee
liability in those cases in which consideration supported the transfer, in
order to determine whether the wife is an innocent purchaser for value.
Again, the test is much more fair and rational than under joint return
liability. The wife would be liable as a transferee only if she had actual
intent to defraud creditors, and the IRS would bear the burden of proof
to show that she had actual knowledge of the husband's debts and of
his insolvency at the time of the transfer.43 6
Transferee liability will not be a complete substitute for joint re-
turn liability in all circumstances. If joint return liability is repealed,
inevitably some situations will arise in which the IRS will not be able to
recover property of the wife that is in part derived from untaxed in-
come. Perhaps the most likely situation is one in which a spouse trans-
fers property into joint ownership during marriage, or outright in
divorce, at a time when the husband is solvent, but later becomes insol-
vent for other reasons. In addition, the IRS may have difficulty proving
that the husband was insolvent at the time of transfers made to the
wife long before the husband's tax delinquency was discovered. In such
cases the wife will have profited, although innocently, at the expense of
the IRS. It seems unlikely, however, for reasons discussed above, 43 7 that
such situations are likely to arise frequently or to present a problem
serious enough to require a remedy in anticipation.
It is not possible, and not even desirable, that the IRS collect every
penny of tax that is owing. The social cost of providing the IRS with
excessive collection powers is simply too great to be worth the revenue.
436. See Miele v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Fla. 1986). The government had
conceded that the wife did not know that the husband had failed to file tax returns. The Miele
court said:
For Joanne Miele, the Prenuptial Agreement served one purpose-security. The property was
deeded to the Plaintiff so that she could sell it and use the funds to provide for herself and
for her baby. In the absence of any evidence of intended fraud by the taxpayer or the Plain-
tiff's participation in an alleged fraud, this Court declines to set aside the transfer.
Id. at 1001.
437. See supra notes 420-35 and accompanying text.
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In some circumstances, not collecting taxes is the price of civilization.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Joint return liability should be repealed because it is unfair to all
taxpayers and contrary to the cardinal tax principle of liability mea-
sured by individual income and ability to pay. In addition, Congress
should repeal the rule because in application it is highly discriminatory
against women.
Joint return liability is rooted in long outdated assumptions about
the economic integration and permanence of marriage. Rules holding
spouses liable for each other's taxes have been repealed, or severely lim-
ited, in all other developed countries in which they once existed, and
the rule likewise should be repealed in the United States.
